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ABSTRACT
Pakistan has; experienced significant inflationary; 
pressures in the course of her economic development. Although 
inflation Was often repressed by Government controls, estimates 
based on free market prices existing alongside the controlled 
prices indicate that inflationary pressures have most of the 
time been quite significant. The price;inflation has also been 
partly diverted towards the balance of payments pressure. Monetary 
expansion, caused by large deficit financing operations in the 
Government sector arid bank financed development expenditures in 
the private sector, was often supplemented by substantial increases 
in income'velocity. Nevertheless, monetary factors do not seem to 
.have played as vital a role in generating the ..inflationary pressures 
as the structural factors like.Chronic food shortages and foreign 
exchange bottlenecks. Government’s agricultural and Commercial 
policies were greatly responsible for. these shortages, Foreign;, 
economic aid and the P.L. 480 food imports relieved the general 
inflationary pressures considerably and played an important 
stabilizing role. Nevertheless, the pressure on prices and balance 
of payments has always been significant;
- Evidence shows that inflation has not given much support
to economic growth. Real savings and capital formation have/been so 
much encouraged by rising prices as by the availability of capital 
goods and raw materials. Profits have been mainly determined by 
the degree of competition rather than by the rising prices. On the 
whole, high rates of growth in the economy have been associated 
with low rates of inflation. On the other hand, inflation has
; - -  5 'v.....
 ^ - distoTted the' distribution of real; incbme, Real- wages have
often been adversely affected by; the. rising cost of living 
and the brunt of inflation has been borne mainly by the working 
classes whose wages have risen very reluctantly in the process 
of inflation due to high unemployment and abundant supply of 
labour.
More stable economic growth in future would require 
sound agricultural development in future Plans and larger food 
supplies. Likewise, increased foreign exchange supplies both 
through exchange rate manipulations and foreign capital inflows. ; 
together with relatively liberalized’ imports can ensure more 
efficient economic growth. Improvements in the fiscal and 
monetary management, lessjer .reliance on . deficit financing and 
increased tax efforts would also be warranted in the interest of 
stable and efficient economic development• ,
4PREFACE V;:
Inflation has currently assumed a global significance^ 
affecting both the developed and the less developed areas of the 
world in varying magnitude. While the developed countries are 
confronted; with-the difficult task of /maintaining full employment 
with price stability, the developing countries, committed to 
development programmes, are faced, with the problem of maintaining 
high rates of economic growth with, reasonable price stability.
The purpose of this study is to analyze the infiationary‘1 pressures ; ,
experienced by Pakistan in her process of planned economic develop­
ment and to discuss the policy implications of current inf-I ationary 
pressures. 'X'.„ ' ‘
v I t ma y b e not e d tha t a r  esea r ch w o rk e r an aly z i ng the .
\ economic problems of a country whose statistical machinery is 
still rudimentary is painfully handicapped bythevpaucitygbf-v. 
statistical data. One may also, at Limes, have to be a little 
sceptical about their reliability. Nevertheless,, the available . .
data have been used with care and conclusions have been drawn from 
them with caution. , ; . v
Several debts have accumulated in the course of this 
study that must be acknowledged. I am deeply indebted to my . :
supervisor Professor Edith T. Penrose for her very keen interest 
in my work and general help and encouragement throughout the course 
of.this study. I was also greatly belief itted by my discussions with : ; \
other members of the staff especially M r . Peter Ayre, Mr. T.J. Byres 
and Dr. B . Dasgupta. In the end, I would like to thank the University
of Karachi for granting me leave of absence.and the Government 
of Pakistan for financing this study. . :
LONDON, . V-' Q.II. SIDDIQI.
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CHAPTER:!
■r: ' INTRODUCTION
' The Problem And Nature of Investigation
1.yjhflation And Economic Growth: V"
Most developing countries bof the post-war world have 
experienced some inflationary pressures — ■ mild or strong. In­
flationary pressures in these countriesyare often caused by wrong 
policies of governine n ts and monetary authorities which result in 
monetary expansion at a faster rate than the rate of growth of 
real output and the demand for money. Pakistan has experienced- 
inflationary pressures in her process of economic development : 
which can, by;no m e a n s b e  termed as insignificant. The object of 
: this study is to analyse the inflationary pressures in Pakistan 
since the heginning/;of sys.tematic economic/planning in 1955. Our 
attention would be focussed mainly on the assessment of the rate 
of inflation, examination of the policies of the Government and 
the monetary authority which led to inflationary pressures arid the 
need for adopting a clear-cut price plicy in the course of economic 
development. , :
In analyzing inflation in an under-developed economy, 
two schools of thought have developed, namely, the monetarist and 
the structuralist.The monetarists emphasize that the causes of 
inflation^must be sought in the sources of excess demand. According 
t6 them, the development process in an under-developed country ; 
leads to monetary expansion at a faster rate than the rate of 
increase in real output and this causes inflationary pressures in 
the economy.This school considers the pressure of monetary demand
13
as the over-riding factor in inflationary pressures'* They argue . 
that the inflationary- pressures whether generated by supply 
shortages, wage increases or in an,y other way cannot spread them­
selves into a general and sustained rise in prices unless monetary 
expansion takes place in the economy or income velocity rises;
Supply factors may change the relative prices but a rise in general 
price level is purely>a monetary phenomeiioh. Income ireldcity is;, 
in itself, assumed; to be greatly influenced by monetary expansion.
If the rate of monetary expansion is high and money balances accu-  ^
mu late with the public in excess of what they wish to hold, spending ; 
will increase and this will influence the price level.
In analyzing the sources of monetary expansion in av  ^
developing economy, the monetarists have placed great emphasis on 
the role of budget deficits.^ In an attempt to industrialize and ; 
develop, the governments of some under-developed countries have 
taken liberal resort to deficit financing and seriously unbalanced 
budgets have.caused inflationary pressures* The monetarists insists’ 
that in a country where - real resources are iimited, inf latiori' is 
very likely to be initiated if the government insis'ts on securing 
, additional resources without other sectors in the econo my be i ng 
. willing to reduce their share.^ The monetarists also stress the r 
effect of government borrowings from the banking system on the 
expansion of private credit. It is realized that bank credit to
1 . See, for example, A.C. Harberger,: "Some Notes ;0n Inflation", in 
t' W. Baer and i  . Kers tenetzky ( Eds. ) Inf 1 ation And Growth In
: ; Latin America (The Economic Growth Centre, Yale University ,
1964), P. 322 and E. Gudin, "Inflation In Latin America’-, in
D.C. Hague ( Ed. ) Inflation (London, 1962 ) ,. P. 343. ■/
2. C f . E.M.Bernstein and I.G.Patel,;"Inf1at1 on In Relation to 
Economic Deve 1 opment" , I .M«F Staff Papers,; Vol., 2 No. 3,
1951-52 P. 368.
the public sector'will have secondary expansionary effects as a 
consequence of rising bank reserves. As inflation gets under way, 
the return from investment rises and rising profits induce 
enterprises to expand the scale of their operation. This is largely 
sustained through increased borrowings from the banking system.
With regard to Chile, Tom E. Davis points out that in the course" ; 
of inflation, the business sector develops a vested interest in
credit expansion which comes to it at a very low Or even negative
■ : : .3
real rate of interest.
Thus the monetarists insist that excess demand, caused
by excessive monetary expansion in the government and/or private
sector, is the main Cause of inflation in an under-developed economy.
They, admit the role of wages as transmitter of inflation but, in
their analysis, a wage-price spiral does not play as important a role
as in the structuralist analysis which we shall consider, shortly.
The monetarists are also not happy about the effect of inflation on
the general economic development of a country. They believe that
inflation leads to great waste of resources and:produces distortions
which, in the. long-run might slow down or even stop economic growth
(depending upon the intensity of inflation). Although no conclusive
empirical evidence has been found to establish the adverse effect
of inflation on economic grcd£th, the case for inflation assisting
y - . 1 :.-..'.;'. ■ .. .v. 4  ’ .... -
economic growth is also not established. It is, however, maintained
that inflation induces forms of investment which do not make the
highest possible contribution to growth in terms of increased
3. C f . Tom E. Davis, "Changing Conceptions Of The Development 
Problem: The Chilean Example", Economic Development And 
Cultural Change, October, 1965,. P . 28. >
4. Cf; R.J. Bhatia, "Inflation, Deflation and Economic Development",
I.MvF. Staff Paperst Vol. VIII, 1960-61, P 102; U.Tun Wai, "The 
Relation Between Inflation And Economic Development", I.M.F Saff 
Papers , October, 1959 and Graemfit. S\ Dorrancej "Inflation and Growth: 
The Statistical Evidence" , I .M.'F ,Staff Papers, 1966 P. 91.
employment, production and standard of. living. These investments
'include construetibn;and stock-piling of goodb ./* The monetarists,
therefore, suggest that economic• deve1opment should proceed with/
price" stability. With appropriate monetary and fiscal policies,
ecdnomic; deyelppment/and price stability may be made mutually , ’
compatible. 7 '■'././ , /•/■ /■• ;/ ;•/■'./■/,/.’■'"-/ '//■ ' -vi'/* /
The structuralist approach to the causes of inflation
in a developing economy is in sharp contrast to the monetarist
approach.They seek the causes of inflation basically on the supply
side. It is argued that one must look for the real forces underlying
the inflationary pressures rather than to treat them simply as a
monetary phenomenon. Their analysis starts from the structural .
characteristics of an under-developed economy including the supply
position of essential goods, import capacity of the economy and other
real factors that might influence the price level. The structuralists
claim to be. realistic in the sense that they try to look beyond the
. monetary forces and the veil of money into the real structure of '
the economy and at such things as inelasticities of supply in the
key sectors of the economy, import bottlenecks, downward rigidity
of prices and wages etc. The monetary factors responsible for
inflationary pressures like budget deficits and credit expansion
are considered to be passive factors and treated as dependent on
real factors. it is claimed .that; credit expansion and budget deficits
adjust themselves to the changes in real situation in the conorny.
v The structuralists consider-the structural def iciencies
in the eConomy, factor immobilities and supply inelasticities as
/ 5, Cf. Graeme S'. Dor ranee, "The Effect of Inflation on Economic : 
Development", I .M .F Staff Papers, 1963; R.A.Mundell, "Growth, 
Mobility And Inflationary Finance", Journal of Political Economy,
/ / -April 1965 and Alexandre Kafka, "The Brazilian Stabilization ( 
// Program, i964-6(>", Journal of Political Economy, August 1967.
\ : " , ■" . : ' 16 ' ; ‘ ;vV; - .'7
the basic cause of; inflation. The,food supply is specially 
considered to; be stagnant in the face of rising demand in the 
course of economic development. In addition to lagging food 
supplies, bottlenecks may also be Created in other ways. The 
difficulties of increasing and diversifying exports and export 
earnings, balance of payments difficulties and the resulting . 
scarcity of imported goods, inadequate savings and capital for-
. ■ , i. *■ ■' c-' . 1 *. ■’ ;
matiori and deficiencies in the tax system are .some of the other 
factors responsible for generating inflationary pressures; in an 
underr-developed economy; The inflationary rise;in prices may create 
demand for higher wages and if.wages also rise they would be passed 
on to consumers in Still higher prices. Rising food prices caused 
by a lagging agricultural sector are claimed to be the prime mover 
in inflationary pressures and are supposed to be the main source 
Of wage-price spiral as food occupies a very important place in the 
total spending of under-developed countries.^
Economic development in under-developed countries 
increases demand in those sectors of the economy where bottlenecks 
prevent the expansion of supply. The demand for food often rises 
in the development process; but the supply of agricultural products 
is rigid due to institutional factors. Often government1s policy 
of agricultural price controls and over-valued exchange rate which 
affect agricultural exports also lead to the stagnation of agricul­
tural sector. Food prices/ therefore, rise and they affect the
6 . C f . G . Maynard, Economic ’Development And The Price Level
( Macmillan And Company, London, 1963, Chapter 3, PP 50-60; ;
Dudley Seers, MA Theory Of Inflation And Growth In Under­
develop) ed Economies Based On the Experience Of Latin America",
; Oxford Economic Pppcrs , J u n e i  96 2; J .> H . 011 v e r a , 6 n S true tufa-1:
Inf lation Aiid:.Latin American Structuralism"/Oxford Economic •
Papers,' Nov0 mber 1964 and O .Suhlcl, "IhflatibnTn Chile: An 
Unorthodox Approach", International Economic Papers, No.10, I960.
prices in other’ sectors of the economy;through; wage increases,; /-v 
Agricultural prices' tend to respond more quickly than the prices 
of /industrial products/to Changes; in the; balance: betweeii supply > 
and demand and therefore their behaviour determines in large part 
.Ifct' behaviourof/tlie general price ;:leVel/- The structuralists also 
attach considerable importance to the instability of world demand 
for primary products and the consequent fluctuations in export 
earnings of underdeveloped countries. An upward swing in export 
earnings is likely to be accompanied by a rise in income and 
economic activity. But a downward ..movement in export earnings does 
not necessarily Check the tendency to inflation. This is beCause, 
the worsening terms of tra.de may put pressure on prices and wages 
by reducing the real income and import capacity of the economy. 
Moreover, the fall in government receipts from taxation would 
necessitate credit creation with further inflationary effects. The 
effect of trade fluctuations on the economy of an under-developed 
.country- has, however, not been empirically. estab1 ishe.d-.;:.;-Thd/'^tudy 
under t aken by A . I . Ma cBeah; i hdi c at es tha t rio s i gni f i cant cor r e 1 a t i on 
exists between sort-term f luctuations in the export, earnings of 
under-developed countries and their level of prices, investment 
and national income.^ .
The wage-price spiral plays an important:part ih 
propagating the inflationary pressures in the structuralist 
analysis but, on the whole, the structuralist approach is quite 
distinct from the traditional cost-push explanatiomof inflation.
7 . C f .. A <i I .MacBean, Export Instability And Economic Development,
: . (Harvard University Press, 1966) , ' .  - v - '
In the latter, the inflationarypressures are initiated by . 
labour1 s- desire to-acquire command over a; large part of the 
real national income or at least to maintain its Share in real 
terms. This brings a rise in moneywages which tend to raise costs 
of production and lead to a further rise in prices. A wage-price 
spiral is, thus, generated. On the other hand, in the structuralist ; 
analysis, iiiflationary pressures are basically generated by struc­
tural deficiencies in the economy like the inelasticity of agri- 
'cultural output, difficulties of foreign exchange, deteriorating 
terms of trade, balance of payments pressure and.deficiencies of 
savings and capital formation. Once they are generated, then the 
role of wages becomes prominent in their propogation and wage-price 
spiral leads to a general inflationary situation in the economy.
In the structuralists1 writings, there is much less 
stress on the undesirable ef f ects of inf lation than iin the 'monetarist 
analysis. On the contrary, the struct up a1i s ts consider inflation as 
a necessary concomitant of economic growth and, therefore, insist 
that it must, be tolerated as such. According to them, an attempt to 
maintain price stability in under-developed economies would condemn 
them to a slow rate of growth, at best to the rate of growth of ; 
their export and agricultural s e c t o r s T h e y  also point out that 
inflation promotes forced savings and thus accelerates growth. It; 
is?.assumed by: thdm thaf substantial gpvernment investment is 
desirable in a developing economy’irt order to eliminate unemployment 
and under-utilization of capacity even though .it may be financed by 
inflationafy; methods./Thhs fheir W  is on fostering *
8 . Cf". R.Ruggles, "Summary of the Conference on Inflation and
; Economic GrowthinLatin America11;, in W.Baer and I . Eersfenetzky ,
( Eds. ) Op.Cit, /// ;•'
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economic development rather than.jon maintaining price stability.
They consider inflation as a necessary price for rapid economic 
development though the possibility of curbing the inflationary 
pressures by removing supply rigidities in the agricultural sector,, 
accelerating exports and reforming the tax system is not altogether 
•£ftcluded.^
It must, however, be pointed out that in spite of the 
distinction drawn between the monetary and structural factors 
exerting inflationary pressures in a developing economy, the fact 
remains that, in practice, the pressure on prices is always the 
combined effect of the monetary and structural forces. Quite often, 
the governments concerned chalk out ambitious development programmes 
which turn out to be inconsistent with the available resources for 
financing them and resort to deficit financing becomes inevitable. 
This causes inflationary pressures and excess demand conditions 
are created for both consumption and investment goods in the economy. 
At the same time, the structural deficiencies in the economy also 
contribute to the inflationary pressures generated by excess demand 
and the prices of those goods and services whose supply is relatively 
rigid rise at a significant rate.: The inflationary pressures thus 
created culminate into; a sustained and general rise in prices through 
wage increases. Thus, a sustained rise in the general price level 
oyer a specific period of time is often caused by some combination 
of monetary, structural and cost factors.
9. 'Cf. Jv Grunwald, MThe Structuralist School: On Price Stabilization 
And Economic Development" in A .0.Hirschman (Ed. ) Latin American 
Issues, ( New York, 19G1 ) . "
A priceinflation may, However , be partly diverted 
V towards the balance of payments pressure because balance of ; 
payments def icits are a way of supplementing the: domestic output 
and of siphoning off the domestic ihflati/i'dnary\-‘-pr.essur.es:* Most . 
developing countries, therefore, experience bothra^ pricejinflation 
and a balance of payments pressure. In this study we sha.ll study 
. both the behaviour of prices in Pakistan, and the balance of payments 
pressure during the period of planned, economic development.
? 2. The Process of Growth In Pakistan:
Economic growth started in Pakistan around 1950 after 
some of the basic problems created by the partition of the Indian 
: sub-continent had been overcome. The available data for this period
show an average annual rate of growth of about 2.6 per cent in the 
pre-Plan period. The gross national product at constant factor 
cost (1949-50 to 1952-53 =100) increased from Rupees 17,909 million 
’ in 1949 to Rupees 20,343 million in 1954-55. The per capita income 
: also increased by about 1,6 per cent in the four years preceding 
the'First Plan. The most spectacular development of this period 
was the growth of large-scale manufacturing industry. Income from 
this sector increased more than two-fold from Rupees 427 million .: 
in 1050-51 to Rupees 10d2‘ million in 1954-55 while agriculture 
remained almost stagnant.
; • During the First Plan period ( 1955-60 ), the economy
^maintained an average rate:of growth of about 2.5 per cent per annum 
and: the real income increased only by 12.6 per cent over the Plan 
period against the Plan target of 15 per cent. On the other hand, 
the rate of population growth exceeded the Plan estimates and
virtually absorbed the rise in real income. The per capita 
income, therefore, remained* almost stagnant, The employment 
situation also worsened.in the Plan period as even new addi­
tions to the. iabour. force could not be fuily* absorbed. While 
agriculture maintained a very poor rate of growth of 1.4 per 
cent, per annum, industry maintained a compound rate of growth 
of about 10 per cent per annum, : - .
> Pakistan1s Second Plan ( 1960-65 ) .was a very
ambitious Plan with more than, double the proposed development 
outlays of the First Plan. The Plan aimed at rii&sing the level 
;of real income by 24 per cent. With a projected population growth 
rate of about 2 per cent per nniiumy the per capita income was 
expected to rise by over 13 per cent in the Plan period. The Plan 
claimed to create 3 million new job opportunities and to raise the 
export earnings by 15 per cent. The performance of this Plan was 
much better than the frustrated take off of the preceding Plan. . 
The real income is reported to have increased by about 30.6 per 
cent over the Plan period against the target of-24 per cent. As 
the rate of economic growth.far exceeded the rate of population 
growth, the per capita real income also increased by about 17.6 
pci' cent over the Plan period. The employment opportunities 
available in this Plan were also large enough to absorb the 3.6 
million add iti on to the labour force, though the in it i al unemploy- 
' merit remained unabated. This Pian had the advantage of drawing 
upon the experience of the preceding Plan and was also able to 
utilize the infra-structure built in the previous Plan.
; The Third Plan ( 1965-70 ) was a still more ambitious
Plan. It envisaged total development outlays of Rupees 52,000*
■- i j-,:: -,U- ‘
million that is, almost double the actual development expen- 
: ditures of the Second Plan (which had substantillay exceeded 
the proposed expenditures) . The Plan aimed at raising the level 
of real income by 37 per cent over the. Plan period with a : ^
compound rate of growth of 6 .5 per cent pdf annum. With an 
estimated population growth rate of 2.6 per cent per annum, the 
per;capita real income was expected to rise by about 24 per cent 
over the Plan period. The performance of this Plan was seriously ■
affected by unexpected events like:the armed cdnflict with India, 
cut-backs in foreign aid and crop failures. The productive capacity 
suffered due to these events and fixed investment declined from
18.8 per cent of the G.N.P in 1964-65 to 13.5 per cent in 1905-66.
Even in the third year: of Ifhe; Plan., the t%te> of investment was only 
14.5 per cent of the G.N.P. In the first two years of-the Plan, 
the economic growth turned out to be below 5 percent per annum.
In the thira year of the Plan, however, the economy maintained a 
high rate of grph5th:;:of 7.5 per cent and the average for throe 
„ years went up to 5*5 per cent. With a population growth rate of ; I
2.7 per cent per annum, the per capita real income increased by j
about 8.5 per cent in the first three years of the Plan. , 1
Most of the developing countries have only small 1
domestic savings and their economic development is largely financed 
by domestic and external borrowings. Domestic credit expansion is : !
often inflationary and this., coupled with the structural deficiencies ;
and bottlenecks in the economy, often cause inflationary pressures.
In Pakistan also, the domestic savings have significantly fallen 
short of capital formation and the difference has been made up by 
credit creation and inflow of external capital. In the First Plan . :
period, capita! formation including fixed investment in public 
arid private sectors and changes ’in stocks averaged about 10 per 
cent of the G.N.P in current prices. On the other hand, the 
average rate of domestic savings was a little over 6 per cent of 
the G.N*P. The gap between investment andfdomestic savings was 
being financed by domestic credit creation and foreign capital 
inflows. The low level of domestic savings in this period was 
partly due to fiscal deficiencies and inability of the Government 
to raise additional tax revenues and partly to a sharp rise in 
prices which affected private savings by increasing spending. On 
the one hand, with a low level of tax revenues and high adminis­
trative expenditures^ no public savings were possible and, on ther 
other, due to a sharp rise in prices in the Plan period, consumption 
expenditures rose significantly and the public was therefore not 
able to make significant savings consistent with the rising level 
of money income.:  ^ ; \ /
, As the real income increased substantially in the Second 
Plan period and foreign exchange position somewhat improved due to 
increased foreign aid inflows, both domestic savings and capital 
formation increased significantly. The ratio of domestic savings 
to gross national product in current prices rose from 6.5 per cent 
in 1959-60 to 12.6 per cent in 1964-65 and that of capital formation 
from 10^5 per cent to 18.8 per cent. In the Third Plan period, 
however, due to unexpected events, fixed investment declined from
18.8 per cent of G,N.P in 1964-65 to 4.3.5 per cent in 1965-66. Even 
in the third year of the Plan, the rate of investment was only i4.5  ^
per; cent of the G.N.P. The average rate of domestic savings also f
declined from 12.6 per cent of G.N.P in 1964-65 to about 9.6 
per cent in 1967-68.
Tables 1, 2 and 5 show the over-all rate of growth 
in the economy during the period 1955-68 and the growth of I
industrial and agricultural output respectively. Chart 1 gives 
a graphic presentation of these variables. Table 4 presents the 
ratio of domestic savings and capital formation to the G.N.P and 
the excess of aggregate investment over domestic savings as a 
ratio to the G.N.P•
5 . The Nature 0 f I nve s t i gat i on:
;The present'study is motivated by the fact that no 
elaborate study has so far been made on Pakistan inflation. Our . 
objective in this study is to investigate the policy variables 
that gave rise to inflationary pressures in Pakistan m  the pro­
cess of economic development and to assess the gravity of the 
ihflatibnary situation. Subsequently, vre would also discuss the ; . 
Importance that should: be given to price policy- aSf a; part; of / i 
the general development policy. V  . : •
'■ It would be usefui to reviewvsome of the;releted:work ^  
done in the contextof Pakistan inflation and to point out the 
lacuna that exists in this sphere. An earlier work of this kind 
is: fhatyof Parvez Hasan. In this study the writer has shownthat 
deficit financing in tmiUnder^eveloped economy like Pakistan would 
lead to an increase in real capital formation only if imported y 
capital equipment and raw materials are available in adequate amount, 
otherwise it:would simply lead to inflationary pressuies. However, _ 
this is not a direct and an elaborate study of inflation and ,
10. See Parvez Hasan, DeficitFlrtahCing And Capital Formation:
The Pakistan ExperienCe, 19lTl-5Cr~:"F~Pakistan, Institute of 
Development Economics, Karachi, 1962. ).
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TABLE 1
Growth of G.N.P. and Per Capita Re a l I n c ome, ;19&5-68 
v > ; - (Million Rupees) U • !'•
Year G.N.P. at. 
Constant 
Factor Cost 
of 1959-60
1955-56
1956-57
1957-58
1958-59
1959-60
1960-61
1961-62
1962-63
1963-64
1964-65
1965-66
1966-67
1967-68
27834
29497
29719
30144
31439
33086
35043
36284
39284
41058
42968
45133
48536
Compound
Rat;e:;nf/:;' 
Growth %
, — 0 . 3 
6.0 
0.8
1.4 
4.3 
5.2 ' 
5.9
3 . 5 H  
: 8.3 ',
4.5 ■.
' 4.6 '
■' 3*0 •
7.5
Per capita 
Income at 
1959-60 
Prices
308
319
315 ;
312
318
326
337. -
340
359
365
372
381
397
Compound 
Rate of 
Growth %
-2.5
3,6
-1,3
— 1.0
1.9;
2.5
3.4 
0.9
5.6
1.7 
1.9
2.4 
4.2
Sourcfe: Government of Pakistan, Economic Survey. .1967-68, 
Statistical Appendix, Table 1. . -
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TABLE 2
Index of Industrial Production, 1955-68 
1953-54 = 100 U'-;:
Year Index Percentage Increase 
Over the previous 
Year*
1954-55 
* 1955-56
1956-57
1957-58
1958-59
1959-60
::- ' V
1960-61
1961-62 ;
1962-63 5
1963-64
1964-65
1965-66
1966-67
1967-68
127 
144
152 -;j:.. / : '
162 ■ v-’ ' V. ’'
. 182 .
205
Revised Index 1959-60 - 100
i6o ''’'"'o-;
7 v'"'"'i^iO'Ovol'OJ.; 
7 0  -’'O' 202 07'
o o  \ -V ; ; ,;7
237 - 
261 , ■ "
-,v!;
13
6 ,
; i2 
13
19
17
15
13
11
6
10
10
-r
Source: Government.of Pakistan, Central Statistical
Office, Monthly Statistical Bulletins
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' TABLE 5 v " !
Index of Agricultural Production:, 1955-68
1959-60 ^ -100 : ’
Year All Crops Food Crops Non-Food Crops Fibres
1955-56 86 ' 81 ^  91 ■'’yiiOV,'
1956-57 96 •■/'. 96 94 . 102
1957-58 93 90 ^ \  ‘ ■ 98 ; 108
1958-59 93 ’ 88 111 103
1959-60 100 100 100 100
1960-61 105 :■ 107 100 91 ;
1961-62 . 112 109 119 119 ; =
1962-63 111 105;; 137; j ;ii9
1963-64 120 118 ■ / 128  ^ v : 124
1964-65 . 123: ■ 121 143 112 '
1965-66 124 , 117 166 ‘ 128 -;, ;
1966-67 123 112 175 134
1967-68 v 142 137 . 164 146
Source: Government of Pakistan, Central Statistical Office, 
Monthly Statistical Bulletins.
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TABLE 4 v- -.1; ' V
Domestic Savings and Capital Formation as Percentage 
of G.N.P. (Current Prices) f V.” r ;
Year ’• .JGapitial’7Rorfli'a^ t'i.Qn: Dpn^ esM'cv3ayi'ng's Excess of Invest-
"• x O v e r  SiJjLngs^
■■1 ■ . v-. .v ■•r '' ■ as % of G.N.P.
1955-56 9.2 . 7.9
1956-57 ; 4.5 .
1957-58 " 10.0 ?./'5 v: 5.3
1958-59 9.7 6.1
1959-60 10.5 V 6.5
1960-61 ' 12.7 > 8.9
1961-62 15.0 11.0
1962-63 . 16.6 12.1
1963-64 ;; 17.5 ■ "i 11.8
1964-65 " 18.8 12.6
1965-66 13.5 9.0
1966-67 13.3 8.2
1967-68 14.5. - ’ ‘ 9.6
Source: Computed from data contained- in The S e cond PIan, 
Evaluation Report of Second Plan and Mid-Plan
1.3
/ ’  ^• ;V. 3.7.' . 
4.7 
3.6 ’ :
4.0
\\ 3.8
4.0 
'4.5
' 1 5.7 . 
6.2
:/ 4.5
5.1 
4.9
Review of Third Plan^ Statistical Appendices.
moreover it covers a different period than that covered by our p
study. Another study is the Pakistan Institute of Development
sv >' Vv- ^  11
Economics monograph: A Measure of Inflation i n P a k i s t a n 1 9 5 1 - 6 0 j
This monograph gives an index of wholesale prices for East and: West"
Pakistan and for. Pakistan as a whole but does not render any ^
L analysis of the index and of the price behaviour in the country.
Moreover, like the former study, this monograph also covers the
period up to the First Plan period. R.C. Porter has also discussed
some aspects of inf lation in Pakistan in; two consecutive papers
but they again do not .constitute a comprehensive!study of price
■behaviour in Pakistan. The present study is intended to fill up
this gap and is designed to uncover all the aspects of Pakistan
inflation and to discuss all the policy and non-policy variables
exerting pressure on prices and balance of payments in the course
of economic development. , ;
Our approach in this study would be analytical but any 
sophisticated stafistical :aiid econometric techniques would not be 
employed because of the fact that the period covered by this study 
is short and the data are not very reliable while statistical 
manipulations are highly sensitive to the inaccuracies of data and 
the results drawn from them are apt to be misleading. We would, v 
therefore, content ourselves with casual empiricism arid presentation 
of the observed facts based On the writer’s field work and experiences; 
in Pakistan.; Although the major;source of information for the study
11. See Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, A Measure of 
Inflation in Pakistan, 1951~6Q, ( Monograph no. 4, Karachi,
■/ 1961 ). ! “ ^
12, See RiC .Porter, ’’Income-^elpcity And ^ Pakistan1 s Second Plan” , 
Pakistan Development Review, Vol.1, 1961 and ’’The Inflationary 
Implications Of Crop Failure” , Pakistan Development Review,
Spring, 1962. .. . : • ; : ; .
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is the published official statistics, considerable information 
has also been collected by the writer from various Government 
and research organizations in Pakistan and from interyiews with 
businessmen, consumers etc *
, The study covers the o^hole of the First and the Second 
Plan periods and first three years of the Third Plan but a back­
ground of the price behaviour in the pre^Plan period would also 
be given.
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:';/V CHAPTER II '
THE PRICE TRENDS IN PAKISTAN t K
Pakistan presents, an interesting case study of inflation 
in a developing economy in the sense that here the inflationary 
rise in prices has typically coTnciddd with the implementation 
of; development plans. While the average price level in Pakistan 
was declining in the pre-Plan period, it began to rise at a 
* significant rate in the First Plan period. Although inflation 
was officiaTlyvTepressed in this period through .price and distri­
bution controls on food and othdr essential commodities (like 
cloth, petroleum, coal, iron and steel, cement etc. ) and 
administered prices recorded very little change, indices prepared 
from free market prices» .Which existed alongside the controlled 
prices, as controls were not very,rigid, indicate a significant 
rise in the general price level in this period. The price and 
distribution controls on essential commodities including food- 
grains were imposed in 1953 following a poor crop which raised 
the food prices in 1952-53 and scarcity of other consumer goods 
which arose as a consequence of the imposition of import controls 
in. August 1952 in the wake of seriously depleted foreign exchange 
reserves. However, these controls were not very effective and, 
in the case of food rationing, only Urban centres and municipal 
areas were, covered and even in these areas:the public purchased ;
a part :of their requirements in the open-mafket. Thus, free market 
prices also existed alongside the controlled prices.
y;\. ■ •• ■ 33 . v  *• ; ■ . ■- . ; ■
Most of the price and distribution controls were 
lifted in 1960-61 and a movement towards a freer economy was 
made. However, the price situation remained fairly stable i 
during the Second Plan period as the economy maintained highii 
rates of growth and domestic supplies were-liberally supplemented 
by imports which were in turn made possible by the expanded 
foreign aid supplies and improved foreign exchange position. On 
the other hand, the food position had also improved by this time 
due to higher rates of growth in the agricultural sector and 
increased PiL. 480 food supplies. Infthe Third.Plan period again 
there was a sharp rise in j>riccs due partly to poor chops and 
partly to the acute shortage of foreign exchange caused by cut­
backs in foreign aid.at a time when scarce resources were being 
diverted towards armament and. thus the over-all growth, of the 
economy was adversely affected. We begin our study of prices with 
tin examination of price movements in the pre-Plan period. .
1. Price Movements in the Pre-Plan Period: ; ^ ;
The declining trend in the average price level in Pakistan 
in the pre»*PIan period is indicated by almost all indices available 
for that period.- First we consider a wholesale price index prepared 
by the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics which is based 
' on free market prices.According to this index, the wholesale 
price level registered a decline of about 30 per cent from 100 -
\ in 1051-52 to 70.;2 in 1954-55. The index shows a? downward trend 
both in East and West Pakistan but there was a Sharper decline 
in the former as compared with, the latter mainly because the price 
of rice declined sharply in East Pakistan while the price of wheat 
was rising in West Pakistan except in 1954-55 when the wheat crop
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was good. West Pakistan was facing a serious food shortage due
to drought and locust swarms arid therefore in spite of food
control and rationing, the market price of wheat and other food-
grains rose substantially. On the other hand, in East Pakistan,
the food position'improved aVlot as a result of good crops. East
Pakistan has always been a rice deficit area and the price of rice
has remained high iri that province but due to successive good
crops, the rice prices began to decline and were at their lowest
level in 1950 since the partition. The food position in East
Pakistan remained fairly satisfactory thereafter arid the price of
rice maintained a declining trend, though the province continued
to be a rice deficit area. Following a bumper crop at the end of
1953, the rice prices further declined and the province was able
to build up an encouraging reserve and to declare a surplus area,
for export for the first time in its history. Moreover, the jute
price also declined sharply after the Korean boom was over and
these two crops largely determine the general price level in East
Pakistan. As the weight assigned to rice iri the East Pakistan index
is greater than that assigned to wheat in West Pakistan ( 0,80 as
compared with 0.24 ) the downward movement of East Pakistan price
index in the pre-Plan period is more marked. The East Pakistan
wholesale price index has always moved in the same direction and
Usually by about the same percentage as the price of rice. On the
other hand, in the case of West Pakistan, although a change in the
price of wheat almost always had a change :iri the index in the same
direction, the amount of change was usually smaller . Table 5 shows
1. Cf. P.I.D.E., A Measure of Inflation in Pakistan, 1951-60, 
Op.Cit. PP.5-67 ’ : ~ *•"~  —
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the P.E.D.E. index of wholesale prices for this period. V
In addition to the E.I.D.E index, ; otheryfritiices also . 
indicate a declining trend in prices and cost of living in the 
pre-Plan period. Table 6 gives the following indices: (i) a simple 
average of the Central Statistical Office cost of living indices j
for industrial workers in selected centres of Pakistan, (2) thei 
C.S.6 consumer price index for government and commercial employees 
( clerical ) in Karachi., (3) the implicit national income deflator 
and (4) the indices of import, and export prices.
Unlike the wholesale price indices, which showed a clear 
downward trend in both wings of Pakistan, the cost of living indices 
moved in different directions. While the East Pakistan cost ofJiving 
index declined by 16 per penty. thatlvdi West Pakistan rose by 4 per 
cent. The Central Statistical Office consumer price index for Karachi 
also rose by .1 per cent. The main reason for regional differences m  
cost of living were the widely differing food position and general 
availability of consumption goods in the two parts o f :the country:v 
While West Pakistan was faced with a serious drought and food 
shortage , the f ood position in-East ’ Pakistan was much; better; and 
since food items have great weight in the consumer price and cost 
of living indices, this accounts for the difference in the movements 
of these indices. ; "'V ■ \ '
: .. There i s .a wide: difference between the movements of the
PVl vDlE Vwholesale;pripe index and the C .S.0 cost of living and . 
consumer price indices. While the Institute* s wholeShle price index 
recorded a fall of 41 per cent in East Pakistan,, the C.S.O cost of 
living1index for Narayanganj ( E.P ) showed a decline of only 16
— 36 —
TABLE 5
P . I . B .E index of Wholesale Prices, 1951-55
1951-52 “ 100
Year East Pakistan 
Price Index
West Pakistan 
Price Index
All Pakistan 
Price Index
1951-52
1952-53
1953-54
1954-55
100.0
96.4 
76.1 
,■ 58.7
100 .0
114.2
98.8
81.7
100.0 
105.3 
. ~ 87.5 
70.2
Source.:yA Measure;of Inflation in Pakistan,; (Pakistan 
Institute of Development Economics, Monograph 
N o. 4, March 1961, Tab1e 1. p. 5.
per cent. Similarly,: the P.I.D.E index recorded a decline of 18 
per cent, in West Pakistan prices while the C.S.0 cost of living 
index:for West Pakistan recorded a rise of 4 per cent., T h i s ;  
difference in sensitivity and movements of the indices is the 
result of differences in weights, prices used and goods covered.
The inverse movements of the two indices in some years are primarily 
due to the difference between free and controlled prices. While the 
cost of living indices are based on controlled prices and have 
given more weight to such items as food, rent and services, the 
P.I.D.E wholesale price index is based on free market prices and 
, weights included in it are derived from the amount of goods entering 
into the final use in each part of the country. Thus the C.S.O 
indices include the dampening effect of rents and services whose 
prices remained stable over the 1950*s.
On the other hand, the implicit national income deflator 
shows a continuous decline of about 14 per cent in the pre-Plan v. 
period arid its movements are similar to those of the P .1.D.E wholesale 
price index except in the year 1952-53. There was a sharp decline in 
export prices in that year following the Korean War boom and these 
prices are covered by the national income deflator whereas the , ;
whoi esale price index is not directly influenced by them. Although 
both import and export prices were declining in the pre-Plan period, 
export ;prices dec lined more sharply than import prices and therefore 
the; terms of trade deteriorated significantly. .
: Considering all the indices given above, it may be con­
cluded that the average price level in Pakistan was declining in 
• the pre-Plan period. ReasoniS'for the declining trend in the price 
level were many. Although monetary expansion was fairly high in
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income and wealth especially in the wake of rapid industrialization 
and the consequent increase iri the demand for money. The money 
supply increased by about 41 per cent between June 1950 and June 
1955 giving an annual average of about 8 per cbrit. Deficit financing 
was the major factor contributing to monetary expansion in this 
period. The net contribution of Government sector to the money supply 
was Rupees 1468 million while that of the private sector (adjusted 
for a shift to time deposits) was only Rupees 248 million. Almost 
80 per cent of the overfall 'budget deficits of this period were met 
by bank borrowings and cash balance utilization. Credit expansion 
on private account was, however, low because private investment was 
still at a low level as foreign exchange difficulties proved to bpi, 
a serious constraint on trade and investment. Table 7 shows the 
growth of money supply in this:period .and Table 8 gives its causative 
analysis. ■. ■ ' ■ , , , ' . S.-'. i
On the absorption s i d e t h e  average annual rate of growth 
was around 2.6 per cent, that is, even higher than in the First Plan 
period and this absorbed a substantial part of the monetary expansion. 
The'^  gross: national^^ prodUct increased by 13.6 per cent in real terms . 
during the period 1949^50 to 1954-55. Although, agricultural produc­
tion was stagnant in this periodindustrial production increased 
at a fast rate though with a very/low base.With the rising level of 
real income, the demand for real cash balances increased and, at the 
same time, the ratio of money to income also registered a rise of :
about 21 per cent representing .a net> decline in the income velocity 
. v „ ' the
of money. This can be accounted for partly in terms of/existence of
direct economic controls which limited spending epportunities in the
40
' TABLE 7 ' v"
Money Supply In Pakistan (In Million Rupees) 
, ; 1949-50 to 1954-55
Last Friday 
of June
Currency in 
Circulation
Demand Deposits 
(General) . i;
Other Deposits 
With State ?>: 
Bank of 
Pakistan*:
Money 
;Supply
1949-50 ,1691.8 999.9 36.8 2728.5
1950-51 , 1987.0 1098.2 39.5 3124.7
1951-52 ^ 2172.5 1045.2 37.7 ' 3255.4
1952-53 2172.8 1118.1 ’ 21.1 '//'■ 3312.0
1953-54 2362.9 1201.8 20.1 3584.8
1954-55 2556.3 1270.2 29.5 3856.0
* Excluding I.M.F. Account No. 1, Special Commodity Aid 
Accounts, liB.R.D. Indus Accounts, etc*
Source: State Bank of. Pakistan, Currency and Finance Reports.
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economy and partly in terms of the gradual monetization process 
in the substance rural sector which increased the demand for money 
and facilitated the absorption of expanding money supply. The 
growth of money-income ratio in this period is shown in Table 9, 
Internal credit expansion was also greatly cushioned by 
balance of\,payments deficits which followed the Korean War boom. The 
import controls were imposed in 1952 as a consequence of serious 
depletion of foreign exchange reserves accumulated during the trade 
boom, yet imports remained high and they greatly supplemented the 
domestic output. The deteriorating terms of trade in the post-Korean 
war period also put pressure on the country*s balance of payments. 
Large imports and balance of payments deficits served as a cushion 
for internal credit expansion. Table 10 and 11 present the terms of 
trade and the balance of payments position in this period.
The Inflationary Price Trends Since 1955:
In contrast to the declining price level in the pre-Plan 
period, Pakistan experienced a sharp rise in prices in the First 
Plan period. The price and distribution controls imposed in 1953 
continued until 1960 and, in order to measure the rate of inflation 
in this, period, the P.I.D.E index of wholesale prices would again 
be used though its movements would be compared with other indices 
as well. Acording to the P.I.D.E all~Pakistan index, the wholesale 
prices increased:by 74 per cent in the First Plan period giving an 
average annual rate of increase of about 15 per cent. The rise was 
concentrated mostly in the first two years of the Plan for the 
reasons to be discussed later. East Pakistan experienced a sharper 
rise in the price level as compared with West Pakistan because of 
differences in the prices of basic foodgrains. While the price of
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TABLE 9
Changes in Monetary Ratio, 1950-51 to 1954-55
Year Money National 
July-June Income (Million 
Rupees)
Money Supply
(Million
Rupees)
Monetary
Ratio
Income 
Velocity v
1950-51 20,740 3,125 0.150\
6.66
1951-52 22,500 3,255 0.144 6.94
1952-53 21,802 3,312 0.152 6.58
1953-54 21,836 3,585 0.164 6.09
1954*g>55 21,147 3,856 0.182 5.49
Source: Computed from State Bank of Pakistani Currency
and Finance Repo rts •
TABLE 10
Pakistan’s Terms of Trade Position 1951-55
Price Indices 1951-52 = 100
Year Export Prices Import Prices Terms of Trade
1951-52 \ 100 ' 100 100
1952-53 59 82 72
1953-54 57 90 63
1954-55 60 ; 86 > 69
Source: Government of Pakistan, Central Statistical Office, 
Monthly Statistical Bulletins*
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TABLE 11
Balance of Payments Position and Foreign Exchange ' 
Holdings- of the State Bank of Pakistan
1950-51 to 1954-55.
(Million Rupees)
Year
July-June
Balance of Payments 
on Current Account
Gold, Dollar and 
. Sterling Reserves 
(End of June)
1950-51 ■ +567.2 -/ . .; 1513.1 —
1951-52 ; -463.6 1045.7
1952-53 -466.7 668.8 ;
1953-54 ’ - 59.7 v 630.5
1954-55 ■ + 9.9 -'.■'•‘V;-' , -V 696.4 _ :
Source: State Bank of Pakistan, Report on Currency and v. ^
Finance, J962-63, Table No'. 1 p . 108*
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rice in East Pakistan rose from Rupees, 13.25 per maund in 1954-55 
to Rupees 30.02 .in 1959-60, the price of wheat in Weat Pakistan 
rose from Rupees 8.94 per maund in 1954-55 to Rupees 15.31 in rV ' - 
1959-602 . /'i; /i'i’.
On the other hand, the C.S.0 index of wholesale prices 
covering only four years of the Plan namely 1956-57 to 1959-60 
indicates a rise o^ only- 5, pe^:-cent because of the fact that ; :
. administeredprieeson which this index is baseddid hot change 
much. Consequently, for measuring the inflationary pressures in 
Pakistan in the First Plan period, the C.S .0 index does not serve
much purpose as it conceals the i n f 1 a t i o n a r y s i t u a f i o n p r e v a i 1 i. n g
in the economy. Table 12 gives the P.I.D.E and the C.S.0 wholesaleI ^
price indices. ■;> '■ ' • "
; The C .S .0. has also prepared the consumer and cost of 
living indices for the period under study. The consumer price index 
with 1959-60 base covers the consumption expenditures of government 
and commercial ( clerical ) wage earners at Karachi and industrial 
workers at .four ,Centres —  three in West Pakistan and one in East 
Pakistan. Commodity weights for this index were derived from a 
family expenditure survey conducted in 1955-56. On the other hand, : 
the C iS.0 cost of living index with 1948^49 base coyers pnly 
industrial employees at the above mentioned four centres. Commodity / 
weights for this index were based-on a family budget enquiry made 
in , 1944# The consumer price index shows a rise of 17 per cent in . 
therFirstiPlan period, giving an annual average of 3*4 per cent 
while the C.S .0 cost of living index for industrial workers indicates 
a rise of 19 per cent. Difference between the movements of this /; ;
2. Cf. P.I.D.E., Op.Cit, P.6.
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TABLE 12
Index of Wholesale Prices, 1955-68.
Year P.T.D.E. Index !';>:y . >. 
1951-52 = 100
All P ak i s x a n ; Vife s:t P ak i s t a n East Pakistan
C.S.O. Index 
1959^60 -1100
A .1.1 Paki st an
1955-56 88*3. ;;>•■> V'\ ' 93.2 '
..to00 Not available.
1956-57 115.1 112.0 . 118.2 -V’;V. 95.4 :V>;
1957-58: 111.4 109.4 113.4 777..7 k  7; 95.6
1958-59 115.4 : 113.2 117.6 _ ;.7>K 93.9
1959-60  ^ 121.8 119.9 123,7 100.0 ’
1960-61 > ;> V : 7yy7103.0 .
1961-62 y.: > k* ' ' * 7 ’ 7 v  77;,7'7>7-- 105.9
1962-63 ■ 7 7 >  7-7.> 7 k 104.8
1963-64 •” . . 7";";,. 104.6 >
1964-65 . T •' s '• ■ • '■ ,*■* , 5 r“ ;77 - 7 *”* 112.4
1965-66 “v *■+ <■.■f *7 ’■*-* - ;• 5 . fr y 117,5 y
>1966-67 ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ' “ 7  k  . 133.9 .
1967-68 .. /, ••• '•■■■■ ■ 7 . 7 ' '^ 'r' 7 ' ,' ** • ' 128.6
1968-69 >■ ' 7-1 > ' ~  • • : ’ > 136.0
Source: P.T.D.E. Monograph, No, 4, A Measure of Inflation 
; c i , in Pakistan, 1951-60 and C>S.O., Monthly Statistical 
• Bulletins, < "■
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table 15 .■,'5'-.
C .S.0. General Consumer Price Index, 1955-68 r
/ -195'9Jo; =: 10p!vy ^ :f■ ’
Year Clerical Wage Irid us t r i a1 W ork ers
Earners^ "v r! ?;;■ : ■ ... v
Karachi only. ’ C, .Si-':/. '
" - - Karachi Lahore Sialkot Narayan Average
•S.S S;-'.,^ S s ' v - S s  / ■ ’ gan;j of all
SS' /S -' V ‘ SS; jS!SS/::s s• . ■. ■ . S;/ Columns
1955-56 Not " 85.2 85.2 ^78:,2--' 85.4Ss >83.5^
S S'; v available . ■ "' ,S S s S S  " S'.'.i’, ' S = S ^
1956-57 92,8 s-/- 90.7 92.0 87.3 89.4 90.4
1957-58 98.3 S: 98.4 99.9 94.7 94 . 8 97.2
1958-59 95.7 /S ; 94-.6 93.5 S 92.2 95.7 : 94.3
1959-60 : 100.0 V 100.0 's’100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1960-61 , :v 102.8 101.8 107.0 108.4 100.7 104.1
:1961-62 ; 106.6 { 104.6 ■ 109.7 108.8 105.6 : 107 .0
1962-65 106.7. v>;V W  103.2 108.0 106.9 107.2 106.4
1965-64 110.5 .-.S' ‘ 106.6 113.6 . 114.3 109.1 110.8
1964-65 116 .9 112.9 • 119.7 117.0 113.8 116.1
1965-66 121.6 118.6 122.3 116.7 114.9 118.8
1966-67 -130.8 ; 129.1 1 34.9 132.5 126.1 130.7
1967-68 136.1 ' 132.0 138.4 138 .4 . 127.9 134.2
Source: S C . S .0 ; , Monthly Statistical B u l l e t i n S ep t embe r, 1968 .,
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Year
X XsX> X/. TABLE 14 ‘ >X. _ ; XX-/.: • - jXXx X X
C.S^0. Cost of Living Index for Industrial Workers 
in Selected Centres
Base: April 1948 —  March 1949 a 100 
Karachi Lahore Sialkot Narayanganj Average
1955-56 106,6 ;X'-\ 94.3 84.3 f 104.6 X /•■;X 97.4
19,56-57 113.4 XX 101.7 94.1 • X- vX 109.5 104.7
1957-58 123.1 110.6 102.1 X-XxX' 116.1 113.0
1958-59: 118.3 103.4 99.3 . 117.3 109.6
1959-60 125.0 110.7 107,8 XXvX^’V 122.5 . •, 116.5 X:;
1QfiO-fiT 127.3 118.4 116.9 ;X-X X - 123.3 121.5
1961-62 130,0 vX 124.4 117.4 X'^X' 128.1 125.0
1962-65 128.0 120.3 114.6 ■:'X.  ^ 132 . 4 XXX/123.8 X •
1963-64 131.9 127.1
• ‘ ' ' | > -
\ X s- 122.6 5' 133.2 128.7
1964-65 139.0 135 i 9 X 125.1 139.9 135.0
1965-66 X 147.0 134.6 ' 124.3 . ; • 138X5 . 136.1
1966-67 162.1 143.8 142.2 156.1 151.0
1967-68 162.2 . 146 .,2 150.6 155.8 153.7
Source: C.S.O. , Monthly Statistical Bulletin, September 1968.
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TABLE 15
The National Income Deflabor and 01 h er T-ndic es
1954-55 - 100
Year National Income.
. Deflator
Index of 
Export Prices
Index of 
Import Prices
1955-56
1956-57
1957-58
1958-59
1959-60
1960-61 ;
1961-62 
. 19o2—63
1964-65
1965-66
1966-67
1967-68
106.9 
118.8
125.4
121.4 
132.0
138.6 
. 137.3
139.9
145.2 
.151.8
170.3
167.6
118.8
131.8 
143, i, 4 ; 
128.3 ;
126.5 
;i86vO
156.0 " 
144 .3
\ k i ^
157.9
158.5
185.9
162.1
138.0
170.9
168.5 
ltfl.4
157.8
168.9 
160.4
168.9 
: 141.4
167.6 
-157.4
159.6
Source ; Computed from National Income data^ Indices of 
Export and Import have been taken from C.S.0.
Monthly Stat i sti ca1 Bui1etins.
index and the consumer price index is due to varying weights 
assigned to different items in the two indices. Tables 13 and 
14 present these indices*
On the other handy the implicit national income deflator, 
being a more comprehensive index, indicates a rise of 32 per cent ■ 
in the First Plan period, giving an annual average of 6.4 per. cent.
The export arid import prices also maintained an. upward trend during 
the period under study. The import prices moved up at a faster rate 
than export prices in the First Plan period; so that the terms of 
trade, deteriorated significantly* particularly in the first two years 
of the Plan because of rupee devaluation. Table 15 shows’ the movements 
of the implicit national income deflator arid the export and import 
prices* '• \ :
; b i « Several'factors were contributing to the sharp rise in . 
prices in the First Plan period. On the’one hand, the deficit rate 
was high especially in;, the f irst three years of the Plan and this 
resulted in a high rate of monetary expansion. At the same time, 
.income velocityialsp increased; because of absl^p rise in public and 
private sector investment and consumption expenditures. On the other 
hand, availabilities; were greatly limitedbdue to a low rate of growth 
in the economy and restricted imports on account of seriously depleted 
foreign exchange reserves. Lastly, the devaluation of Pakistan*s rupee 
raised the domestic prices of imports sharply in the first tw° years 
of the Plan. For all these reasons, the First Plan witnessed a sharp 
rise in the general price level*
In the Second Plan pieriod, however, there was, relative \ 
price stability in the country. The. only index of wholesale prices 
available for this period is the C.S.O index. By 1961, the price and.
distribution controls had been lifted and, therefore, changes in 
market conditions are fully:reflected in this index. A modest rise 
of only 12.5 per cent has been recorded by this index ifor this 
' period, giving anr‘ annual average of about 2.5 per cent. The price, 
situation reflected considerable stability in the first four years 
of the Plan but the last year witnessed a rise of about 7.5 per 
cent in the Wholesale prices. On the other hand, the C.S.O consumer 
price index and the cost of living index show a rise of 16 per cent, 
giving an annual average of about 3 per cent. The rate of increase 
shown by this index is a little higher than shown by the C.S.O index 
• of wholesale prices because of the.fact; that it is heavily weighted 
.f or cons urner items whose; prices moved up relatively more than other 
prices in the economy^ Like the C .S.O index of wholesale prices , the 
national income deflator also shows a modest rise of only 10 per : 
cent, or 2 per cent per annum on an average. Although, monetary i 
expansion was quite high throughout the1 Second Plan period both on 
account of laz^ge deficit financing in the public sector and credit 
creation for the private sector, the price situation, however, 
remained fairly satisfactory as the economy maintained high rates of 
growth and imports were greatly liberalized as a result of larger 
: inflow of o foriU'gn aid and expanded P,L. 480 programme.
; b In the first year of the Third Plan, monetary expansion 
was exceptionally highon"account of a;sharp^nsebin';deficit financing 
necessitated by a sudden rise in defence expenditure and curtailment 
in foreign aid. But income velocity declined very sharply in that 
year on account of the general depressing effects of Pakistan’s war 
with India. The C.S.O index of wholesale prices then recorded a rise 
of about 5 per cent. In the following year, however, there was a ;
' ~ 52 ~ yy-'-v^
sharp rise in income velocity as the economy recovered from the 
: effectsb of war and, the same time, ;the food position worsened
due to a severe drought in West-Pakistan and floodsyin.-East P'akistan.
The C.'S.O wholesale price index then recorded a rise of about 14 per 
cent. In 1967-68, the economy maintained a high rate of growth of 
7.5 per cent and agricultural crops were good, this index then : VL  ^!
registered a decline of 4 per cent. The average annual rate of infla- ■
/ tieri; shown by the C>S^O; wholesale price index:for the first three .  ^ b 
years of the Third Plan is thus 5 per cent as compared with 2.5 per b 
, cent recorded in the Second Plan period. The C.S.O .consumer and cost
of living indices also show a rise of 16 per cent in first three 
years of the Third Plan or about 5 per cent per annum on an average* " 
Likewise, the implicit national income, deflator also indicates a rise 
of 17 per cent in these .three years. Both the export and import price 
b indices maintained an upward t r e n d i n t h e  first three years of the
Plan but as import prices moved up more sharply, theie was some 
deterioration in the terms of trade except in 1966-67 when they greatly 
, ■ >-i.:;lmproved;i ■ ' iy---/ yy.f- ' i-_y y-7 ' - y/ • ■*., ‘ : y\- _ ' y-y - • b ■.v--y
The break-up of the C.S.O index of wholesale prices into 
different groups like food, manufactures, raw materials etc. is given 
in Table 16• This.table indicates that food prices moved much more 
sharply over the period under study than other prices and they greatly 
b Contributed to the general inflationary pressures in the economy. ; ^
y ’ y- Since Pakistan has two distinct geographical yregions, the
price situation varies between the two wings of the country and this > 
warrants a detailed regional study of price situation during; the. 
b period under study. In fact, the entire study needs to be so planned 
•■.-y, as to analyze thefpfice situation and. the. variables af f ecfing it ; ; ,
separately for each wing but the limitations of accurate data > y y
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TABLE 16
: C.S.O .Index of Wholesale .Prices by Groups
’ 1959-60 = 100
Year Food Raw Matcria1s Fuel, Lighting 
and Lubricants
Manufac
1956-57 ; 93.1 102.6 96.4 ,:\\\ 99.7
1957-58 92.8 103.2 ■ 99.2 . 102.1
1958-59 93; 4 :; 92.3 V Vf; 101.1 97.0
1959-60 100.0 100.0 . 100.0 r : 100.0
1960-61 100.5 y H 9 . 2 99.2 101.2
1961-62 106.6 107.3 98.7 / 102.1
1962-63 104.9 105.1 v 99.0 . 104.9
1963-64 104.3 . 105.3 104.5 : 105.8
1964-65 112.1 i 121.4 104.8 . > 107.1
1965-66 117.3 : 125.2 /• 108.5 113.4
1966-67 139.6 124.8 118.0 : l16>t
1967-68 134.7 ■ 106.4 120.0 " 120.0
1968-69 141.8 : • 116. 7 V 123.2 127.8:
Source: C.S.O., Monthly Statistical Bulletins.
and Information on certain import an t variables entering'the ana-; 
lysis> especially the money., supply, impact of deficit f inancing on 
each province, credit expansion for private, sector arising from 
each province,.balance of payments for each wing etc. do not allow 
a separate study. Nevertheless as much regional information would  ^
be given in the study as possible.
The price situation in the two wings has been greatly 
determined by the relative food.position in each wing. In a predo­
minantly agricultural econoiny -with' the majority of population having 
a subsistence living, the foodgrains position has the greatest signi 
ficance for the general price level and the cost of living. The 
foodgrains position is affected not only b,y crop conditions but also 
by expectations about them. A crop:failure .affects.the;foodgrains 
supply directly and also through speculative hoardings so that the 
marketable surpluses decline more than in proportion to the decline 
in output. This is because, while the small: farmers try to maintain 
their consumption, the large farmers build up speculative foodgrain 
hoards io the hope of selling them later at higher prices.' In rural 
areas, a part; of the real balances are held in the form of foodgrain 
stocks and:these stocks increase when food prices are rising^. ; ; 
Generally speaking.,: the prices of rice and jute in East Pakistan 
and those of wheat and cotton in West Pakistan greatly influence the 
general price level. It must also be mentioned that because of a 
larger inflow of goods into East Pakistan from the Western wing, the 
inflationary pressures arising in the latter usually tend to spread 
themselves into the Eastern wing- whereas those generated in East . 
Pakistan often tend to remain confined to that province.
3, Cf. R.C. Porter, ,fThe Dangers of Monetary Policy in Agrarian: 
Economies,n Pakistan Development Review, Vol. I No.3, 1961 and 
HThe Inflationary Implications of Crop "Failure”.,- Op.Cit.
3. The Price Situation In East Pakistan:
There was a sharp rise in prices in East:Pakistan 
during the First Plan period as in the rest of the country. This 
is clearly shown by the P.I.D.E index of wholesale prices given 
in Table 12, though the C*S,0 index given in Table 17 below tells 
a different story as it is based on controlled prices which were 
maintained by the Government through imports and subsidized distri­
bution of foodgrains and other essential commodities. In addition 
to the. effects of devaluation of Pakistan rupee in August 1955, 
Governments deficit financing operations and import restrictions, 
the province also suffered a food shortage caused by recurrent 
floods which sharply reduced the rice production especially in
1955-56 and. 1957-58. With hardly any imports in,1955-56, the rice 
prices rose sharply in this and the following year from Rupees 
13.25 per maund on an average in 1954-55 to Rupees 20.94 in 1955-56 
and to Rupees 30.83 in 1956-57. However, crops were good in 1956-57 
and this had a moderating effect on rice prices in 1957-58. Moreover, 
rice imports into East Pakistan also exceeded half a million ton 
both in 1956-57 and 1957-58. These, coupled with the subsidy on rice 
tended to stabilize the prices in 1957-58. But the crops were again 
badly damaged by floods in 1958-59. Moreover, the subsidy on rice 
was removed in that year and, therefore, the average retail price 
of rice again increased to Rupees 30.50 in 1958-59 and to Rupees 
32.02 in 1959-60, In addition to food, there was also a sharp rise 
in cloth and y^arn prices, sugar and other consumer goods in the 
First Plan period. The price controls were tightened by the military 
regime in 1958-59 and these brought down the cloth and consumer 
prices in that year but they rose again in 1959-60. The jute prices,
which were rising up to 1956-57 took a downward turn in 1957-58 as 
floods in the early season accelerated disposals by cultivators.In
1959-60, however, jute prices moved up as production declined and : 
domestic consumption of raw jute by jute manufacturing firms
increased. The wholesale price index which had taken a; downward turn
and 1958-59 ■ '
in: 1957-58 ^ o s e  again in the following two years. Oh the other hand,
the cost of living indices maintained a Constant upward trend 
throughout the First Plan period due to a serious shortage of food 
and other consumer goods in the province. V
In the Second Plan period, however, there was a tendency . / 
for the prices to stabilize in East Pakistan as elsewhere. Although 
the province was- hit by two cyclones, production of rice crop harvested 
in December I960-January 1961 was at a record level of 9.5 million ; 
tons; The increased local production of rice in East Pakistan conti­
nued to be supplemented by despatches from West Pakistan and subs­
tantial imports from abroad. These factors contributed to keep the i
price of rice at a lower level during 1961 as Compared to I960. The 
jute prices, however, reached unprecedented levels in 1960-61, i ' 
following a very small crop due to damage caused by floods. But the 
effect of this on the general price level was greatly neutralized by 
a substantial reduction in rice prices. .In 1961-62 again the level 
of rice Output remained high and rice prices remained more or less 
unchanged but jute prices subsided to more normal levels in that 
year as a large crop was marketed. The cbst of living, however,' 
continued to rise throughout the Second Plan period despite Govern­
ment's efforts to hold it. Cost of living index at Narayanganj (E.P. ) 
increased frOm 122 in March 1960 to 128 in March 1962 and continued 
to rise till June when it reached 135. This was largely due to
increases in the food, clothing and miscellaneous groups• But in 
the second half of the year not Only the upward trend was arrested 
but there was some decline and the index fell to 130 in December 
which, however., was four points higher than ini the beginning of the 
year. The price of rice which was sharply affected by a bad harvest 
and later by flood damage to crops was kept in check by the supply • 7 ' 
of large quantities from Government stocks and by a large increase 
m  imported wheat from the United States. Yet, the cost of living 
did not get much support because wheat is consumed in very small 
quantities in East Pakistan. The cost of living for industrial 
wankers at Narayangani further increased frOm 128 in M a r c h 1962 7^
to 129 in March 1963. ■■. 7 * ' 7,7 ' .,.7' -777.'- 7 ■ 777‘ --."'7-,
7 Unlike 1962-63., the rice crop was exceptionally good in
1963-64.The^ average wkolesaie 7price70f medium yqudlity; rice at Dacca 
dropped from Rupees 34•00 per maund in July 1963 to Rupees 32.38 
per maund in December due to the arrival of new crops. The all- 
Pakistan Wholesale price index for rice ( 1959-66 = 1 0 0  ) rose from
95.6 in 1961-62 to 103.0 in 1962-63 but dropped to 80.25 in March 
1964, The cost of living index for industrial workers at Narayanganj ; 
however, continued to rise and moved up from 129 in March 1963 to 
131 in March 1964. This was due to the general shortage of housing, 
transport and consumer goods and rise in their prices.
^^77  On the whole, the price situation remained satisfactory till 
the middle of 1964 but inflationary forces.tended tp( become assertive 
thereafter and caused concern to the Government aiid the people alike. 
The wholesale price index ( 1959-60 = 100 ), which had not changed 
much in the first four years of the Plan jumped from 102.6 in 1963-64 
to 111.3 in 1964-65., The rice crop in 1964-65 was marginally smaller 
than in 1963-64 but it exceeded the Plan target by 12,7 per cent. The
58 . 7 -  \ v  ■ . 7 ‘ ■ 7 7 "  ' ' *■ \ v -
price of rice, therefore, remained easy during 1964-65 as in 7 9 7.
1963-64. However, the pyereail price rise was quite significant.; 
in that year !due 760 large monetary expansion and rise in income 
velocity which reflected the increased tempo of development 
activity in the province. Nevertheless, in the Second Plan period, 
as a whole, the general level of prices remained stable despite 
accelerated development expenditures in the province. This was mainly 
due to improved food position during the period and liberalized 
imports of raw materials and finished yproducfs * The general wholesale 
price index increased by only 2.2 per cent annually on the average,
The present structure of the. economy is such that food prices are 7
the most important determinant of the general price level. Hence, 
increased availability of food has been the main factor behind 7
/relative price stability in the Second Plan period while monetary 
factors played only a secondary foie in determining the price level.
By Contrast, the first year of the Third Plan showed a 
substantial rise in the general price level which increased by about 
10 per cent during 1965-66. This was again due to a slight deteriora­
tion in domestic production of rice and dislocation of import trade 
due to Pakistan’s war with India in September 1965. The war resulted j
in lower volume of Imports including raw materials and necessitated 
additional taxation in .the form of import surcharge, thus increasing 7
the prices of imported Commodities. Increased defence expenditure 
also worked in the same direction. The rice price remained high 
during 1965 and the monthly average .wholesale price at Dacca ranged 7
between Rupees 26.45 and Rupees 36.87 per maund compared to Rupees 
22.44 and Rupees 31.25 per maund during 1964. The rise was mainly 
due to tight supply position. The devastating cyclone of May 1965
59
.caused widespread damage to standing crops. The price of rice 
: further rose, when hostilities broke out with India and both 
, ; internal and external communications were adversely affected.
The year 1966-67 saw a further deterioration in the 
price situation. The general wholesale price index rose by about 
;/7,7^f'f7:157por: cent. Once again, availability of food was mainly responsi­
ble for this rise. Domestic production of .rice -recorded a substantial 
fall due to adverse weather conditions, leading to a rise in the price1 
of rice. The food: price index rose from 122.6 in 1965-66 to 148.5 in 
1966-67 due partly to bad crops and partly to restricted availability 
of foodgrains under the P.L. 480 programme. The availability of 
other consumer goods was also reduced by the restrictions on imports 
. necessitated by a long delay in the receipt of foreign economic aid
and the; diversion of a large part of the country’s foreign exchange 
resources to food import. Between April.-0ctober 1966, the wholesale 
7 price index increased by 24,1 points. During the period November 1966 
to March 1967, however, it declined by 6 points, The average wholesale 
price of rice Tremained high during that year. From July 1965 to 
March 1966, the average wholesale price of rice at Dacca ranged between 
Rupees 28.27 to Rupees 36.87 per maund but tlie corresponding figures 
for the-period July 1966 to March 1967 were Rupees 37.00 to Rupees 5:
. 48.50 per maund. The general consumer/price index ( 1959-60 = 1 0 0  )
' at Narayanganj rose from-114.9 to 126.1. The sharp increase in
prices in that year was mainly due to a substantial increase in food 
■ prices though the /monetary factors, especially/ a rise in: income 7 
, yelocitv also contributed, to. it*. 7 ■
77yC.-’‘ There was a substantial improvement in the price situation 7, 
in 1967-68 due to a large increase in the domestic production of : ,
: r i c e  .loading to a decline in food' prices. The wholesale index of
food prices declined from the 1966-67 average of 148.5 to 135.6 
in 1967-68 while the general /wholesale price index declined from
141.5 to 129.7. The .index of raw material prices also fell from
122.5 to 107.1. On the other hand, the consumer price index for
industrial workers at Narayanganj ( 1959-60 == 100 ) rose from 
114.9 in 1965-66 to 126.1 in 1966-67 and to 127.9 in 1967-68. The 
rise in cost of living in 1967-68, despite a fall in general price 
level especially in food price index, may be attributed pai’tly to 
the rise in the Government issue price of both rice arid whjat. in that
year and partly to a rise in the prices of other main heads of
expenditure,comprising the consumer price index. The downward trend 
in prices in 1967-68 was, however, reversed in the last quarter of 
the year. The wholesale price index rose sharply thereafter both
in East and West Pakistan but more markedly in East Pakistan. The 
rise in prices was partly due to end season shortages of food and 
the consequent rise in food prices. The wholesale price index again 
moved up to 141.1 in 1968-69 and its movement was sharper in East 
Pakistan than in West Pakistan. On the whole, the increase in the 
general price level during the first three years of the Third Plan 
was mOre pronounced in the Eastern wing than in the Western wing.
In both parts of the country the. price increases were mainly in 
food items, fuel, lighting and; lubricants group and manufactures•
Table 17 presents the C.S.O indices of wholesale prices for 
East Pakistan, V: ■ : =  y,
4. The Price Movements in West Pakistan: 7 v
The First Plan period was a period of almost cpntinupus 
pressure on prices in West Pakistan as well. On the one hand, there 
were recurrent floods from 1955 to 1957 which created serious food
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shortages that were partially, alleviated by a high rate of imports 
after the middle of 1956. Despite this, the wholesale prices of 
wheat m  important centres of West Pakistan rose by about one-third 
over the 1954-55 level. Imports of other consumer goods were also 
severely restricted due to dwindling foreign exchange reserves. On 
the other hand, monetary expenditures were rising rapidly both in 
; the public and private sectors. Deficit financed development V 
■ expenditures of the Central Government were higher in this province 
and they created inflationary pressures. Moreover, the devaluation 
, of 1955 raised the domestic prices of export products like cotton,
wool etc.. and tnus increased agricultural incomes, giving a push 
to consumption expenditures. At the same time, the rupee prices of 
imported commodities also went.up. The net result was rising prices 
and cost of living in all parts of the province. In 1957-58, however, 
there was some decline in wholesale prices as export prices receded.
The wholesale price of cotton, the major export from West Pakistan,, 
especially declined by about 10 per cent. The consumer and cost of 
living indices, however,5 maintained an upward trend as import res-. 
trictions,were f urther tightened^ and:retailers were able to make - 
large prof its ..The military goyerninent which took . over in October 
1958, tightened direct economic controls and brought profiteers 
and hoarders to books. Large stocks Of consumer goods were then 
' brought to the market and prices showed a marked decline. But the ;
effect of these restrictions lasted only a few months and on the . 
whole during 1958-59 there was again somo rise in prices especially ,
in the free market prices which emerged soon after the restrictions 
• ’.•'•■Were''-'r.el^ x'ed•..H-dwey-er'-,’ the C.S*0 wholesale and donsumer price indices , 
show a decline in that yoar as they are based on controlled prices.
Both the central and provincial budgets for 1958-59 introduced y
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TABLE 17 .
C.S.O. Index of Wholesale Prices for East Pakistan
Y ear General
1959-60
Food
= 100 
Raw
Materials
Fuel, Lighting 
and Lubricants
Manuf a< 
tures•
1956-57 100.9 99.9 108.8 93.7 , 99.4
1957-58 96.0 95.1 92.4 95.8 109.3
1958-59 94.5 96.5 80.6 99.2 97.5
1959-60 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1960-61 102.8 96.5 136.7 99.7 107.3
1961-62 106.8 108.0 101.7 99.7 105.4
1962-63 106.2 108.4 96.0 100.1 102.8
1963—64 102.6 104.0 94.0 105.7 102.1
1964-65 111.3 111.5 . 113*9 103.6 107.0
1965—66 122.8 123.6 124.7 106.7 115.5
1966-67 141.5 148.4 122.5 111.0 115.7
1967-68 129.7 135.6 107.1 111.5 115.9
1968-69 141.1 147.1 122,2 113.2 122.1
Source: C.S.O., Monthly Statistical Bulletin^.
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several new taxes but as deficit financing; still continued,/ 
though in a restricted formy overfall inflationary forces, continued 
in the economy. Moreover, shortages of different kind also conti­
nued, to be felt as imports were severely restricted by the new 
regime in an attempt to cope with the seriously depletedforeign 
exchange reserves and hoarding and profiteering re-emerged. In 
1959-60* there was again a sharp rise in prices and cost of living.
In May 1960, the Government decided to decontrol foodgrain marketing 
and the'issue price of'imported wheat was raised from Rupees 14 to 
Rupees 18 per maund. This, coupled with a drought and reduction in 
domestic production of wheat raised the food prices by about 40 
per cent. However, increased sale of imported wheat gradually 
brought bUCki the rise in food;; prices to about 20 per cent after 
decontrol. During 1958-59 and 1959-60, the annual import of wheat 
was as high ;as 900 thousand tons. On the whole, during the First 
Plan'period, inflationary pressures were less severe in West Pakistan 
than in East Pakistan because of larger, foOd supplies.
There was relative price stability in the province during 
the Second Plan period. The decision to decontrol was extended to 
cotton textiles and other consumer goods in 1961 and therefore 
there was some rise in prices in 1960-61. But as imports were libera­
lized, following the increased foreign aid inflows and improved 
foreign exchange supplies, industrial production increased substan­
tially and therefore the pressure on prices was greatly alleviated.
The year had a fairly good foodgrains harvest, and this, coupled 
with large imports of wheat in i960 and 1961 brought the food prices v 
down, which had risen significantly after decontrol. There was a 
bumper wheat crop in 1961-62and imports also remained high especially 
after the conclusion of a commodity agreement with the United Stales
under which Pakistan was to receive wheat worth S.621 million 
during 1961-62 to 1964-65. The Government then reduced the release 
price for imported wheat to Rupees 14 per maund iri 1962 and the 
prices of domestic wheat also dropped below the support levels in 
some areas. The cost of living, however, increased in all important 
centres of West Pakistan both in 1960-61 and 1961-62 due to decontrol 
and the rising cost of transport, housing and other services* In 
1962-63, however, there was a general decline in the cost of living 
in West Pakistan mainly due to improved food position and a further 
decline in wheat prices. The index of wheat prices ( 1959-60 = 100 ) 
declined in West Pakistan from 114.9 in 1960-61 to 106.61 in 1961-62 
and to 101.43 in 1962-63. The cost of living index for Karachi, which 
rose from 130 in January 1962 to 132 in February came down to 127 by 
the end of December 1962. In March 1963, however, the indices stood 
at 129 at Karachi and 123 at Lahore;
The price of wheat during 1963-64 was generally higher than 
in the previous season. The issue price of imported wheat was raised 
in West Pakistan from Rupees 14 to Rupees 15 per maund in April 1963 
and in East Pakistan from Rupees 12.50 to Rupees 15:per maund in 
November 1963. Import of wheat from the United States under P.L. 480 
programme continued to meet the. food gap in West Pakistan and also 
to improve the critical food situation in East Pakistan following 
a seriops damage, to the rice crop due to drought and later floods*
The wholesale price index for wheat ( 1959-60 s 100 ), which, had 
come down from 114.90 in 1960-61 to 106,61 in 1961-62 and to 101.43 
in 1962-63 rose again to 112.12 in 1963-64. The cost of living index 
at different centres of West Pakistan,:therefore, rose significantly 
during the year but the general wholesale price index remained almost
65 ; ; ....... . .
unchanged* The cost of living; index ( 1948-49 ^ 100 ) increased > ,
at Lahore from 120,3 in 1962-63 to 127.1 in 1963-64. : ;
v The price of wheat moved up very sharply in 1964-65, the
'"irniex:.. ris;ing: from 112.12 in 1963-64 to 122.53 in 1964-65 due to ; ,
poor crops. The C.S .0. index of wholesale prices then showed a
marked rise in West Pakistan from 106.4: in 1963-64 fo; 11.3.6 in
1964-65. The upward trend was most marked in raw materials and food ; 
groups. The prices of fuel, lighting, lubricants and manufactures, 
however, remained fairly steady. Later, in view of the prospect of 
a good crop in April-May, prices began to decline and in March 1965
stood at Rupees 18.51 per maund, the same as in March 1964. In East
■^Pakistan, however,: wheat was available at the subsidized rate of
Rupees 12•50 per maund during 1964 and in the first quarter of 1965.
The price was kept low in order to popularise its use in that province. 
As a result Of the,sharp rise in food prices in West Pakistan, the 
cost of living further moved up at all centres of the province.
Due to a bumper wheat crop in May 1965 and liberal import 
of wheat, the wheat prices declined sharply during the fiscal year 
;1965-66. The index of wheut price in West Pakistan declined from 
122.53 in 1964-65 to 111.66 in 1965-66. The general index of 
wholesale prices in the province also moved down a little. Howev.er, 
due to Pakistan' s war- virith India in September 1965 which resulted in 
a serious shortag'e of .consumer goods on account of restricted imports 
coupled with a high rate of deficit financing, the, general consumer 
price index for industrial workers increased in almost all centres 
of West Pakistan and more particularly at Karachi. In the following 
year, however, there was a very sharp rise in prices in the province 
as in the rest of the country> the' one;hand^ there;^ was a serious - 
. . fall in wheat production because of a drought in West Pakistan.
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Moreover, there was a reduction in the availability of foodgrains 
under the P.L. 480 programme because of the changed United States 
policy towards aid to Pakistan. The index of wheat prices in West 
Pakistan, therefore, jumped to 168.48 from its previous year*s 
level of 111.66 per maund. The average wholesale price of wheat 
started rising after July 1966 and the price quoted at Rupees 
17.42 per maund at Lyallpur ( an important wheat market in West 
Pakistan ) rose to Rupees 24.12 in.November 1966. At the same time, 
the availability of other consumer goods also continued to be 
limited by import restrictions necessitated by a long delay in the 
receipt of foreign economic aid and diversion of scarce foreign 
exchange towards the import of foodgrains. The index of wholesale 
prices in West Pakistan, therefore, jumped from 112.0 in 1965-66 to
124,4 in 1966-67. The consumer price index ( 1959-60 - 100 ) also 
jumped from 118.6 to 129.1 at Karachi and from 122.3 to 134.9 at 
Lahore.
The effect of food shortage in 1966-67 continued for most 
part of 1967-68 as well. However, there was a good crop in April-May 
that year and the P.li. 480 food imports were also restored to their 
former level. Foodgrain imports from Pakistani own foreign exchange 
earnings were also high and, therefore, the price situation was 
greatly eased. The index of wheat prices in West Pakistan declined 
from 168.48 in 1966-67 to 149.10 in 1967-68. The general index of 
wholesale prices also displayed a continuous declining trend during 
the year. It stood at 130.29 in March 1967 but declined to 124.34 in 
March 1968. As in East Pakistan, the sharpest decline in West Pakistan 
occurred in the prices of raw materials. The index for the food 
group was, however, lower in West Pakistan than in East Pakistan. The 
declining trend in general price level and cost of living had started 
since May 1967. This continued up to March 1968 but prices started
— ^ — i-------------------------- — — !— — — — -----------■ : ■ >  ' ■_____________ L _____________ - U  l J ____________ ■'
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rising again from April 1968. Between April and November 1968, 
the wholesale price Index increased rather sharply. The rise; 
in prices was partly due to the end season food shortages and 
the rise in food prices* The wholesale and cohsumer price indices 
rose more sharply in 1968-69 and more markedly in East Pakistan 
than in West Pakistan. The long prevailing disparity between 
prices in East and West Pakistan:5 (v the former experiencing: more 
inflationary p.resfsures than the latter ) continued almost at the 
same ratio in the first three years of the Third Plan* ,
Table 18 gives the. C.S.O indices of wholesale prices in 
West Pakistan and Table 19 gives the break-up of these indices for 
important commodities in both wings. Chart II graphically presents 
the inflationary price trends in Pakistan during the period under
5 • The Overfall Rate of Inflation: \ i
On the whole, each of the above mentioned indices tells a 
somewhat different story about the rate of inflation in Pakistan.
For the First Plan period, the PVI.D.Eindex based on free market 
prices indicates the sharpest rise as compared with other indices*
Next to this,:the implicit national income deflator also shows a | 
fairly,sharp rise because of the fact that it is abroad^based 
index covering a large variety of prices including the most sensitive 
ones. For the Second Plan period, however, all indices indicate 
relative price stability. But for the first three years of the Third 
Plan all indices again show a sharp rise in prices as.compared with 
the Second Plan.period. Considering the movements of implicit national 
income def lator and the C .S *0 indices, the average annual rate of 
inflation in Pakistan during the period under study works out to a 
littie over 5 per cent. But when the. movements of the P.I*D.£
68
C.S.O . Index
TABLE 18 
of Wholesale Prices for West Pakistan
Manufac­
tures
Year General
1959-60 =* 
F Food
100
Raw
Materials
Fuel, Lighting 
and Lubricants
1956-57 90.0 83.4 98.8 97.6 99.8
1957-58 95 • 4 89.4 109.9 100.6 99,8
1958-59 92.8 88.9 99.6 101.9 96.8
1959-60 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1960-61 104.8. 106.3 108.2 99.0 99.2
1961-62 104.7 104.7 110,8 198.3 ■ 101.0
1962-63 102.9 99.9 110; 6 98.5 105.6
1963-64 106.4 104.6 112.4 103.9 107.1
1964-65 113.6 113.1 126.0 105.3 .107.2
1965-66 112.0 108.2 125.6 109.2 112.7
1966-67 124.4 126,9 126.2 120.9 117.0
1967-68 126.0 133.3 106.0 123,6 121.7
1968-69 129.5 134.0 113.2 127.4 129.8
Source: C.S.O., Monthly Statistical Bulletins,
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.wholesale price index are taken into consideration, this average 
:rises to 8 per cent per annum for the entire period covered by 
this study* .'7,
\ Economists have pointed out that for an under-developed
country, a rate of inflation of about 5 per cent is not very 
serious^. Viewed in this way,, it may; be said that Pakistan has 
; ehjoyed;reasonable price stability in the course of her economic, 
development* The average rate of inflation shown by different 
official indices also compares very favourably with several other 
under-developed countries during the period under study. Table 20 
gives a comparison of the average rate of increase in the cost of 
living of selected countries. This table indicates that very high 
rates of; inflation were experienced, by the Latin American countries 
during the period concerned while most of the Asian countries enjoyed 
relative price slability. Among the Asian countries also Pakistan1s ; 
performance has been relatively better. However, in order to under- 
stand Pakistan inflation more fully, the following, facts must be 
borne/mind.  ^ ;= /-: " ,:.rr\ V- i - /
C Firstly, statistics on prices and cost of livingare
grossly under-estimated. Difficulties of obtaining correct inform 
malion from different markets and of compiling accurate statistics 
in a country where statistical machinery is still rudimentary are 
enormous. Moreover, the weights used in the compilatibn of various 
indices are often outdated and tend to present an under-estimated 
picture. The actual rate oiV inflation and the: p i m  h of rising cost
4. See, for example, H.G. Johnson, Essays in Monei ary Economics, 
(London, 1967), Chapter IX P. 284 and Irving 8. Friedman, . 
’’Comments on Monetary Problems of Pakistan'1, Journal of Political 
Economy, August, 1967, P , 651.
TABLE 20
;Average Rates of Inflation in Selected Countries '
Cost of Living Indices only (Per Cent P er Annum)
Country f t 1954-59 1960-65 1966-6J
Argentina , 33.3 . ■ ./ 23.9 27.0
Australia 2.5 ^. 2 ■ . 3.0
Bolivia 86 .9 . : :',6 *3 i:1 6i0
Brazi1 ■ ■ 21,9 ' ■> 58.0 ' V'7- 43,0
Canada 1.6 ; 7 ' 1.6 7 .;Vf: 3.7
Chile • 49.8 25.2 27.2
France 4.3 3,7 3.8
Ghana i 2.1 10.2 ' 1*'2'
India - 2.4 5.5 7.4
I rah 7.6 . 3.4
. ' ■’ ■ 1*7
Japan . 1.6 7- 5.9 5.6
Korea 25.6 14.4 14.3
Mexico 7.6 2.5 3.4
Pakistan : 1.8 •/. 4.2 . 6.3
Philippines 0.7 4.7 - : : ‘ 4.5
Turkey 14.1 4,2 10.2
U.A.F. ' * 0.4 2.9 2.4.
U.K. 2.7 3.1 4.3
U.S.A. . 1.4 ' 1.3 3.9
Sburce:; Joseph, O. Adekurile, "Rates, of Inflation in Industrial, 
Other 'Developed aid Less Developed Countries, 194-9-6511, 
H '  I.K.F. Staff FapersiAfol; 'Xfei968', Table 5 and l.M.F. ;C 
International Financial Statistics, October 1969,p.31.
of living felt by the common man is often much more than; what thei. ij-:, 
official indices show. ,
Moreover, direct economic controls in Pakistan including 
import controls have most of the time suppressed income velocity 
of money. The income velocity increased sharply whenever direct ; J 
controls were relaxed. If inflation had not been repressed and ; 
income"velocity had been allowed a free play, price increases would 
have been much more pronounced than actually recorded by most of ; 
the indices examined above*  ^ : •)
It must also be remembered that price inflation in 
Pakistan has been greatly diverted towards the balance of payments 
pressures which were pretty Strong throughout the period under study 
in spite of import controls and attempts to accelerate exports. The 
current account deficits were greatly relieved by large foreign 
caoital inflows yet foreign exchange; reserves were also seriously. 
depleted in several years under study. Internal inflationary 
pressures were, t h u s g r e a t l y  cushioned -by the external sector. If 
pressure oh the balance of payments and foreign exchange reserves 
is also taken into account, the overfall inflationary pressures 
would become ;all the more?significant*) ‘  ^ ; )
Lastly, a substantial part of the inflationary pressures 
in Pakistan have been absorbed by relative wage rigidities. As 
expected in a labour surplus economy, with relatively less organised 
laDour, money wages in Pakistan have increased in the process of 
inf lata on) but)their : .risewas pf ten much loss than the rise in the 
cost of living so that real wages were often adversely affected. Due 
to this wage«lag;, inf lationary-pressures cbuld not fully spread - 
themsevles and the working classes had to bear the brunt of inflation
In most modern economies, wages.either serve as the initiator 
of inflationary pressures or at least: play:a n ■ adtive;role in ; 
their transmission. This is true riot only of developed Countries 
but also of the Latin American countries where 'industrialization 
has gone far ahead of the less developed countries of Asia. In 
Pakistan wages have tended to absorb a part of the inflationary 
pressures created by large monetary flows and shortage of essential V;
commodities including food, .?
All these points would be elaborated further in the study,
6. A Preliminary Analysis of Price Changes;
As a ppelude to the analysis proposed to be.done in this 
study, a preliminary analysis of the observed price changes in 
Pakistan may be rendered here. This will, in a nutshell, give the 
combined effect of all the.forces exerting inflationary pCCssure 
in the economy of Pakistan during the period under study. The v
analysis would be based on all-Pakistan data as details of some
relevant variables are not available separately for each wing. 
Moreover, only aiinual changes in prices would be considered because 
quarterly changes in some variables required to exp$&in these changes 
like national income etc. are not at present compiled in Pakistan. ,
, : As mentioned earlier, the price level in Pakistan.was
declining in the).pre^Plan period mainly because income velocity 
maintained a downward trend in that period as spending opportunities 
were greatly limited by/the existence';'.of- direct: economic Controls. 
Monetary expansion on account.of deficit financing was being greatly 
absorbed by the rising money-income ratio. On the other hand, the 
foreign exchange reserves accumulated during the Korean War boom 
were being spent on supplementing the domestic availabi1ities 
including' f ood supplies which were causing great concern in the face
of stagnant agricultural output and rapidly rising population, .
A substantial part of;Internal monetary expansion was thus also 
being absorbed by the balance of payments deficits.
In 1955-56, the G.N.P deflator showed a rise of 6.9 per 
cent while the P.I.P.E index Of wholesale prices based on free 
market prices recorded a steep rise, of about 25.8 per cent. This 
can be partly accounted for by net deficit financing of Rupees 
166 million during the year and aggregate monetary expansion of 
Rupees 629 million. At the same time, there was a decline of about 
,8 per cent in food output and as imports under the P.L. 480 programme 
were still low and foreign exchange position was tight, food imports 
supplemented the domestic out-put only to a limited extent. The 
import prices also jumped up in that year due to the devaluation of 
Pakistan'rupee in July 1955 and the terms of trade deteriorated, by 
about 14 per cent. The money-income ratio, however, reached a peak 
of 0.198 because of high monetary expansion and limited spending^ 
opportunities on account of continued direct economic controls. Money 
balances, therefore, accumulated with the public which were rapidly 
spent in the following year. The rise in .prices in this year would 
probably have been greater if income velocity had not substantially 
declined. . ,
In the following year, net deficit financing increased 
further to Rupees 416 million and there was a sharp rise in bank 
credit to the private sector but due to the contractive effect of 
the external seetor which showed a deficit Of Rupees 217 million, 
the money supply increased only by Rupees 466 millioni- However j 
there was a sharp rise in income velocity arid the money-income ratio 
declined from 0.198 in the previous year to 0.186 in this year. The
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food position was, however, good in this year as the foodgrain 
output increased by.18•5 per cent and PVL. 480 food imports also 
increased sighificantly. But on account of a substantial monetary 
expansion and a sharp, rise in income velocity, the price level , 
increased very sharply. The P .I .D .E index showed a rise of 30.4 
per cent and the implicit national income deflator recorded an 
increase of 11.1 per cent. , i
In '1957-58, the quantum of deficit financing further 
increased to Rupees 67:1. million but the private sector exercised 
a net contractive eff ect:; ofRupees 90 million on money supply due 
to a significant shift on the part of the public towards time 
deposits. At the same time, the foreign sector also exercised a 
net contractive effect of Rupees 282 million so that the money 
supply increased only by Rupees 366 million,.There was also a 
slight decline in income velocity. But on the other hand, the • 
foodgrain output in that year declined by 6 per cent and the P.X.
4 8 0 imports were also less than in the previous year. At the same 
time, other imports declined by about 11 per cent in real terms 
and thus general availabilities m  the economy were poor in that 
year. The prices then recorded an increase.of 5.5 per cent according 
to the G.N.P deflator. The P.I.D.E index, however, showed some 
decline because of the fact that the, prices of rice and wheat used 
in this index .declined during the year and this index has assigned 
heavy weight to these two commodities t The prices of raw materials 
and manufactures therefrom also declined significantly during the
year. - ^ i
In the following year, net deficit financing declined to 
Rupees 223.5 million as the military regime decided to curb the
deficit rate with a view to stabilize the price.level. The private 
sector exercised a net contractive effect of Rupees 57.4 million 
as economic activities were greatly reduced due to tightening of 
economic controls and the flow of bank credit to the private sector 
was less than in the previous year. Moreover, there was a significant 
shift towards time deposits during the year which .meant a leakage 
from the money supply. The external sector, however, exercised a net 
expansionary effect of Rupees 121.7 million in that year. The money 
supply, therefore, increased by Rupees 195 million; On the other 
hand, the income velocity declined:sharply due to tightening of. 
economic controls by the military regime and the money-income ratio 
rose to a high level of 0.197. The new regime also strongly curbed 
profiteering and hoarding. Although foodgrain output declined by .
2.2 per cent during the year and real Impoi'ts declined by about 20 
per cent due to stricter import controls, general availabilities, 
however, increased significantly' as speculative hoards were brought 
to the market. Due to an increase in..;.aVailabil'ities>:ahd\:ai decline 
in income velocity on account of strict economic controls, the G .K .P . 
deflator recorded a decline of 3.2 per cent. The P .1.D .E index 
however, registered a movement b a c k  to its 1956-57 level as the 
market prices of wheat and rice in East and West Pakistan went up 
due tO a decline in foodgrain output, v: /
. , In 1959-60, there was another sharp rise in prices when 
the national income deflator recorded a rise of 8.7 per cent and 
the P .1.D,E index rose from 115.4 to 121.8. Net deficit financing . 
in that year was negative t o the tune of Rupees 35 mi H i  on but the 
private and foreign sectors exercised a net expansionary effect of 
Rupees 165 million and Rupees 220 million respectively and therefore, 
the money supply increased by 302 million. At the same time, income
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velocity also rose very sharply as a movement towards decontro1 
and liberalization of the economy started in the later part of; 
the fiscal year. The money-income ratio dropped to 0* 185♦ General : 
availabilities in the economy were quite good during the year a s ,. 
the foodgrain output increased by 13*6 per cent and the P.L,.480 
food imports also1 increased further. The over-all rate of growth • 
maintained, by the economy was also fairly high, namely over 4 per 
cent. Moreover, due to relaxations in import control, imports in 
real terms increased by 59 per cent,. Nevertheless, the rise in 
prices can bo accounted for b y t h e s h a r p  rise in income velocity 
during the year initiated by relaxations in direct economic controls. 
In the Second Plan period, there was considerable price 
stability on account of high rates of growth and liberalization of 
imports together with increased monetary and fiscal controls 
exercised by the authorItiesi:In 1960-61, net deficit financing 
amounted to Rupees 108 million; and the private sector also exercised 
a net expansionary effect of Rupees 135 million on the money supply 
but the foreign Sector absorbed a large part of the internal monetary 
expansion so that net increase in money supply was only Rupees 29 
million. But with; the liberalization of imports and:other economic; 
controls, income velocity increased further and the money-income 
ratio declined sharp1y to 0,168. General availabilities in the 
economy were very good because of liberalized imports, expanded ; 
P.L. 480 programme- and a rise of 7 ;per = cenb in Topdgpairi: output. 
However, because of a sharp rise in income velocity, the price level 
went up by 5.per cent as shown by the G.N.P deflator. The G.S.O index 
of wholesale prices, however, showed a rise of only 3 per cent as the 
;price of:rice in East Pakistan declined significantly during the year 
due to a good crop and it has a substantial weight in the index.
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The following year, net deficit financing totalled 
Rupees 290 million and the private sector also exercised a net 
expansionary effect of Rupees 411 million on the money supply.
But due to a large contractive effect of the external sector, 
the money supply increased by Rupees 226 million. Income velocity ;v 
also increased to some extent in that year as the money-income 
ratio declined from 0.168 to 0.166. But, on the other hand, the 
rate of economic growth was high during the year, namely 6 per 
cent. The food output also went up by 1.9 per cent and imports in 
real terms were also higher than in the previous year and, therefore, 
general availabilities in the economy were very good. The G.N.P 
deflator, therefore, showed a decline of 0.9 per cent in that year* 
The C.S.O index of wholesale prices however, moved in a different 
, direction and j^howedi a rise of 2.8 per cent due tor the fact that 
wholesale prices of rice, fish and cotton manufactures in East 
Pakistan recorded a significant rise as the supply, position was 
not good in that province and East Pakistan has a heavy weight in 
the wholesale price index. The cost of living also, therefore, showed 
a rise in that province. ' ' b
In 1962-63, the G.N.P deflator recorded a rise of 1.9 per 
cent but the C.S.O wholesale price index showed a decline of 1 per 
cent. The disparity between the two indices is quite understandable 
as the national income deflator is a broad-based index and includes 
the prices of all goods and services comprising the national income 
whereas the wholesale price index includes only the change in 
wholesale prices of major commodities in different markets. As the 
prices of jute and jute manufactures,; cotton and cotton manufactures 
and wheat registered a decline in;both provinces, the wholesale price
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index was markedly influenced by them. Monetary expansion in that ; 
.year was fairly high namely Rupees 84 6  million which was jointly 
contributed by the Government, the private and the foreign sectors 
to the extent of Rupees 165, Rupees 3 6 4  and Rupees 2 7 4  million 
; respectively. But income velocity in that year declined as money t; 
balances were hot quickly spent by the public and the money-income 
ratio increased to 0.179, The foodgrain output during the.year 
declined by 3*7 per cent but it was very heavily supplemented by 
imports under the P i L .  4 8 0  programme and imported wheat was 
released by the Government at reduced prices in both wings of the 
cduhtry. Other imports in real terms also increased by 16 per cent. 
Thus monetary expansion was partly absorbed by an increase in the 
demand for money arid partly by good supplies in the economy and, 
therefore, the pressure On prices was not much, ' .
In the following year, monetary expansion was one of the 
V; highest especially as net deficit financing increased sharply to ;
Rupees 627 million and the contribution of private sector to monetary 
expansion also turned out to be high, namely Rupees 418 million. 
Deficit financing was high in that year because Government1s capital 
expenditures rose sharply in an attempt to achieve the Plan targets 
well in time. On the other hand, with import Tiberalization, economic 
activities in the private sector were already increasing. Internal 
. monetary expansion was, however, partly absrobed by the contractive 
effect of the foreign sector of about Rupees 153 million. The money 
supply, therefore, increased by Rupees 1029 million. Rut it was 
; heavily absorbed by a sharp rise in money-incoiue ratio to 0.192 and 
also a high rate of economic growth of 8.3 per cent. The foodgrain 
, output also went up by 12.4 per cent and it was, heavily supplemented 
by P.L. 480 food imports. Other imports in real ternis also increased
by 23 per cent in that year. For all these reasons, the G.N.P deflator 
registered a decline of 1 per cent; during the year. The G.S.0 whole­
sale /price index, however, recorded only a nominal decline of 0.2 
per cent.
in 1964-65, net deficit financing was reduced to Rupees 
359 million but there was a sharp rise in private sector's contri­
bution to money isupply namely of Rupees 920 million. Internal 
monetary expansion wasj however, partly absorbed by the contractive 
effect of the foreign sector of Rupees 357 million. The money supply, 
therefore, increased by Rupees 682 million. This was also coupled 
with a rise in income.velocity as the money balances accumulated in 
the previous year were rapidly spent in that year and the money- 
income ratio declined to 0,189. Although the economy maintained a 
rate of growth of 4.5 per cent and the; foodgrain output' also increased 
by 2,5 pet cent, the pressure on food prices was quite significant ;;
in both wings. Prices of cotton,;jute and jute manufactures also 
increased significantly; during the year. The wholesale price index 
then recorded a rise of 7.4 per cent and the G.N.P deflator a rise ; 
of 4 per cent, , .
In the following year, net deficit financing was the 
highest namelyRupees 1680 million on account of a sharp rise in t .
defence expenditure due to Pakistan's war with India. But the ; ;
private sector exercised a net contradtive effect of Rupees 445 ;
million as time deposits increased significantly due to limited 
spending opportunities in the economy as a consequence of the 
tightening of economic coiitrols. For the same reason, the money- 
income ratio also reached a peak of 0,198. Although, money supply 
in that year increased by Rupees 1221 million, it was greatly
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absorbed by the rise in money-income ratio. The over-all rate 
of growth in the economy was 4.6 per cent but the foodgrain 
output declined by 3.3 per cent due to unfavourable weather 
conditions. On the other hand, P.L. 480 imports were also 
greatly reduced on account of cut-backs in foreign aid. Other 
imports into the economy were also seriously curtailed due to \
foreign exchange difficulties. The G.N.P deflator then recorded 
a rise of .4.5 per cent and the wholesale price index a rise of
4.6 per cent. Wheat prices,; however, remained low because of a t ; 
bumper crop in 1964-65. . , , ; • . ,
: :dn; 1966-67,; the price rise was one of; the highest recorded,
during the period .under study. The wholesale price index jumped from
117.5 in 1965^66 to .133,9 in that; year 'Showing a rise of. about 14
per cent. The national income deflator also recorded-a rise of 12.1
per cent. The -Sharp rise in prices was to a considerable extent due
to; a rapid increase in income velocity as the public spent their
money balances rapidly after relaxations in direct .economic controls
and the money-income ratio declined from 0.198 to 0.178. Net deficit
financing was negative in this year to the time of Rupees 7.9 million
but private borrowings.from the banking system increased sharply as
.economic activities7reco&i$£^^ effect of Pakistan1 s
war with India. The private sector exercised a net expansionary . ;
effect of Rupees 835,million but the external sector absorbed a part
of the internal monetary expansion by registering a deficit of Rupees
493 million. The aggregate money supply, therefore, increased fey
Rupees 541 million. The monetary factors responsible for inflationary
pressures were coupled with the deterioration in/food position in.
both parts of the country due to drought and floods. Foodgrain output
declined by 4.3 per cent and the P.L.:480 food imports continued to
be low. Food prices, therefore, jumped up very sharply. Although 
the economy maintained an over-all growth of 5 per cent and real 
imports increased by 32 per cent with a revival towards economic 
liberalization, the poor food supplies together with large 
monetary flows caused a severe pressure on prices during the year• 
In the following year, the government and foreign sectors 
exercised net expansionary effects of Rupees 685 million and v ; 
Rupees 173 million respectively on the money supply but the private 
sector exercised a net contractive effect of Rupees 83 million as 
there was a largo shift towards time deposits during the year. The 
money supply,5 -thereforey increased by Rupees 375 million* This was 
also coupled with some increase in income, velocity as the money- 
income ratio fui ther declined to 0.174. Blit the over-all growth in 
the economy was one of the highest recorded during the period Under 
study, namely 7*5 per. cent: and the foodgrain output increased by 
22 per cent due to exceptionally good crops. The P *L. 480 food 
imports a I so revived to their f ormer level with a revival of , 
foreign'economic aid to Pakistan. Aggregate imports in real terms, 
were also high as import controls had already been liberalized in 
the previous year. For all these reasons,' general .availabilities 
in the economy were exceptionally: .good ;• T h e ’.wholesale.'price index 
therefore recorded a decline of 4 per cent and the G.N.P deflator 
a decline of 1.5 per cent despite the fact that' the monetary 
factors, exercisfed a significant expansionary effect.
CHAPTER ill
WAGE MOVEMENTS, INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND INVESTMENT. PATTERN ;
An inflationary economy is bound to exhibit certain : 
distortions and repercussions. Normally, inflation adversely 
affects the distribution of income, the pattern of investment 
and the balance of payments position of the country concerned. 
Inflation generally turns the distribution of income in favour 
of capitalists, entrepreneurs and others who benefit by rising 
prices. On the other hand, wage-earncrs and fixed income groups 
suffer from inflation. Wages often tend to lag behind the rising 
prices and this is more likely to be the case in a labour surplus 
edonomy. Iiising prices and profits .coupled with wage-1ags: and 
other income rigidities create serious distortions in the, distri­
bution of national income. The pattern of investment and resource 
allocation is also adversely affected by the inflationary rise 
in prices. While aggregate investment; ( including fixed investment 
and stock formation ) tends to rise with rising prices, the tendency 
to hedge against inflation begins to gain ground and the,investment 
pattern tends to be biased towards less productive forms like 
the acquisition of real assets. Investment in real.estate and; stock­
piling is often encouraged in the process of inflation and the. 
stronger the inflationar’y pressures, the greater will be this
tendency. Lastly, inflation affects the balance of payments position
• : ■ ' ' . . ■ / i V : -.exports- and •eiicouraging >"
of the country by discouraji^ng^imports provided the rest of the 
world is experiencing no inflation or less inflation. The balance 
of payments problems of Pakistan will be examined in a later
chapter while the effects of inflation on the distribution of 
income and resource allocation are discussed in the. present
chapter, ~ ■ >; ' ■  -,’v- • “■ : /
1. Wage Movements And Income Distribution;
When, prices are rising, the working classes try to 
maintain thbir share in the real national income by demanding 
higher wages with every price increase. To what extent they are 
able to maintain their share in the real national income depends, 
upon ;the pace of wage increases, viz-a-viz price increases and 
this in turn depends upon the bargaining power of labour as a 
class. In a labour surplus;economyj with considerable unemploy­
ment, the bargaining power; of labour is greatly weakened. Labour 
is, also often less organised in these countries because of the f i 
lack of industrial traditions and education among the working; 
classes. Nevertheless, some rise in wages does take place in the 
process of inflation though the wagc-lag is often well marked.
Wages in Pakistan increased in the process of inflation but they 
could not keep,pace with the rising prices. Complete;wage statistics 
are not available for all years and all sectors of the, economy as 
this is the most neglected aspect of the statistical information 
compiled in Pakistan.; However, the avaialble data Von money and 
real wage rates in the manufacturing sector of Pakistan are given 
in Table 21. Chart III presents this information graphically. It 
is evident from this table that money wages in the manufacturing
sector remaihb.dt.aimb^t’v-§'t:&tic'^duMVngb.the. .period- 1956-59 though 
prices were rising at a fast rate so that real wages declined
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significantly in this period. There was a noticeable increase 
in money, wages after 1959 and they increased substantially; 
during the period 1963-66» The real wages, however, maintained 
a declining trend until about 1962 as the rise in money wages 
lagged behind the rise in cost of living. But during the period
1963-66, the real wages also increased to some extent. On the 
whole, the rise in wages has lagged behind the rise in prices 
and the growth of gross national product. Due to this wage-lag 
in Pakistan, the’real wages remained stuck up at what may be 
called the bare subsistence level and, living standards of the 
working classes did not show any significant improvement.
The obvious explanation of this wage-lag in Pakistan 
and probably in.some other Asian countries also, is the presence; 
of an excess supply; of unskilled labour and the consequent com­
petition between them due to which the employers need not bid 
for them by offering higher wages. The high rate of population 
growth and of labour force with comparatively little indus­
trialization in Pakistan has resulted in serious unemployment 
and under-employment and this has greatly affected the level of 
wages and their rate of increase in the process of economic, 
development. This does not mean that industrialization and economic 
development have not resulted in a rise in the demand fbr labour 
but the fact is that while the rising demand for labour slightly 
reduced unemployment, the real wage remained almost unchanged. As 
shown earlier, money wages in Pakistan increased in the process 
of development and inflation but most of the time their rate of 
increase lagged behind; the rate of increase in prices and cost 
of living so that the real wage either declined or increased very
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slowly. It is generally thought that at least for some time to 
come the real wage of unskilled workers in Pakistan is not 
likely to rise much though their productivity would rise with 
capital accumulation and technical progress, due to the excess 
supply of labour and high unemployment. The per capita incomes 
; ; hate; also risen with a rise in the G.N.P but the rate of increase . t ;
in real wage has lagged behind the rise of per capita income 
also. The standard, of living of the working classes has, therefore, .
not changed much despite economic development. This seems to be 
true not only for Pakistan but for the South Asian region as a 
whole'*'. . . t y :.
Wages .in Pakistan are generally fixed through collective 
bargaining and they differ from one industry and occupation to 
■- another• The wage rates given in Table ,21 are annual averages of t rVtt
various manufacturing, industries in Pakistan. By and,large, the 
bargaining position of workers in most industries is very weak and 
they are also not properly organised. In order to protect, the 
interest of those workers who are in an unusually weak position 
or do not have an organised trade union, a minimum wages ordinance 
was promulgated by the Central Government in 1961. Under this, 
the Government regulates wages in those industries where it feels 
that they are inadequate. This is done through a wage board which 
includes representatives of the Government, the employers and 
workers. However, in most cases wages are fixed through direct 
. negotiations ’between the;workers^1 unions and the employers. But I >;
1. C f . A .D. Smith ( Ed. ), Wage Policy Issues in Economic ; i
Development (Macmillan and C o ., London, 1969) Part A 
; Section III and the I.L.O, General Report to the Asia.n ,y
Advisory Committee, ( Singapore, December, 1966) PP 58-59.
TABLE 21
Movement of Money and Real Wages in the Manufacturing
Sector of Pakistan^
Year Average Money Wages 
in Manufacturing 
Sector (Annual)
Index
1955=100
Average Real 
Wages in 
Manufacturing 
Sector*
(Annual)
Index
1955=:
1956 996 103.6 1023 100.9
1957 977 101.7 931 91.9
1958 995 103.5 881 86.9
1959 991 103.1 901 88.9
1960 1119 116.4 956 94.3
1961 1098 114.2 900 88.8
1962 1061 110.4 849 83.8
1963 1262 131.3 1018 100,5
1964 1483 154.3 1149 113.4
1965 1392 144.8 1031 101.7
1966 1524 158.5 1120 110.5
1967 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
1968 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
+ Deflated by the Cost of Living Index.
Source: Computed from the I.L.O., Yearbooks of Labour Statistics.
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on the whole the trade.union movement in Pakistan is still very f 
weak. Most of the unions are organised: within individual estab- . v
lishments and their development on the basis of craft or of 
industry is not yet a common feature. Taken all round, the role of 
collective bargarriingihSputh Asia seems to be still very limited^. ■
In twostudies on wages in Pakistan, A.R.Khan found that'
although the money wage rates increased over the decade 1954-64
both in East and West Pakistan, the real wages declined in that ; ,
period. He also found that there is not much difference between
the average wage in the industrial arid agricultural sectors. Com-, 
petition in the labour market has tended to narrow the gap between 
wages;in the two sectors" to a level necessary to compensate for 
urban-rural differences in cost of living and rudimentary training 
provided to unskilled andsemi-skilled workers in the industrial 
sector'? ■* r :" _
Working on tlie data contained in the C>S.O Censuses of • ; ' !
Manufacturing Industi't^s^, A.R.Khan, found that during the period
1954-55, real wages in East Pakistan, for industry as a whole,
remained lower in all years as compared with the base year (1954)•
The real wage declined sharply in 1955 and then remained fairly , 
stable until 1962-63 when the recovery was more pronounced. For 
textiles in East Pakistan, there was a small, rise in 1955 over the:; .
2. Cf. A.D . Smith, Op.Cit. P. 25 - "A; A'/..- ^''A;
3. Cf. A.R.Khan, ’'What Has Been Happenning to Real Wages in Pakistan11 
Pakistan Development Review, V o l i V i l  ; No?3, Autumn, 1967 and also A 
Wages, arid Prices in Karachi: A Case Study, (P .1 .D *E Monograph No*8,
■ ' Karachiy 1961) . v .i : A;: A/. A
4. These are not annual and are available only for some years.
A
base year and then a fairly sharp decline in 1957; Recovery 
started from 1958 arid continued lip to 1962-63 when the base 
year value was. slightly exceeded.: An upward bias in East 
Pakistan textile wages is created throughout the period due to 
continuous rise in the share of jute textiles (wages in jute; 
textiles; being ori the average about 20 per cent higher than wages 
in cotton textiles ). When real wage rates for jute and cotton 
textiles are estimated separately, real wages in each of them were
still lower by 1962-63 as compared with the base year.
In West Pakistan, the result is more striking. The real 
wage rate for aggregate industries dropped in 1955 over the base 
year level and remained fairly stable until 1962-63 when it dropped 
sharply:again. In textiles also, there was a fairly sharp decline 
up to 1957 after which it remained stable for about half a decade.
It again declined by a few percentage points in 1962-63, Thus real
wages at the aggregate level have, on the average, been about 25
per cent higher in West thari in East Pakistan, This does not 
include any adjustment for the regional difference iri purchasing 
power. When adjusted for the difference in purchasing power of wages 
in the two regions, the disparity would be greater. A study made by 
Abdul tihafur on interregional purchasing power of wages indicates 
that the prices of wage-goods on the average were about 10 to 15
per cent higher iriiEast,Pakistan in the years 1961 and 1965-66 for
A A ' 5  '
wttich he has undertaken the study .
5. Cf. Abdul Ghafur, "A Comparison of the Interregional Purchasing 
Power of,Industrial Wages in Pakistan", Pakistan Development 
Review, Winter 1967.
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TABLE 23
RATIO OF WEST PAKISTAN1S REAL WAGE TO EAST PAKISTAN1S 
REAL WAGE ( BASED ON CMI DATA ) "
YEAR ALL INDUSTRIES COTTON TEXTILES
1954 1.22 1.38
1955 1.30 1.46
1957 1.25 1.46
1958 1.26 1.47
1959-60 1.27 1.48
1962-63 >- 1.17 1.42
Source: A.R.Khan, Op.Cit, Table V
9 6
To overcome the possible distortion due to the difference 
in regional composition of industries, one could refer to the 
regional disparity in cotton textile wbrkers’ wages.This is con­
siderably greater than the disparity for the aggregate manufacturing 
sector ( about 45 per cent higher in West Pakistan than in the 
East on an average ). Table 22 presents the real wages in East and 
West Pakistan based on the Censuses of Manufacturing Industries 
data. Table 23 presents the ratio of West Pakistan1s real wage to
East Pakistan's real wage. ; -V , .
It is obvious that any rise in money wages during the 
: period under study would have been passed on to the consumers in
the form of higher prices but there is no evidence in Pakistan of 
a wage-price spiral as such. On the contrary, wages liave risen 
rather reluctantly during the period mnder study and the burden; of . !r » 
inflation has been greatly borne by the working classes/Wages are 
often an important transmitter and in some economies the initiator 
of inflation but in the case of Pakistan, because of high unemploy- 
. ment and abundant supply of labour, the rate of inflation has been
; greatly curbed by tho slow rise in wages and absence of a wage-
price spiral* v\v;-
On the other hand, inflation has promised high profits to 
entrepreneurs. There has been a fairly wide gap between the input 
and output prices of maufactured goods as wages and raw material 
prices haVe risen at a slower rate than the prices of manufactured- 
goods. Liberal tax concessions, high protective tariffs,. over-valued 
: ;;currency and low-priced labour have all ensured high prof its to the ,
manufacturers in Pakistani In the,early years of industrialization 
profits were especially high because of limited .competition. As
competition grew in the manufacturing sector, profit margins 
somewhat declined,! yet remained on the'higher side. According: 
to tlie Censuses of Manufacturing Industries, gross profits 
( value added minus employment costs ) as a per cent of sales 
( value of products made ) were as high as 23 per cent in 1954 
but they dropped to 20 per cent in 1957. Gross profits in cotton 
.textiles declined more sharply from 35; per cent to 24 per cent in
the same period^. From:a study of public limited companies .quoted
on Karachi Stock Exchange, K. Ilaq and M.. Baqai have reported that 
gross profits as a. ratio of gross sales declined; from 19.7 per cent 
to 18.2 per cent during the period 1959 and 1963, The ratio of gross 
profits to, gross, capital employed also declined from i4.2 per cent 
in 1959 to 13.4 per cent in the same period. With the liberalization 
of economic controls, particularly in respect of the import of 
capital goods and raw materials and introduction of a greater degree 
of competition in the economy coupled .with restraint on monetary 
expansion, the profit margins registered a decline^". Table 24 gives 
the,available information on the amount and distributibn of indus­
trial profits in Pakistan dhttng the period 1958-63.
. % In spite of a decline in the rate of industrial profits,
the rate of industrial investment in 1964-65 was more than double
that of 1959-60®, It is also evident from Table 24 that industrial 
companies in Pakistan .were saving an increasing proportion of their 
profits in the i960's. All this tends to show that industrial 
investmentsin Pakistan were still very profitable and economic ; : v^
incentives were pretty strong.. ; , -
6. Cf. Central Statistical Off ice, C ensus.es of Mariufacturing 
Indus tr ies-, (1954, 1955 ; arid ; 195.7) . V
7. C f . K . Ilaq and M . Baqai * "Savings and Financial Flows in the
Cqrpbrate Sector, 1959-63"., Pakistan Development Review, :/
. Autumn, 1967,-;  ^ -.V;' A
8. Cf. G,F. Papanek, Pakistanis development (Harvard University Press 
1967), P. 13, Table 3.
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S Reluctantly; rising wage rates, in the- industrial sector 
of Pakistan and relatively high profits have greatly distorted 
the distribution of income in favour of capitalists v
and entrepreneurs. On the other hand, the working classes have 
been forced to bear the brunt of inflation and the rising cost 
of living in the economy. The process of economic development v 
in Pakistan has resulted in acute concentration of wealth in a 
few hands and inflation has made the' rich richer arid the poor 
poorer. There is a growing discontent in the country about 
increasing concentration of income and wealth arid economic power 
in the hands of a relatively few. A; few family groups own i© 
industrial undertakings, banks, insurance companies, distribution 
trade etc. and exercise tremendous economic power, According to 
the Third Five Year Plan document, the top 5 per cent in Karachi 
have incomes 27 times higher thari the bottom 5 per;cent^. :
Ini addition to the distortions in income distribution in 
urban industrial sector, there has.been considerable redistribution 
f 9*'th;e urban sector in -the course of economic 
development and inflation. Domestic resources have been mobilized 
in Pakistan by restraining the growth of living standards of the 
poorest members of the society namely the rural masses. There was 
a considerable transfer of savings.from the agricultural to the , 
industrial sector as terms of trade were deliberately turned against 
agriculture;in the 1950Ts,through^ such policies as licensing of 
scarce foreign exchange earned primarily by agriculture to the 
iridustiral sector, compulsory government procurement of foodgrains
9. Government of Pakistan, Planning Commission, The Third Five Year 
; Plan, 1965-70, May, 1965, P. 29,
at low'prices to subsidize the cost of living of the;urban 
indus/trial workers, generous tax concessions to industry and 
lack of similar incentives forlconimercial agricultural ; invest- 
meht. Government1s measures had the effect of reducing per capita 
income and consumption in rural areas in relation to the rate of 
growth of per capita gross national producfc. Table 25 presents 
a comparison of the growth of per capita gross national income and 
per. capita;rural incomes during the.decade 1954-55 to 1964-65. This ;v 
table clearly shoves that while the gross national income per capita 
was rising over .the' period, the’ per capita ‘ rural incomes.;remained 
more or less unchanged. According to an estimate by K.B. Griffin 
the average urban incomes in Pakistan are six times higher than
. rural incomes ( Rupees 1278 against Rupees 207 ) and that they 
grew four times Taster ( 12.8 per cent over the period 1954-55 to
1964-65 against 5 per cent ). Thus the fruits of development 
have been reaped by the minority of urban rich while the majority 
of population;in rural areas stillvremain very poor. Even in urban 
areas, the bottom 5 per cent are probably as poor as their equivalent
in the rural group. ;; ■'] ;:' ■''/ •• ■■■/".; ,f:v'_■ V . T; ■; ;y; '
; 2. Investment Pattern And Resource Allocation:
Development efforts in Pakistan have obviously led to a
substantia!^ increase ip public and private sector investment. Tables
S.A. 1 to S.A. 6 in the Statistical Appendix show the aggregate
development expenditures in the three plans and their sectoral
break-up. It is evident from these tables that development outlays
increased very sharply from one Plan to another and these led to a
rapid increase in Government*s borrowing from the banking system,
10. Cf. K.B. Griffin, "Financing Development Plans in Pakistan",
- Pakistan Development Review, Vinter, 1965. .
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TABLE 25
GROWTH OF G.NvP PER CAPITA AND PER CAPITA RURAL INCOME
YEAR
1954-55
1955-56
1956-57
1957-58
1958-59
1959-60
1960-61
1961-62
1962-63
1963-64
1964-65
G.N.P Per Capita 
( Rupees )
316:
316
316
317
317
318 
326 
334 
342’ 
351 
360
Rural Income 
Per Capita 
(Rupees )
201 :
199
199
195
’ i94
197 
199 
202
V?;:.; 205 V
207
Source: K.B.V Griff in, ’’Financing Development Plans; in Pakistan”;, 
Pakistan Development Review,/Winter, 1965, Tabie III.
monetary expansion and money income. In the private sector also, 
bank borrowings were the major source of development funds and 
these created inflationary pressures in the economy. However, 
evidence does not suggest that inflation has encouraged real 
savings and real investment in Pakistan to any significant degree.
The structuralists claim that inflation encourages domestic savings 
through its redistributive effects and that investment is also 
encouraged as investment opportunities become more profitable in the 
course of inflation. Table 26 gives relevant data on domestic savings 
and capital formation for Pakistan. This table indicates that although 
real sayings and real capital formation increased substantially over 
the period under study, changes in them do not seem to be; much 
related to price changes; On the other hand, both savings and capital" 
(formation bear, a close relationship to the availability of capital 
goods, raw materials and Government’s import policy. Whenever the 
supplies of capital goods and other materials were adequate, real 
investment tended to rise sharply and .vice versa. Real sayings were 
also greatly determined by investment opportunities in the conomy. In; 
the absence of proper investment opportunities, potential savings 
tended to divert.towards redundant consumption and other socially 
unproductive activities. r
In the .First(Plan period, prices were rising at a fast rate 
. but foreign exchange was extremely scarce and there.was an acute 
shortage of capital equipment and raw materials and, therefore, real 
investment and savings were rather low and did not rise much. On 
the other hand, iii the Second Plan period, there was considerable 
price stability but due to the expanded foreign aid, programmes and 
resulting import liberalization, supply of capital goods and raw 
materials had greatly improved and, therefore, both real savings and 
real investment responded very favourably. In the Third Plan period
103
TABLE
REAL CAPITAL FORMATION
.26
AND REAL SAVINGS;
YEAR CAPITAL FORMATION DOMESTIC s a v i n g s.;
Current Prices 1954-
*
-55 Prices Current Prices 1954-55 I
1955-56 1670 1562 1440 1347
1956-57 1850 1557 1015 854
1957-58 2210 1762 1175 937
1958—59 2370 1952 1500 1235
1959-60 3840 2909 2875 2178
1960-61 4605 3322 3225 2327
1961-62 5710 4159 4205 3063
1962-63 6710 4796 4885 3492
1963-64 7625 5501 5130 3701
1964-65 9100 6267 6085 4190
1965-66 6964 4588 4714 3105
1966-67 8629 5067 5245 3079
1967-68 10845 6471 6552 3909
* Deflated by the G.N.P deflator.
Source: Computed from Government of Pakistan, Planning Commission 
Data.
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again both real capital formation and real savings declined sharply 
as foreign exchange difficulties and import restrictions limited 
the investment: opportunities.
Savings were adversely affected by sharply rising prices 
iif certain years under study through.the inflation tax reaction of 
the public. Profit margins also play an important role in determining 
the level of investment and of savings. Detailed information on 
profits in Pakistan.is not available, nevertheless, the information 
given in Table 24 suggests that gross, prof its in the corporate sector 
have been determined mostly by the degree of competition rather than 
by price changes. Profits increasedi.m some periods of falling prices 
and decreased in some periods of rising prices. By and large profit 
margins were high in the early years of industrialization when . v
competition was less and declined as competition grew irrespective 
of the movements of general price level• Studies also indicate that J
non-corporate private savings in Pakistan.have not risen much since j
1949^^ Furthermore, a sample survey in Dacca revealed that.as much j
as 42.5 per cent of personal savings in the urban sector are in the . j
forik of gold/ ornaments , consumer durables and housing . In periods 
of rising prices especially, savings either reduce or tend to divert ]
towards unproductive investment and hoards. =
It is also generally belljved and more particularly by 
the monetarists that inf lation tends to distort thepattern of 
investment since investment in stocks and real estate often increases . * 
as the public try to hedge against inflation. Table 27 presents the ;
11. Of. Stephen R. Lewis and MiI.Khan, MEstimates of Non-corporatePrivate,
• Saving/in P aki stan: 1949-1962M , Pakistan Deve1ppment Review,
■ Spring 1964. , ,'„/v-"t . - ■ - " ■ / / ;
12. Cf. M . Habibullah, Pattern of Urban Savings*, A Case Study, of 
Dacca City, (Dacca University, 1964).
investment in stock formation and its ratio to gross national 
product together with the contribution of construction to gross 
national product at factor cost during the period under study.
While stock formation shows no specific trend over the period 
concerned, the contribution of construction to G,N.P increased 
substantially. Construction activity has particularly gained 
momentum in Pakistan because under conditions of inflation and 
economic uncertainties, the public have considered investment in 
housing as the safest type of investment. Speculation in land and 
real estate has increased substantially over the period under study 
as the public have tried to hedge against the rising prices.
On the whole, conditions in Pakistan do not suggest that
inflation has assisted economic growth/because it has not pushed
up real savings and investment to any Significant degree. On the
contrary, steady rates of growth in Pakistan in some periods,
especially in the Second Plan period, have coincided with relative
price stability. All this weakens the argument that inflation may
be effectively used as an stimulant to economic growth in Pakistan.
Relative price stability should, therefore, be the desideratum of
Governments development policy. Economic policies must be directed
to maintain reasonable price stability in the economy both in the
*
interest of steady economy©growth and distributional justice. Never 
theless, a margin of a few per cent increase in prices every year 
and perhaps more in years of poor crops cannot be ruled out,
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TABLE 27
Investment in Stock Formation,and: Construction
Year Stock Formation 
(Million Rupees)
Ratio to 
G.N .P, in %.
Contribution of 
Construetion to 
G.N .P., in %
1955-56
1956-57
1957-58
1958-59
1959-60
1960-61
1961-62
1962-63
1963-64
1964-65
1965-66
1966-67
1967-68
190
150
70
90
800
275
345
380
240
920
-710
180
1500
0.8 
0.6 
0.3 
0.3 
2.5 
0.8 
0.9 
0.9 
0.6 
2.0 
-1.4 
0.3 
2.4
1.8
1.9
2.0
2.0
2.1
2.4 
2.8 
3.0
4.3 
4.7
4.3
4.5
4.5
Source: Compntbd from C,S.0., Monthly Statistical Bulletins.
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c h a p t e r  IV. . ;
THE MONETARY FACTORS LEADING TO INFLATION
We now turn to sort out the factors exerting pressure on 
prices and balance of payments in Pakistan during the period under 
study. To begin with, we examine the monetary factors leading to 
the over-all inflationary pressures in the economy. In the present 
chapter, we analyze monetary expansion and the demand for money 
while a critical appraisal of monetary arid: fiscal policies will 
be done in the following chapter* ■ :
Considered as a means of payment, the money supply in 
PskiStan consists of currency and coins circulating in the harids 
of the public outside, the^banks and demand liabilities of the 
banking system. The latter include the‘demand deposits of the 
public with scheduled banks1 arid certain other deposits writh the 
State Bank of; Pakistan.excludirig Counterpart funds, the I.B.R.D 
Indus account and the I.M,F account no: 1. Counterpart funds 
represent the sale proceeds of commodities received under the ;
UvSlP .L. 480 programme. This:fund is, not included. inithe money 
supply but it has a great' bearing an the. latter,. Releases are 
made from this fund to the Government of Pakistan by the represen­
tatives of the donor country for financing agreed development 
projects. An excess of releases front this fund over accumulations 
in a given year exercises a net expansionary effect on the money 
supply and is more or less equivalent in its net effects to deficit 
financing. On the other hand, an excess of accumulation over 
releases exercises a net contractive effect on the money supply. It
is, therefore, a practice iri Pakistan to adjust monetary expansion
1. A scheduled B bank in Pakistan is a commercial bank whose capital 
v assets exceed half a .-million of rupees arid Which has been placed on 
/>the':. 1schedulef'-"\mai niaine'd by the State Bank of Pakistan. ’
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on Government account for changes in counterpart funds. The 
I .>1.F account no• 1, on the other hand, represents the rupee 
counterpart of the Government of Pakistan1s equity claim in 
the Fund and is not a working balance for the Fund’s expenditure 
in Pakistan. Consequently, it is riot.included in the money supply.
The money supply in Pakistan exhibits significant 
seasonal variations due to the fact that, in a primarily agricul­
tural economy, the d emand for bank credit increases during the 
period September to March for finaricing the movement of major crops 
and gets slack invthe rest- of the year. In this study, however, only 
the annual changes in money supply caused by variations .iri the ; *
internal and external assets of the banking.system ;will be considered. 
The reason for choosing annual variations is that quarterly variations 
of certain other Variables in relation;-;: to which the changes in money 
supply are to be considered are not available.
: The money supply increased steadily and more than doubled
'during' the. period under study; While demand deposits were mote than 
three times in 1967-68 as compared with 1955-56, currency in circu­
lation increased at a slower rate and was less than twice that of
1955-56. The proportion of currency in total money Supply, therefore, 
declined and the monetary expansion was largely due to the rapid 
increases in demand deposits. With the increasing tempo of economic 
development in the country, the claims of the bankirig system on the 
Government and private sectors increased at a fast rate and this 
resulted in a significant increase in demand deposits. The rate of : f
monetary expansion during the period under study far exceeded the 
rate of growth in real income and since monetary expansion could not
be fully absorbed by the demand for money and available imports, ■ 
it reflected in the rising prices. The avei’age annual rate of 
growth i n i ;  the money supply during the period was about 13.8 per 
cent while the average rate of oconomid.growth was only about 5.5 
per cent per annum. , .?; ■
Monetary growth during the period was determined by three 
factors: (a); the Government's deficit financing operations, (b) the
flow of bank credit to the private sector and (c) changes in the 
external assets and liabilities of the banking system. The sources 
of. monetary expansion are considered below in detail.\:The growth of 
imdneyi supply durihg the period under study is shown, in Table 28 
while Tables 29, 30 and 31 give its causative analysis.
1. Government’s Deficit Ffnahcing Operations: ;
■ ; ; The >tefm’:^ de-ficit;'flnahcing;:'ndrm|tily .-refers'--- t‘b'„ the^goy.ern*-''
ment’s over-all budget deficit which may,be financed by printing 
new currency, borrowi ng from the banking system and the general 
pub 1 i c , li t i 1 iz a t ion of government’ s cash balances or some combi­
nation of these. In the case of Pakistan, the over-all budget 
def icit: cannpt^badakem to mean def ici t .financing ^ because of the 
f adt that: cons iderable v part f ofthisdeficit is, f inancod by '.f oreign.-', 
aid and loans which provide real resources to the country and do 
not merely mean ’amrncrease;.in money supply, likewise internal 
borrowings from the general public and non-banking institutions do 
hot lead to direct creatiori-of noney and only transfer funds from 
private hands to the Government. In an under-developed country, it 
is the objective of Government’s cconoriiic policy to tap all available 
resources for financing economic development and therefore such
TABLE 28
Growth of Money S/pply m  Pakistan, 1955-&3 (Mi.1.1 i on Rupees) .
Last Friday : Currency in Demand Other Deposits Money .
Iff-^ J.une^ - ; ^v.’;' Circulation ' Liabilities with State Bank Supply
of Pakistan VHy ‘
1955-56 2,981.6 , 1,431.2 72.6 4,485.4
1956-57 v‘ / 3,372.8 1,490,1 88,3 4,951.2
1957-58 3,581.7 1,689.2 46 • 0 : 5,316.9
•1958-59 3,597.9 1,869.6 : 43.9 5,511.4
1959-60 . 3,772.4 '' 1,997.1 : 43.7 ; 5,812.9
1960-61 3,806.2 1,9990.7 .'■;v  ■ 45.1 5,842.0
1961-62 3,824.9 2,190.1 49.5 6,064.5•
1962-63 4,081.5 2,779i8|;':  ^ V 49.6 6,910.9
1963-64 4,612.1 3,274.0 . 53.6 7,939.7
1964-65 ^ 4,902.1 3,655.1 ; 64.2 8,621.4
1965-66 \VW, 5,802.0 3,94 9.4 • 9i.s 9,842.9
1966-67 5,561.7 : 4,689.6 132.3 10,383.6
1967-68 5,783.0 4,899.0 76.o 10,758.0
Source: State Bank of P aki stan , Currency and Finance Reports and
Monthly BuiLetinsv * ;
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TABLE 31
Causative Analysis of Changes in Money supply (Third Plan) 
’ (Million Rupees)
Causative Factors 
July-June basis
1965-66 1966-67 1967-68
Changes in Money
Supply +1221*4 + 540.7
Domestic Private
Sector + 366.3 +1935.9
Adjustment for Shift
to Time Deposits - 810.8 -1101*4
Net Private Sector - 444.6 . + 834.5
Government Sector +1432.7 + 32.8
Adjustment for
Counterpart Funds + 246.8 - 40.7
Net Govt. Sector +1679.5 ♦- 7.9
Foreign Sector +153.9 « 493.1
I.B.R.D. Indus
Account - 52.7 + 6 0 . 2
Other Factors - 114*6 + 147.0
Total Causative . •
Factors +1221.4 + 540.7
(1)
(2)
+ 374.6 
+ 710.1
- 793.0 
*r* -82 a 9'
+1032.2
- 347.0 
+ 685.2 
+ 172.8
4.5 
« 396.0
+ 374.6
(3)
(4)
(1) Adjusted for Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan foreign 
currency loans.
(2) Adjusted for devaluation of Indian Rupee, subscription to Asian 
Development Bank etc.
(3) Adjusted for retirement of ad hoes created on account of Indian 
Rupee devaluation and also for Pound Sterling devaluation,
(4) Adjusted for Pound Sterling devaluation, repayment of the drawings 
from I.M.F. etc.
Source: of Tables 3<6) and 31} Government of Pakistan, Economic
Survey, 1968-69, Statistical Section, Table 14, pp.28-29;
transfer does not have any significant monetary implications. 
Consequently, in this study, we consider only government 
b o r r o w i n g s  from the banking system adjusted for the changes in
Government1s cash balances with the State Bank of Pakistan as 
deficit financing. The quantities thus obtained are, however, 
adjusted for the changes in counterpart funds. An excess of 
releases from the counterpart funds over their accumulations in 
a given year is considered equivalent to an addition to deficit 
financing arid vice:versa, We call this estimate 'ne t  deficit 
financing* in the Government sector.’Both the Pakistan Planning 
Commission and the State Bank of Pakistan have interpreted the 
term deficit financing in this sense. In other monetary studies 
oh Pakistan also this term has been used in a similar manner *;
Pak.i stan1 s First Plan had made a provision fOr public 
borrowings of Rupees 1500 million in the form of permanent and 
floating debt for financing public sector development expenditures. 
GovernmentVborrowingsfrom non~banking institutions and general 
public were expected to be very small and the bulk of proposed 
borrowings during the Plan period were to come from the banking 
system. It was assumed by the planners that the real national 
income would rise by 15 per cent over the Plan period and absorb 
a substantial part of the monetary expansion caused by deficit 
financing so that the proposed amount of deficit financing would 
not: have noticeable inf1ationary effects. In reality, Government
2. Cf. M. Haq, Deficit Financing in Pakistan, ( P .1.D.E Monograph 
,No: 3, Karachi, 1961) and Parvoz Hasan, Deficit Financing and
Capital Formation:. The Pakistan Experience, Op.Cit.
3. Cf . Government of Pakistan, PlanningCommission-‘,\ The First Five
Year Plan Pre1iminary Evaluation Report, (September, 1959),
pp. 11-127 ■ ■ ■ ■ , u.v: y V v :;’y.
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borrowings from the banking system and cash balance utilization 
(adjusted for counterpart funds) amounted to Rupees 1442 million in 
the First .Pian period which were almost equal to the Plan target for 
deficit financing. Deficit financing was mainly concentrated in the 
first three years of the Plan as, with the implementation of the 
Plan, development expenditures in the Government sector rose 
sharply while tax revenues and aid inflows were still very meagre.
In 1958, the military regime tried to curb the inflationary pressures 
and deficit financing was then greatly curtailed. In 1958-59, net 
deficit financing was considerably reduced as compared with the 
preceding two years and in 1959-60, the Government sector exercised 
a net contractive effect of Rupees 35 million on the money supply.
The money supply increased by Rupees 1957 million over the Plan period 
registering a rise of about 51 per cent from its pre**Plan level and 
almost 74 per cent of this increase was due to the Government*s deficit 
financing operations. Details of deficit financing in this period are 
given in Table 32. The sharp rise in prices in the First Plan period 
was to a great extent due to a high rate of deficit financing in 
addition to other factors like a serious food shortage and foreign 
exchange difficulties.
The draft document of the Second Plan proposed eficit 
financing of Rupees 1000 million and envisaged a rise of about 25 
per cent in the money supply. With the proposed rise of 20 per cent 
in real national product ( later raised to 24 per cent ) and the 
rising demand for money in the economy, deficit financing of this 
order was considered to be within safe limits . The revised version 
of the Second Plan, however, Altogether discarded deficit financing
4. Cf. Government of Pakistan, Planning Commission, The Second Five 
Year Plan, 1960-65, (June I960), PP 61-62.
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as a.cautious approach towards the price situation. This decision 
seemed to be justified in view of the severe pressure on prices 
in the First Plan period. But as the Plan proceeded, the Government 
took resort to deficit financing on the pretext that in view of 
the high rate of economic growth during the Plan period especially 
in the agricultural sector, some deficit financing would be non« 
inflationary. Consequently, net deficit financing totalled Rupees 
1548 million over the Plan period and thus exceeded the First Plan 
aggregate by Rupees 106 million. Nevertheless,, on account of the 
large size of the Plan, the share of deficit financing in public 
sector development expenditures declined from 20 per cent in the 
First Plan period to 11 per cent in this Plan. The money supply 
increased, by Rupees 2809 million over the Plan period, registering 
a rise of about 48 per cent as against the Plan estimate of 25 
per cent and about 55 per cent of:this.increase could be attributed 
to net deficit financing in the Government sector. The price 
situation, however, remained fairly stable in the Second Plan period' 
as the economy maintained a reasonably high rate of economic growth 
which absorbed a substantial part of the monetary expansion and 
domestic supplies were liberally supplemented by imports made possible 
by the expanded foreign aid supplies and improved foreign exchange 
position. Table 33 gives the details of deficit financing in the 
Second Plan period•
Like the First Plan document, the Third Plan again proposed 
a sum of Rupees 1500(5;; million to be raised through deficit financing 
for supplementing the public sector resources. It was claimed by 
the Planning Commission;that this amount of deficit financing would 
be consistent with the expected increase in the demand for money and
118
the rise in real income. It was stressed? thaty in: ordEer to 
maintain the monetary ratio at its iSecond :Plan tevel, the money / 
supply must rise by Rupees 4Q00 to 5000 million. The proposed 
amount of deficit financing would, thus, leave ample scope for 
the private sector borrowings from the banking system. In fact,; 
this amount of deficit finanqing was considered necessary to 
generate suff1clent-primaryS reserves in the banking system oh 
which credit creation for the private sector could be based^.
As against the Plan proposals, there had already: been 
net deficit financing Of Rbpees 2357 million by June 1968. The 
Plan projections of domestic and; external resources were based, 
on the expectation of normal conditions and growth of the economy ... 
as pr o jected by the Plan . On the contrary, PakiStan? s hostillt_i.es 
with India and:consedueht disruption m  economic and ;pplitical ‘ 
circumstances distorted :the pattern of Government receipts and 
expenditures. On thC one hand, defence expehditune almost doubled 
in 1965-66 and, on the other, foreign aid.receipts were seriously 
reduced due to the changed attitude of the United States and other 
member countries of Pakistan Aid Consortium. Consequently, in 
addition to substantial increases in taxation, the/quantum of-v 
deficit financing had to be. increased sharply. In the first three 
years of the Third Plan, the share of deficit financing in the 
public sector development expenditures/ again increased to 19 per t 
cent as compared with 11 per cent in the preceding Plan. However, 
a substantial:part of internal credit expansion in this period1 
was absorbed by heavy balance of.payments■def ici ts and depletion 
in foreign exchange reserves. Nevertheless, the money supply , .
5.: Of. Government of Pakistan, Planning Commission, The Third Five 
/ Year Plan, 1965-70, ( June 1965 ) PP. 72-74.
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YineleELsed ^ ‘Rupees: 2137'; millio^Yih; the threeyyearsymsLintaining an , 
average annual rate of growth of about 8,2 per cent. The details = :
of deficit financing in the first three years of the Third Plan are
given in Table 34. . . /. '-.Y/.Y-YY-'Y / y '-YY"-'.;r--■ Yvv ' ■ ""V-VY Yy/ :/;y
Large-scale development programmes in PakistanYhave resulted 
in increased Government yilabliity to the banking system. In view of . 
the mounting development and non-development expenditures of the 
central and provincial Governments in Pakistan, increasing resort has 
been taken to; deficit financing. Quite o f t e n t h e  amount pf net .
deficit financing in the. Government. sector far exceeded the provisions 
made for it in various, Plans or in the annual budget. In fact, the
Claims of the banking; system on the Government sector and excess y
withdrawals from counterpart funds have been greatly influenced by 
political circumstances and foreign aid inflows; Foreign aid has been 
an important source of financing Government development expenditures 
and whenever there were difficulties or delays in obtaining adequate 
quantities of it, reliance on deficit financing increased. Among the 
Goyernment*.s recuffing expendituresyydefence expenditure has been 
very large and changes in it have also reflected in the size of deficit 
financing. ; y , y . ‘ ■ y yy;’
2. Bank Credit to Private Sector:
Monetary expansion in Pakistan has also been strongly ;
influenced by the r ap i d 1 y rising demand for bank credit in the 
private sector. With the increasing participation of .private sector 
in;the ceuntryisYeconomic developmeht add increasing investment in 
industry, the need; for bank finance increased at a. fast rate. In the 
pre-Plan period and in most of the First Plan period, the flow of 
bank credit to private sector was very low because the private sector
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investment was still' small* But it picked, up. very sharply with 
relaxations in direct economic controls and a movement towards 
freer economy and the demand for bank credit on private account 
began to rise at a significant rate. Bank credit extended to the 
private sector in the-First Plan period aggregated only to Rupees 
731 million. Of the advances made to the private sector, nearly ^
43 per cent went to commerce and 38 per cent to manufacturing 
followed by other sectors. The expansionary effect of bank credit 
was, however, partly offset by a rise in time deposits of Rupees 
427 million. After adjusting the credit expansion on private account 
for a shift to time deposits, the net contribution of the private 
sector to monetary expansion was only Rupees 304 million or 15.6
6
per cent of the total increase in the money supply in this period .
In the Second Plan period. ( 1960-65 ) , bank credit to 
the private sector totalled Rupees 4300 million. As there was 
considerable Increase in private sector investment during the Second 
Plan period, the demand for bank credit also increased at a sharp 
rate. Of the total bank loans extended to private sector, 39 per 
cent went to manufacturing and 37 per cent to commerce, followed 
by other sectors. However, the expansionary effect of bank credit 
to the private Sector was partly offset by an increase in time 
deposits of Rupees 2282 million. Thus, the net contribution of the 
private sector to monetary expansion was of the order of Rupees 
2018 million or 72 per cent of. the aggregate monetary expansion.
Internal credit expansion during this period was, however, greatly 
absorbed by deficits on external accounts.
6. An increase in the non-monetary liabilities of commercial banks 
works as a leakage from the money supply and tends to offset the 
expansionary effect of credit creation by the banks for the private 
sector. It is, therefore a practice in Pakistan that while estimating 
the net contribution of the private sector to monetary expansion, 
any change in the demand deposits of scheduled banks on behalf of 
the private sector is adjusted for a shift to time deposits.
12£
In the f irst three; years of the Third: Plan,, bank 
credit to the private:sector aggregated to Rupees .3012 ■ ’
million. Of this, manufacturing claimed nearly 45 per cent ,
and commerce 35. per cent, followed by other sectors. There : 
was a significant shift towards time deposits amounting to 
Rupees 2705 million which;partly offset the' expansionary 
effect of bank; credit to the private sector. Thus the net i
contribution of private sector to monetary expansion was only : ?
Rupees 307 million or 14 per cent of the aggregate. Table 35 
shows the flow of scheduled banks1 credit to the private and 
public sectors during the period under study.
On the whole, biiik credit. to the private sector has 
increased at a fast 'rate since the Second Plan period. In 
addition to the increasing opportunities; of private sector 
participation in productive activities, one reason forthe rising 
demand for bank credit was the low cost Of borrowing. Although 
the advances rate of scheduled banks increased over the period under 
study, the real rate did not rise much. The; State Bank of Pakistan 
publishes; a weighted average of the scheduled banks1, advances 
rate since 1958 by type of securities. A simple average of these 
rates: together with the real rate of interest is given in Table 
36. With;the rising opportunities of investment and relatively 
high profits, the low real rate of interest made borrowings more 
• attractive., -4-4';/ .-•■"■/
Rapid expansion in bank credit was financed by the ; 
rising bank reserves and general increase in banks1 liquidity.
On the one hand, on account of Government1s liberal deficit 
financing operations and increased State Bank lendings, to ; 
commercial banks, bank reserves increased at a fast rate. On the
other, the public1 s curr.ency-deposit ratio declined signi­
ficantly in this period so that'banks were able to attract, 
more deposits and their liquidity increased at a fast rate. 
Moreover, a substantial shift towards time deposits took place v 
'in this period which enabled banks to extend;longer/term loans. 
Table 37 shows.the growth of bank reserves and of high-powered 
money in the period under study while Table 38 shows the growth 
of commercial banks1 borrowings; from the State Bank of Pakistan 
and details about their reserve position. With increasing bank 
liquidity and a high demand for credit in the economy, the banks 
were able to create more credit. The values of the money 
multiplier increased substantially in this period mainly on 
account of the public*s declining cash-deposit ratios. Table 39 
gives the public^s cash-deposit ratios, the banks* cash-deposit 
ratios arid th/e, values of the m o n e y  multip1ier.
3. Role of the External Sector: ^’ 4
;■ Internal credit expansion on a large-scale and resulting
infIationary pressures in a country almost invariably give rise to 
balance of payments deficits which tend to siphon off the infla­
tionary effects of internal credit expansion both through their 
effect on the foreign assets holdings of the banking system and 
by supplementing the domestic supplies with required imports. In 
Pakistan, the deficits on external accounts and the resulting 
depletion of foreign exchange reserves:have greatly cushioried the 
internal inflationary pressures created by ambitious development 
programmes.Attempts to industrialize reapidly almost always put 
pressure on the balance of payments of a country because of the 
increased demand for capital goods that have to be imported.;
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V  ; table 55 J
■ Scheduled Banks1 Credit to; PMvate: .arid Public ■
; - : ~ Sectors, 1 9 5 5 - 6 8 ,  (Million Rupees)
Last. Friday . Private Sector i Public Sector Total
ol‘ June V." , v
7 3 8 . 1  . 1 4 6 . 0  8 8 4 . 1
V  8 3 8 . 1  / 7 7 . 5  9 1 5 . 6
1 0 7 8 . 3  5 4 . 4  1 1 3 2 . 7
' 'V < 1 1 0 7  .3 . 1 1 8  .2 ‘ . 1 2 2 5  .5 - '
1.101.0 2 0 1 . 0  - 1 3 0 2 . 0
• 1 4 5 8 . 3  . / . ’ 159.1. • 1 6 1 7 . 4  ■ .
1 3 7 2 . 2  . ... .330.6 . 2 2 0 2 . 8  !
_ '! 2 5 3 4 . 9  . U 3 2 6 . 6  2 8 6 1 . 5  V.'-
3 2 9 1 . 9  : 3 7 8 . 4  ■ 3 6 7 0  iO
4 1 8 6 * 0  \ 6 0 5 . 3  4 7 9 1 . 3
5 7 5 8 . 7  7  . 6 2 9 . 0  6 3 8 7 . 7
5 9 8 4 . 2  6 0 6 . 8  6 5 9 1 . 0
7 4 4 0 . 9  /;-■ 5 6 4 . 2  8 3 0 5 . 1  '
8 5 1 8 . 0  : 8 8 7 . 2  9 4 0 2 . 2
Source: State Bank of Pakistan, Currecny and Finance Reports
and Monthly Bulletins.
7 77 ; 1955 '
1956 . . 7
• ;^l957-:;,;:;;^'
' 1958 i
; / . 1 ^ 5 9 .  \
7’7. 1960 •' 77-
1961
\V-: • - 1962
1963 
' , 1964
. 1965
1966 
" 1967
1968
TABLE 56
S cheduled Banks* Advances Rate % per annum 
(Average) 19158-68
Year ■ ■ 7:;-
End of\June
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
In t er es tvRat e
4.2 
5.0
5.3 
5*4.
5.6
5.8
5.6
6.6
6.9 
7.2 
7.5
Real Interest Rate 
(Deflated by G,N.P• 
Deflator).
3.3
4.1
,4.0
4.0
4.1 
. 4.1
4.0
4.5 
: 4,6 
7 4.3
4.5
Source: State Bank of Pakistan, Monthly Bui1et ins.
Year
1955-56
1956-57
1957-58
1958-59
1959-60
1960-61
1961-62
1962-63 
1933-64
1964-65
1965-66
1966-67
1967-68
; ■ TABLE 37 •
Growth of H1gh-P owe red Money 1955-68 
(Million Rupees)
Cash with 
The Public
2981*6-
3372.8
3581.7
3597.9
3772.1
3806.2
3824.9 
4081.5
i 46:12.1 
4902.1
5802.0
5561.7
5783.0
Cash in Scheduled Banks*
Banks* Tills balances with 
the State Bank
49.5
53.3
51.7
69.3
81.8 
83.0 
95.2
129.8
149.4 
166.1 
230.1 
350.9
310.5
187.8
264.3
141.4
193.8
252.9 
172.6
184.0 
207.2
262.5
359.6
574.0
475.9 
719.8
Total
3218.9
3690.4 
3774.8,
3861.0
4106.8
4061.8
4104.1
4418.5
5024.0
5427.8
6606.1
6388.5 
6813.3
Source: Computed from State Bank of Pakistan, Currency:and 
Finance Reports and Monthly Bulletin*
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TABLE 59
. The Values of Money Multiplier 1955-68
Year V- . fS> y '  dCyft
1955-56 2.08 0.17 2.25 0.45
■■ 1956-57 2.26 7 0.21 2.47 0.40
1957-58 2.12 0.11 2.23 . 0.45
1958-59 1.92 1 0.14 2.06 0.49
1959-60 1.88 0.12 2.00 0.50
1960-61 1.91 0.13 2.04 0.49
s i96lS?62 . 1.74 0.13 1.87 " H \  0.53
.1962-63 1.46 0.12 1.58 . 0.63
• ’i 1963-64 ■ 1.40 0.13 :t ' ’ 1.53 ;'*■' , ''V ''' 0.63
1964-65 1.34 0.14 1.48 s '  0.68
1965-66 1.47 0.20 1.67 0.60
1966-67 1.18 0.17 1.35 0.74
1967-68 1.18 0.21 , , 1.39 0.72
Source: Computed from Tables 28 and 37,
06> public1 s cash - deposit ratio. 
f t >  -  banks’ cash - deposit ratio.
Moreover, import substitution, through high tariffs and import 
quotas, is always biased against, exports is so far as attention : 
is,focussed mainly on foreign exchange saving rather than on 
foreign exchange;earning projects. Serious current account deficits 
are, therefore, experienced in those under-developed countries where 
industrialization programmes are going on and whose exports are 
inadequate to meet the demand for imports; The current account 
deficits on balance of payments are partly met from foreign capital 
inflows’but often the forei gn exchange reserves of the country also 
tend to be depleted.
Pakistan has experienced balance of payments difficulties, 
from the very outset. Deficits began to appear after the middle of' v \ 
1948 when under the Open General License system, imports were high 
and large; quantities, of defence and other stocks were being pur chased; 
on Government account. During the Korean War boom of 1950-511 however, 
the country was able to build up isiibstantial foreign exchange reserves. 
After the war was over, exports began to decline again arid .terms, of 
trade deteriorated duo to recessionary tendencies in the world commodity 
markets. Consequently, deficits re-emerged from 1951-52 and grew larger 
as earnings declined faster than payments. As the inflow of external 
resources was, at that time, very meagre, foreign exchange reserves; 
were seriously depletedV Consequently, the Open General License 
which had existed since the emergence of Pakistanvhad to be discontinued 
in the later half of 1952 arid import restri.ctions were imposed. With 
the devaluation of Pakistan rupee in August 1955, however, the; balance 
of payments position improved. The value of exports increased by 10 
per cent while payments for private imports declined significantly.
But the advantage of devaluation proved to be short-lived and the
declining; trend in exports was resumed in 1956-57 and was inten­
sified in 1957-58. Industrial growth in the country aggravated 
the effect of internal inflationary pressures on the balance of 
payments by diverting export goods to home consumption. This was 
particularly true of raw cotton where there was a growing absorption
in domestic industry without a corresponding increase in the export
'■ ' ' . 7 ■ , ' '
of cotton manufactures .
By 1957-58, the country’s foreign exchange reserves had
fallen,to an extremely low level and in order to overcome the foreign :
exchange crisis, the. Government was advised by some foreign experts
to introduce import surcharges arid auctioning of fofeign exchange .
Consequently,, in 1959, the export bonus scheme was introduced under
which the exporters of specified goods were given transferable import
licenses valuing a certain percentage of their export earnings ( the
percentage varied according to the type of goods exported )• Incentive
to the exporters was provided by the large premium that these licenses
earned in the open-market .With the introduction of this scheme and
also with an improvement in the terms of trade, the country.had a
substantial current account balance of payments surplus in 1959-60.
On the whole, the foreign exchange position in the First 
Plan period was very poor.. The Plan document had projected total 
foreign exchange earnings over the Plan period at Rupees 10,500 
million but actual earnings turned out to be about; 10 per cent less
7. Cf. Parvez Hasan, "Balance of Payments Problems of Pakistan", 
Pakistan Development Review, Vo1,1 N:2, 1961.
8. Cf. J.R* Parkinson, "The Balance of Payments and Fiscal Policy in 
Pakistan", Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 9, 1962.
9. For details see, Henry J. Bruton and S.R. Bose, The Pakistan Export 
Bonus Scheme, ( P.I.D.E, Monograph, No, II, Karachi, 1963.
than the Plan estimation. Consequently the foreign;exchange 
expenditure had to be seriously curtailed and investment programmes 
in industry and transport suffered enormously . A; part .of the indus­
trial capacity had to remain idle due to inadequate supplies of 
capital goods and raw materials. : — : /
The current account deficits revived again in the 
following year and continued throughout the Second Plan period 
becoming more significant in the later part of the Plan. As consider­
able import liberalization took place during the plari period, imports 
increased at a fast rate and serious current account deficits were 
experienced in all years of the Plan. Nevertheless, as the quantum of 
external resources; increased by about 60 per cent during this period 
as compared with the First Pian, the foreign exchange reserves were 
not much affected except in the last year of the Plan when due to a 
large current account deficit, they were significantly depleted.
' / In the first three years of the Third Plan again, the
country experienced serious current account deficits. On the one hand 
defence imports increased substantially in the first year of the Plan 
due to Pakistan1s armed conflict with India. On the other hand, there 
was a serious food shortage in the country in the first two years of 
the Plan and.with substantial cut-backs in tho P.L. 480 food imports, 
a Iarge part of the country*s own scarce foreign exchange had to; be 
spent on food imports. Conseq ueiitly, development imports suffered a 
lot and import controls had to be tightened in order to restrain 
private non-development imports * On account of large current account 
deficits and cut-backs in foreign aid, the country* s foreign exchange 
reserves were seriously depleted and were at their lowest level in 
these three years. The terms of trade also deteriorated sharply in
this period except in 1966-67 when they improved by ahout;^  ^;7 ■ ;
25. per cent. v ; ! / ’
Over the period as a whole, the country*s imports 
increased at a much faster rate than.her exports.Table 40 
gives the ratio of exports and imports to the gross national 7 ;
product. While the export ratio declined significantly, that of 
imports increased substantially. These ratios, however, Conceal 
the terms of trade effect. Table 41 showS the changes in the. 
country1 s terms of trade during the period under study and the 
movements of real exports and real imports at 1954-55 prices are 
shown in Table 42., While imports increased at a fast rate because . 
of high development and food imports, exports failed to increase v 
rapidly because of the diversion of exportables to home coneumption 
under excess demand conditions . V   ^ / 7 r  ^^
As the/foreign exchange!expenditure far exceeded the: 
foreign exchange receipts including capital .inflows, the foreign-7;,. 
exchange reserves were significantly depleted over the period under 
study. Considering,the current account .balance of payments, the 7; 
Capital inflows and all other external transactions, the external 
sector contributed a. net addition of Rupees 287 million to the money 
supply in the First Plan period; This addition took place only, in 
three years, namely 1955-56, 1958-59 and 1959-60. In the first year 
of the Plan, because of devaluation of rupee, the country* s foreign 
exchange earnings increased significantly and these togerner with 
capital inflows contributed a net addition of Rupees 444.5 million. 
In the following two years, the external sector contributed a net 
contractive effect of Rupees 217 and Rupees 282 million. In the next 
two years again the external sector exercised a net expansionary 
effect of Rupees 122 and Rupees 220 million because of the fact that
TABLE 40
Ratio of Exports and Imports, to G,N,P. in per cent.
Year Export Ratio Import Ratio
1955-56 • 7.8 / 5.8
1956-57 6.0 8.7
1957-58 ; ; 7 5.0 7.2
1958-59 4.7 5.6
1959-60 5.8 . 7.8
1960-61 7.. 5.1 9.1
1961-62 / 5.0 8.5 •
1962-63 5.7 9.9
•1963-64 5.5 10.7
1964-65 7 5.2 11.8 .
1965-66 5.4 7 8.4
1966-67 V  4.9 8.9
1967-68 5.0 8.0
Source: Computed from C .S ,0 ,, Monthly Statistical Bulletins.
TABLE 41
Indices of Import and Export Prices and Terms of Trade
Year Import
Prices
1954-55 = 100
Export
Prices
Terms of 
Trade
%  Chaiige 
Terms of
1955-56 138.0 118.8 86.1 -14.0
1956-57 170.9 131.8 77.1 -10.5
1957-58 168.5 143.4 85.1 + 10.4
1958-59 161.4 128.3 79.5 - 7.0
1959-60 157.8 126.5 80.2 + 0.9
1960-61 168.9 186.0 110.2 + 37.0
1961-62 160.4 ;• 156.0 97.3 . -11.8
1962-63 \ 168.9 . 144.3 85.5 -12.3
1963-64 159.4 142.2 V 88.6 + 3.5
1964-65 141.4 157.9 111,7 + 25.8
1965-66 167.6 158.5 94.6 -15.1
1966-67 157.4 185.9 118.1 + 25.2
1967-68 159.6 162.1 101.6 : -14.4
Source: C.S.0., Monthly Statistical Bulletins.
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'.:7 / 'v table 42 VV-v,''' ;•
Real Imports and Exports, 1954-55 Prices (Million Rupees)
Year Imports Imports .Exports Exports V
; (Current (1954-55 . (Current (1954-55
Prices) Prices) Prices) Prices)
1955-56 1325.1 960.0 1783.7 1499.0
1956-57 2334.6 1365.0 1607.6 ; 1218.0
1957-58 2050.0 1213.0 ; 1421.7 _ 994.0
1958-59 
19&£>— 3^$
1578.4
&
3187.6
980.0
ISTS-O
1886.0
1325.3
1786.4
1035.0
S*o
960.0
1961-62 3109.1 1943.0 1824.6 ' 1169.0
1962-63 3818.8 J 2259.0 2223.1 , ; 1544.0
1963-64 4430.2 > 2786.0 2280.3 : 1617.0 !
1964-65 w 5374.2 3811.0 2395.4 1516.0
1965-66 4208.3 2505.0 2691.0
1966-67 5192.3 :■ 3307.0 - 2870.9 1543.0
1967-68 4691.0 2750.0 ; ■ 3084.0 1786.0
Source: Computed from C.S.O., Pakistan Statistical Year Books.
with the introduction of the export bonus scheme, the country*s 
export earnings increased significantly. These, together with 
foreign aid inflows, contributed to the rise in the money supply*
In the Second Plan period, however, the external sector 
exercised a net contractive effect of Rupees 440 million on the 
money supply. In all years of the Plan, except 1962-63, a signi­
ficant contractive effect was exercised by the external sector 
because of the fact that serious current account deficits were 
experienced by the country in these years which exceeded foreign 
capital inflows. In 1962-63, however, there was a sharp increase 
in foreign aid because of liberal pledges by the Pakistan Aid 
Consortium for financing the Second Plan and the external sector 
was able to add Rupees 273 million to the money supply. In all 
other years of the Plan, the external sector partly cushioned the 
inflationary effects of internal credit expansion.
In the Third Plan period also, in the three years under
ts
study, the external sector exercised a net contrajtive1 effect of 
Rupees 166 million on the money supply. In 1965-66, the external 
sector was able to make a net addition of Rupees 154 million to 
the money supply as transfer and capital receipts exceeded and more 
than made up the current account deficit on visible and invisible 
items. Both development and non-development imports were severely 
restricted in this year because of Pakistan’s war with India, On 
the other hand, exports were maintained and other receipts, 
particularly transfer payments, also remained high. Although the 
quantum of foreign aid was reduced in this year, still the foreign 
exchange reserve position was not much affected by it. In the 
following year, however, the external sector exercised a net contrac. 
tive effect of Rupees 493 million as with the liberalization of
'•hX- -138 .• V; ; v
imports, payments on goods and services far exceeded receipts 
including, those under transfer items and capital inflows. In
1967-68, however, the external sector added Rupees 173 million 
to the money supply as foreign aid inflows to Pakistan w e r e  restored 
almost to their former level. Table. 43 gives a summary of the 
balance of payments on current account and the foreign exchange 
reserve position. Details of balance of payments position are " 
given in the Statistical Appendix. Chart IV presents the indices 
of terms of trade and foreign exchange reserves graphically.
On the whole, the external sector has tended to siphon 
off the internal inflationary pressures in Pakistan. On the one 
hand, balance of payments deficits and depletion of foreign exchange 
reserves have exercised a contractive effect on money supply in 
. severalyears under .study and on the; other , imports. have heavily 
supplemented the domestic oujput bringing thereby a moderating effect 
on the price situation. The price level rose rapidly whenever foreign 
exchange difficulties wore severe and imports were seriously restricted 
Despite import restrictions of various kinds, the ratio of imports to 
income rose substantially during the period under study. In the 
Second Plan period especially, there was considerable import libera­
lization resulting in a substantial rise in import ratio which tended 
to moderate the impact of the increased money supply on domestic . 
prices. The same story is told by the ratio of money to imports which 
is given in Table 44. Assuming a stable demand for money and an open 
economy, monetary expansion is most likely to increase imports and 
thereby affect the balance of payments. But when import restrictions 
exist in an economy, this may or may not be true. However, if imports 
.increase at a fast rate in relation to the money supply, the effect 
of monetary expansion on the price level would be greatly reduced..
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TABLE 43
Balance of Payments on Current Account and Foreign Exchange 
-■'V, Re serves, (Mil lion Rs. )
Year Balance of 
Payments
Ratio to 
G.N.P. in
Gold, Dollar 
and Sterling 
Reserves 
(End of June)
Ratio to 
G.N.P . %
1955-56
1956-57
1957-58
1958-59
1959-GO
1960-61
1961-62
1962-63
1963-64
1964-65 
•1965-66
1966-67
1967-68
+ 361.8
- 269,1
- 335.7 
+ 35,0 
+ 118.1
; - 55,5
— 101,3
- 87.8
- 933.1 
-1582,6 
-1247.0 
—2043.3 
-1609.7
> 1.6 ; 
— 1.0 
- 1.2 
+ 0,1 
+0.3 
- 0.1 
-0.3 
—0 .2 
—2,2 . 
-3.5 
—2.5 ■ 
-3.5 
-2 . 6: ’
1394.6
1200.5 
880.5
1043.2,
1169.6 
1225.0 
1128.3
1436.2
1235.3 
951.7
1263.3 
793;2 
816.4
6.1
4.5
3.1 
3.8
3.7
3.5
3.1
3.7
3.0
2.1
2.6
1.3
1.3
Source: Computed from, State Bank of Pakistan, Reports on 
Currency and Finanee and Monthly Bulletins
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TABLE, 44 
RATIO OK MONE^t TO IMPORTS .
YEAR , > , RATIO
' 1 9 5 5 - 5 6  ' / . - V 3 . 4
1 9 5 6 - 5 7  :V." 2. 1
1 9 5 7 - 5 8  ■ : ' ‘ 2. 6
1 9 5 8 - 5 9  ' . \'r 3 *5
1 9 5 9 - 6 0  2, 3
■ . 1 9 6 0 - 6 1  v V  ; 1.8
' 1961-62 -v';---,, 1-9
. , 1962-63 V .Av- 1.8
1963-64 " 1-8
/-/V , 1964-^65; ; "■< V- 1.6 ' ;‘:-
1 9 6 5 - 6 6  2 . 3
1 9 6 6 - 6 7  2 . 0
1 9 6 7 - 6 8  . 2 . 2  ■
Source: Computed from Tables 28 and 42.
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This 'is because, imports .■supplement; domestic supplies directly^ ;
and also enable fuller utilization of domestic productive A
capacity by providing the required capital equipment and raw ":
materials* There; is, however, another aspect of import libera- :
lization, namely that it may bring an increase in income velocity
as opportunities of investment and spending increase in the
economy and this would add to the inflationary pressures. In fact, : f
the real effect of import relaxation would be a combination of these
two effects. However on the whole, it may be assumed that adequate
supplies of foreign exchange and improved supplies of imports would
normally bring aboutva moderating effech on the over-all price , /
. ■ • situation, ■ V/.; ■ V- r jy V-'-; : ; ;-v? v y:::; ■ • — ,
4, Demand for Money arid Income Velocity: V
, V •i Monetary expansion in Pakistan, caused mainly by the 1 v ( ;; '
Government*s deficit financing operations and bank credit to the 
private sector,! was also often supplemented by a rise in income 
velocity.Over the period as a whole, the money-income ratio remained 
more or less stable but, there were significant mai g m a l  changes in it.
Of rthe variables generally supposed to influence the demand for real 
cash balances in an economy, interest rates, particularly the long- , 
term bond rate, do not seem to have influenced the demand for real : 
cash balances in Pakistan to: a :Signif icant degree * -This is ?because 
interest rates have hot changed much during the period under Study :
and have not exerted any significant speculative effect on the demand 
for real cash balances. The demand for real cash balances in Pakistan 
seems to bo primarily of a transactions and precautionarynature and 
has thus been a stable function of the level of real income. Price ■; ;
changes would have inf luenced the demand for real cash balances 
through the inflation tax reaction of the public but the more i 
important price effect seems to. be through the changes in food --
prices. When crops are bad and food prices rise, urban families 
try to maintain their real consumption of food by increasing their 
expenditure on it while the rural producers increase their hoards 
more than in proportion to the decline in their output for specu­
lative reasons. Income velocity of money therefore increases at 
the time of bad harvests • . :
Data about the demand for real cash balances in Pakistan 
are given in TableS45 and 46. These tables indicate that :real cash 
balances have been a fairly stable function of the level of real 
income and that the money-incomeratio has fluctuated within a narrow 
range of 0.166 and 0.198. The marginal changes in money-income ratio 
can, however, be explained in the. following manner: (l) The ratio 
has declined sharply, after every peak which shows that the public 
adjusted their real cash,balances to the desired level with some 
lag (possibly of a year). Whenever monetary expansion was high, 
say on account of large deficit financing operations of the Govern­
ment;, money balances accumulated with the' public till they adjusted 
them to the desired level by increasing their spending in the ‘ \
following year, (2) Spending opportunities in:the economy were greatly 
determined by the tightening or rel axati°n direct economic controls* 
specially import; controls and the money-income ratio was greatly 
influenced by these changes. Whenever direct controls were relaxed, 
the? public increased their aggregate spending and Income velocity 
rose and vice versa, (3) Income velocity increased in the event of
10. G f . R.C. Porter, "Income Velocity And Pakistan* s Second Plan" ,
Op. Cit.
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TABLE 46
Money-income Ratio and Income Velocity
Year Ratio of Money 
to Income - M / Y
Income Velocity 
Y/M
1955-56
1956-57
1957-58
1958-69
1959-60
1960-61
1961-62
1962-63
1963-64
1964-65
1965-66
1966-67
1967-68
0.198 
0.186 
0.187 
0,197 
0.185 
0.168 
0.166 
0.179 
0.192 
0.189 
0.198 
0.178 
0.174
5.05
5.38
5.38 
5.08 
5.40 
5.95 
6.02 
5.86 
5.20 
5.29
5.05 
5.62 
5.75
Source: Computed from Government of Paki s tan, Economic Survey«1967-68
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rising food prices as the >consumpfion expenditures oh. food iricr^ed 
in the years of poor crops and part of the marketable food surpluses 
were heldrhack.byfoodgrain^pducers themselves for speculative 
' reasons* V ; ' i ■. i-'V \ ’ . ■ -V.UV f '■ bv - A'i' ;r- :■
.. Moreover, there has occured a gradual process of monetiza-
“ . tion in the lion-monetized sector of Pakistan1 s economy , Marketed ^
agricultural surpluses, especially of cash., crops have increased :
substantially over the period and more bank branches have been 
opened in the rural areas. Payments that used to be made in kind are 
being increasingly made in cash. Cash purchases of inputs by farmers 
have been rising’. The monetization of these transactions does not 
affect the national income estimates because the latter include the 
imputed value of non-monotary transactions but: it certainly does ; v y 
affect the demand for money and hence the income velocity.However*
there is a consensus of' opinion among economists in Pakistan that . '
this factor has not been very important in determining the demand 
y for real cash balances in comparison with other factors stated above. j
Chart Vgraphically presents the, rise in rnioney supply, j
the changes in income velocity and the money national income during 4
the period under study. It is evident from this chart that income 
velocity increased sharply during the period 1959-60 to 1962-63 
when direct controls were greatly relaxed, It. again rose significantly 
between 1966-67 and 1967-68 when import controls were once again - ;
relaxed* after the foreign exchange crisis due to cut-backs in foreign : 
aid was over. ■ ■“/-: ' : ;yiv' .y’ : i.-■ y
The money-income ratio was rising steadily in the pre-Plan . ; 
period due to the fact that while monetary expansion was fair1y high f
;oil account of Government's deficit financing operations, spending :
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opportunities in the economy wore greatly curbed by the existence 
of direct economic controls. This trend continued up to 1955-56 
but in the following two years, the income velocity increased 
significantly as, with the implementation of the First Plan, monetary 
expenditures in the public and private sectors increased rapidly*
Iricoinb velocity; declined again in 1958—59 when the newly established 
military regime strengthened direct economic controls and curbed the 
speculative activities^ Monetary turnover, therefore, declined 
significantly and money balances remained accumulated with the public. 
But these restrictions: were short-lived and .from .1959-60, a movement 
towards a freer economy took place.; Income velocity then rose again 
in the following three years. In 1962-63, the velocity again declined 
as monetary: expansion was very higti .in these years and money balances , 
accumulated with the public in a larger amount than what they wished 
.to hold so that in the following year they adjusted their real cash 
balances to the desired level by increasing their,expenditures. 
Consequently, the income velocity increased in 1964-65. But iri: ,
1965:i-66, -once-.'-again the money-income ratio rose when, due to Pakistan1 s 
war with India, deficit financing was very large while spending oppor­
tunities 'were greatly restricted due to foreign exchange difficulties.
. As the foreign exchange position improved subsequently and import 
controls were relaxed, income velocity again rose in 1966-67 and 
1967-68.
The capacity of the economy to absorb monetary expansion 
was obviously determined by the Changes in real income and the 
money-income ratio. When the rate of economic growth was high, even 
large monetary expansion was easily absorbed without any significant 
effect on the price level, Similarly when the money-income ratio
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rose indicating a larger demand for real cash balances at a given 
level of income, monetary expansion did not affect the price level 
much. On the contrary, when monetary expansion was supplemented by 
a rise in income velocity, price rises were quite significant.
Table 47 shows the joint effect of monetary expansion, changes in 
real income and the money-income ratio on the price level.
In 1955-56, the money supply increased by Rupees 629 million 
and this was greatly absorbed by a rise in the money-income ratio but 
at the same time there was a decline in output in that year so that 
the national income price index indicated a rise of 6.9 per cent.
On the other hand, in the following year, monetary expansion of 
Rupees 466 million took place and a large part of it was absorbed by 
a high rate of economic growth of 6 per cent but as income velocity 
increased sharply in that year, the national income deflator recorded 
a rise of 11 per .cent. In 1959-60 also the money supply increased only 
by Rupees 501. million and real income rose by 4.3 per cent but income 
velocity again increased.sharply in that year so that the price level 
went up by 8*7 per cent. In 1960-61 again the monetary expansion was 
only nominal namely Rupees 29 million and real income rose by 5.2 
per cent but due to relaxations in direct economic controls, income 
velocity rose significantly and therefore the national income price 
index showed a rise of 5 per cent. In 1966-67 also when the price 
increase was the highest namely 12.1. per cent., it was the sharp rise 
in income velocity that influenced the price level most.
On the contrary, in certain years, monetary expansion was 
very high but.prices did not rise much due to its absorption by a 
decline in income velocity. For example, in 1963-64, monetary 
expansion was large, namely Rupees 1029 million but both real income 
and the money-income ratio increased sharply so that the national
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income price index recorded a decline of 1 per cent.. Likewise, in
1965-66, monetary expansion was,the highest namely Rupees 1221 
million, but income velocity declined significantly due to the 
shortage of foreign exchange and therefore the G.N.P deflator 
showed a rise of only 4*5 per cent.
Thus both monetary expansion and changes in income 
velocity have played a significant role in exerting inflationary 
pressures in the economy of Pakistan. These supplemented the 
inflationary effects created by food shortages and foreign exchange 
difficulties. The monetary factors were obviously the outcome of the 
fiscal and monetary policies pui^ tisted during the period under review
. ' - ' V \ - ■ I . . V  • - . V  ’ . ■
and were to a great extent controjlable. An appraisal of the fiscal 
and monetary policies in Pakistan is, therefore, essential and is 
done in the following chapter* ;
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CHAPTER W
AN APPRAISAL OF FISCAL AND MONEfflRY POLICIES
1 . The Fiscal Policy:
Governments in under-developed countries often find it 
easy to finance their economic development programmes by borrowing 
from the banking system without caring much for its inflationary 
implications. This coupled with monetary expansion initiated by 
private sector borrowings from the banking system, generally 
have serious inflationary effects. Unless monetary expansion is 
fully matched by a rise in real income especially in the key 
sectors of the economy and a rise in the demand for money, the 
pressure on prices is inevitable. Governments in these countries 
can collect more money through increased taxation but this is often 
resisted for fear of political opposition. Likewise, there is a 
tendency among the underdeveloped countries to minimize external 
borrowings. Consequently, inflationary, financing becomes unavoidable 
and pressure on prices is eventually felt. Our purpose in this 
section is to show that deficit financing in Pakistan could be 
greatly curtailed by making adequate efforts to raise additional 
tax revenues but this was not adequately done. Governments in the 
past were reluctant to tap the rich tax-payers fully and even when 
the rates of taxation were high on paper, the total amount collected 
was rather small due to evasions, corruption and other malpractices. 
Some of the. deficiences in Pakistan*s tax-structure and the possibi­
lities of raising additional tax revenues are discussed below.
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The central and provincial budgets in Pakistan are 
divided into two distinct parts namely, .the revenue budget and the 
capital budget. The revenue budgets cover current, recurring and 
administrative expenditures. This part of the budget is financed 
. from taxation, surpluses of public enterprises and other current 
receipts. On the other hand, the capital budgets cover expenditures 
.which result in the creation of capital assets or loans and advances 
to the provinces and local bodies for the same purpose. It is 
financed chiefly from internal borrowings and foreign aid.The 
surpluses on revenue account are also a source of financing the 
capital expenditures. In theVfirst decade of Pakistanis existence, 
the revenue receipts were very meagre while administrative expenditures 
.were rising at a.fast rate so that the central and provincial Govern- 
urientS had to take increasing resort to deficit financing and the 
budgets could not show any significant revenue surpluses. In the 
First Plan period, aggregate tax revenues of the Government consti­
tuted only about. 7 per cent of the G.N.P. while development and 
non-development expenditures were rising at a fast rate. In 1948-49, 
the combined expenditure of the central and provincial Governments 
was below Rupees^ 15Q0 million; in 1957-58 it rose to Rupees 4667 
million. The development expenditure alone stood at Rupees 2128 
million in this year. Public savings were almost negligible in the 
First Plan period,and about one-fifth of the public sector develop- ; 
ment ruant expenditures were financed by deficit financing and fifty 
per cent by foreign aid. The tax structure was very simple and it 
was not fully responsive to the fiscal needs of a developing economy. 
Nearly 70 per cent of all government revenues were derived from 
indirect taxes. The coverage of income fax was deplorably low,
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namely only about 0.26 per cent of gainfully employed population 
paid income tax. Tax yields from the agricultural sector were 
specially small and returns from urban property taxes were negli­
gible. Among indirect taxes, customs duties and sales tax were the 
main sources of government revenue. Excise duties were mainly 
specific and had not been adjusted for price increases for a long 
time. The Government had appointed a Taxation Enquiry Committee in -
i960 which made some useful recommendations but these were not
1fully implemented for political reasons . Attempts were made to 
curtail deficit.financing towards the end of the First Plan but in
the absence of adequate tax revenues, resort had to be taken to it
agaiu in the Second Plan.
Development expenditures of the public sector accelerated
further during the Second Plan period and attempts were made to
raise additional tax revenues and to reduce non-development expen­
ditures. Three new direct taxes were introduced in 1963-64 namely 
a wealth tax, a capital gains tax and a gifts tax. All these taxes 
had high exemption limits and were intended to tax only the rich 
taxpayers. At the same time, a substantial increase in indirect 
taxes was also effected during the Second Plan period. The coverage 
of excise duties was widened and their rates were enhanced. Likewise 
the rates of sales tax and customs duties were also increased. The 
import duties on liberalized imports were increased by about 10 
per cent ad valorem. As a result of the increased tax efforts,
1. The main recommendations of the Committee were the following:
(1) Lowering of exemption limit for personal income tax from 
Rupees 6000 to the levels of average family incomes in the 
country.
(2) Raising of the minimum rate of estate duty and,
(3) Reduction of tax concessions to new industries in view of 
enough protection provided by tariffs, import licenses and 
exchange control system.
Cf. The Taxation Enquiry Committee Report, Vol.I, (Karachi, 1961)
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additional Rupees 1850 million Were collected through new taxation 
in the Second Plan period. The ratio of tax revenues to the G.N.P
also increased from 7 per cent in the First Plan to 9 per cent in
this Plan. Moreover, the central and provincial Government budgets 
began to- show significant.revenue surpluses and their share in 
development finance increased substantially. Correspondingly, "the 
share of deficit financing in the public sector development expen­
ditures declined from 20 per cent to 11 per cent and that of external
resources from 50 per cent to 49 per cent.
The emphasis on mobilization of.domestic resources for 
economic development continued in the Third Plan period, as well.
There was substantial increase in. taxation in the first three, years 
of the Plan especially in 1965-66 which was necessitated by a serious 
cut-back in foreign, aid and a rise in defence /expenditure in the early 
.part of the Plan. The central and provincial budgets also showed' - 
significant revenue surpluses in these year, except in 1965-66 when
defence expenditure almost doubled. However, the ratio of tax revenues
to the G.N.P still remained below 10 per cent. While the share of 
..external resources in public sector finances further declined to 48 
per cent, that of deficit financing increased to 19 per cent,
Over the period as a whole, due to rapid increase in the 
central; and provincial taxes particularly since the Second Plan period, 
the tax system has: shown a high income-elasticity. The computed elasti­
city is as follows:
Log T = - 2.79511 +1.36632 Log Y • 
v ' ( 0.09186)
. R ^ 0.976 R2 =- 0.960 ' .
T = Tax revenues,
and, ' .y;:.,.
Y - Gross national product in current prices.
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Tabled48, 49 and 50 give the cross-section data on the budgetary 
position of central and provincial Governments. Table 51 shows 
the growth of tax revenues in East and West Pakistan in the period 
under study. Air examination of these tables indicates that both 
the central and provincial budgets in Pakistan have grown at a 
fairly rapid rate because of rapidly rising development and,non­
development expendift-bsttc^ i The revenue budgets have also shown 
significant surpluses which have been utilized to finance the 
capital expenditures. Yet due to mounting development and non- 
development expenditures, the Governments have been Iforced to take 
increasing resort to inflationary financing. If adequate attempts 
Had been made to tap all the tax potentialities of the country, 
the reliance on deficit financing could be reduced though not 
altogether eliminated because in a poor country, taxation cannot 
be pushed too far without a serious loss of private incentives to 
save and invest. Some of the outstanding deficiencies in Pakistan!s 
tax structure are therefore worth noting.
First, the agricultural sector, which contributes about
half of the national income, has not been adequately taxed. While
incomes in this sector have increased over time with rising
agricultural productivity and prices, revenue receipts from this
sector have remained almost stagnant. Slo far, there are only two
major sources of taxing the agricultrual sector namely (a) land
revenue which is a direct tax proportionate to the quality and
productivity of land and (b) export taxes on agricultural products.
Of these, land revenue rqfes have remained unchanged since the 
period . ■’
pre-war/and have continuously declined as a proportion of rising
agricultural incomes. There is a pressing need for the revision of
land revenue rates so as to make them consistent with rising incomes
in this sector. Moreover, land reye.nue is not an adequate basis 
for the assessment of incomes of big landowners. Under the 
present system, agricultural incomes are hot coveredyby central 
income tax. The Taxation Enquiry Committee of I960 had recommended 
the extension of central income tax to cover agricultural incomes 
but this recommendation was not accepted because no government in 
Pakistan was prepared to face the opposition of big landlords who 
have always exercised considerable political infIuence particularly, 
in West Pakistan. Under the existing system, the big landlords are 
not adequately taxed while-their counterparts in industry and 
services pay income and super taxes. It is worthwhile reconsidering 
the proposal of an agricultural income tax, as in a primarily "r 
agricultural country the agricultrual sector must contribute ade« 
quatoly to.the national exchequer..There is Tittle doubt that a. very 
large majority of farmers will come under the exemption limit of 
agricultural income tax but at least large agricultural incomes can 
bo properly netted through this measure. Increased tax receipts from 
the agricultural sector can then be used for* building up the rural 
infra-structure ‘.and^development of agriculture through the public
sector though in some countries effective taxation of agricultural
lias been V
sector/Used for financing industrial development also. This was 
true of Japan after 4870 under the Meiji rule
In the industrial sector, receipts from income and 
corporation taxeshave lagged far behind the growth of value added 
in:industry due to a large variety of tax concessions granted, to 
industry. According to one estimate only 10 per cent of .industrial- 
profits in Pakistan have been collected in taxes • In view of the
W/Cf; R.M;. Bird and 0. Oldman ( Eds. ) , .Readings On Taxation in 
■ Developing Countries, ( Baltimore, 1964 ), PP 436-449.
3, Cf. G.F.Papanek, Pakistan1^ Development, Op.Cit. P. 193,,
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TABLE 5l
Growth of Tax Revenues in East and West Pakistan 
( Million Rupees ) "7"  ;
Year Central East Pakistan Vest Pakistan Total
1955-56 ■■ 1113 232 O'-; 263 1608
1956-57 1022 ‘ 234 . 344 1600
1957-58 1048 262 361 7 1671
1958-59 1390 410 ■, 523 2323
1959-60 1399 334 7 . 7 ; 425 2158
1960-61 1572 366 501 2439
1931-62 1717 7  458 , ; 404 2579
1962-63 1681 566 702 2949
1963-64 1878 708 , . 794 3380
1 9 6 4 - 6 5  2404 " 720 7 9 6  3920,
1965-66 2547 863 941 4351
1966-67 3272 974 988 5234 .
1967-68 5592 940 979 5511
Source: Computed from CiS.O., Pakistan Statistical Year Books.
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incentives provided by protective.tariffs, import licensing system 
and over-valued -exchange rate, there is little justification for 
the continuation of tax concessions of different kind to industry* 
Industry*s position with regard to taxes needs to be reviewed if 
additional, tax revenues; are to be raised* f ; { : ; ,
; : , V - Equally important is the revision; of personal income tax*
The exemption limit for personal income tax at Rupees 6000 is much 
abate the average income inPakistan due to which a large section 
of gainfully employed population escapes direct taxation. The 
Taxation;Enquiry Committee of 1960 had also recommended that the ; 
exemption limit of income tax should be lowered so as to make it 
consistent with the average family incomes in Pakistan but this ;. 
proposal was not implemented at that time. In our view, a revision ! 
of personal income tax is also desirable.
‘v: In the field Of indirect taxes, excise duties;have been an
important revenue,; yreider but their receipts have been a declininig 
proportion of the value of output. This is because, most excise duties 
in Pakistan are sepcific in nature and as prices have increased 
considerably over time, their impact has declined,.; It is essential 
that these are brought; in line wifh the rising, level of. business and 
economic activity by changing them into ad valorem. The excise duties 
are an e f feCtive means of reaching the masses" and are sepcially suited 
to the conditions of uncier-developed countries. On the; one hand, they 
compare favourably with other taxes in terms of income-elasticity.
This is due to the fact that in a developing economy, production of 
excisable commodities often increases relatively more than the 
non-excisable commodities ;ahd .the relative importance of custom
duties also declines because of import substitution and import 
controls• Excise duties and sales taxes can, therefore, prove to 
be an effective way of taxing the common man*
In addition to raising the tax revenues by re-organising 
the tax structure, it would also be necessary to check the growth 
of^non—development expenditures and to economize government expen­
ditures. These stepS are most likely to reduce the inflationary 
implications of deficit financing. Nevertheless, it would be too 
optimistic to; hope^that deficit financing Can be altogether elimi­
nated and if deficit financing operationsj< continue, the monetary 
authorities will have to regulate monetary expansion on private 
account more effectively with a view to maintain price stability. In 
the following section, therefore, we examine the monetary policy of 
the State Bank of Pakistan during the period under review and 
suggest some improvements in it* :
2. The Monetary Policy:
; -In a, country: where defici-t jfinancing operations are , going 
on, the Central Bank must regulate bank credit to the private sector 
more effectively if it wants to avpid unpleasant experiences • In 
Pakistan monetary expansion has been largely determined by the 
Government1s deficit financing operations over which the State Bank 
did not have much Control* Nevertheless there is evidence to suggest 
that the State Bank has;not demonstrated adequate skills in acquiring 
control over monetary expansion on private account, It has failed to 
make an effective use of the monetary control measures available to 
it* In order to appraise the monetary measures taken by the State Bank
4. Cf. Joachim Ahrensdorf, "Central Bank Policies and Inflation",
I.M.F Staff Papers, Vol. VII, N: 2, 1959.
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of Pakistan during the period under study a historical digression 
. seems to be necessary, • v,;’.': .
: The State Bank was established in July 1948, almost a year
after; the creation, of Pakistan. In its early years, the Bank was 
mostly concerned with the rehabilitation and expansion of credit 
facilities dislocated by the partition of India, Occasion for monetary 
control^ therefore, did not arise;for some time. In 1949, Pakistan 
decided not to devalue her currency while Britain and India did and 
this made the imports chegLpi In the absence of import controls, this 
meant great pressure on the balance of payments and diversion of credit 
resources towards the import trade. In September 1950, therefore, the 
State Bank issued a. directive to the scheduled banks for not financing 
the import trade too heavily and to make adequate provision for 
financing domestic investment and export trade. With the outbreak of : ; 
the Korean War, the export trade automatically expanded and the balance V; 
of payments position improved significantly. In order to relieve 
strigency in the money market, the State Bank then supplemented' the 
; commercial banks! Tiquidity through open-market operations^. When the 
war was over, the balance of payments once again came under pressure.
The State Bank then fixed a margin.of 50 per cent on advances made by j
the scheduled banks to importers against the value of imported goods. 
Moreover, unsecured advances and those secured only by a guarantee 
were completely prohibited^• These conditions were, however, withdrawn 
in March 1953 because, with the imposition of import controls in 1952, 
the import.trade automatically declined. ■' _
Prices increased at a sharp rate in the First Plan period but 
the State Bank continued^ to rely mainly oh selective credit controls.
5;’ Cf. ;S.A. Meenai, . Money and Banking i n P  ak i s t an, (Karachi^ ;1966 )
P. 161. v'..  ^V f ■'''
6. Cfy:4Stat e:': Bank ;-o£.- Paidbisttoty, Annual Report;. V ''I95I"52V- '
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In January 1957, the scheduled banks were directed to limit their 
advances against imported manufactured goods, bullion, foodgrains 
and oilseeds to a maximum of 60 per cent of the value of such goods
and also to restrict unsecured advances and those secured by guarantees
’ 7
to a maximum of Rupees 50,000 to an individual borrower . In January
1958, a margin requirement of 50 per cent on advances by scheduled
8
banks against shares of companies was also made . A l l  these restric­
tions were, however, withdrawn in November 1958 when, with the
imposition of Martial Law, speculative imports and stock exchange
9
activities were greatly curbed •
The new regime paid greater attention to the maintenance 
of price stability and the State Bank was directed to take more 
rigforous measures of monetary control. In January 1959, for the 
first time, the Bank rate was raised from"Sx-t.m 4 per cent. As a 
result of this, the advances rate of commercial banks and other
credit institutions increased but the market for gilt-edged securities
10and stocks remained almost unaffected Selective control on credit, 
however, still continued to remain the most popular weapon in the State 
Bankfs armoury. With the relaxation in Martial Law regulations and a 
general movement towards a freer economy, speculative imports and stock 
exchange activities again revived. In January 1960, therefore, the 
Acheduled banks were once again directed to limit their advances to 
60 per cent against the shares of established companies and to 50 
per cent against those of newly floated companies. In March the same
7. Cf. State Bank of Pakistan, Report on Currency and Finance,
1956-57 P. 37.
8. Ibid, 1957-58 P. 36.
9. Ibid, 1958-59, PP.35-36
10. Cf. S.A. Meenai, Op.Cit. P. 165.
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year,.they were further directed,to limit their advances against 
imported manufactured goods and.cotton yarn to. 60 per cent of their 
value. They were also required to Limit their unsecured advances and 
those secured by guarantees to a maximum of Rupees 50,000 to an ; 
individual borrower. However, in spite.of these restrictions bot|i 
the money supply and the price level continued to rise at a fast rate 
throughout the First Plan period,
In the Second Plan period, the price situation was fairly 
satisfactory but monetary expansion remained high especially in the 
last three years of the Plan. The pressure on prices was less because 
of a high rate of economic growth and liberal supplies of imports 
including those undei the P.L. 480 programme.; In' the year 1962-63, 
monetary expansion reached a high level of Rupees 846 million. The 
rapid expansion in money supply and bank credit was the result of 
increased economic activity- which gained momentum as the Second Plan 
entered its fihai phase.Of the total increase in money supply in this 
y e a r t h e  pr i vato sector accouhted f or Rupees 364 million and the 
government sector for Rupees 165 million.; In order to guard against the 
risk of serious inflation and to check the pace of credit expansion, 
the State Bank took more rigorous measures of monetary control. In 
July 1963, minimum resotve requirements for time deposits were raised 
from 2 per cent to 5 per cent;while those for demand deposits were 
already:5 per centv Moreover, the Bank introduced a quota i system under 
which the scheduled banks could borrow from the State, Bank at the 
prevailing Bank rate only v- up to 50 per cent of their average 
statutory reserves in each week of the previous quarter. The quota 
applied only to borrowings against government securities. For
11. Gf. 'Government of Pakistan, Economic Survey, 1961-02 P. 122.
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borrowings under the.commercial bills re-discounting scheme, a limit 
was set at the maximum amount availed of by a particular bank in the 
year 1962-63. For borrowings in excess of the quota, the following rates 
were specified,
(1) Borrowings up to the limit of the quota
(2) Borrowings in excess of (1) but limited 
to 100 per cent of the quota.
(3) Borrowings in excess of the aggregate of 
(l) and (2) but limited to 200 per cent 
of the quota.
(4) Borrowings in excess of the aggregate 
of (l), (2) and (3) but limited to 
200 per cent of the quota,
(5) Borrowings in excess of the aggregate of
(1), (2), (3) and (4)
Despite these restrictions, monetary expansion in 1963-64 
reached a record level of Rupees 1029 million. Of this, the government 
sector accounted for Rupees 627 million and the private sector for 
Rupees 418 million. As the demand for credit was high, scheduled 
banksr borrowings from the State Bank also increased substantially in 
this year. As money balances were not spent by the public immediately 
and remained accumulated for some time, the money-income ratio 
increased sharply to 0.192, Due to a high rate of economic growth of 
8.3 per cent and a sharp rise in the money-income ratio coupled with 
a 23 per cent increase in real imports, the price level declined by 
1 per cent in this year. Nevertheless, a high rate of monetary expansion 
was a cause of alarm for the State Bank. Consequently, in 1964-65, the 
Bank adopted more rigorous measures of monetary control. On the one 
hand, the quota for scheduled banks’ borrowings from the Bank was
At Bank Rate
At l/2 per cent above 
Bank Rate.
At 1 per cent above 
Bank Rate.
At I 1/2 per cent above 
Bank Rate .
At 2 per cent Above 
Bank Rate.
12. Cf, Government of Pakistan, Economic Survey, 1963-64, Chapter 9.
reduced from 50 per cent of average statutory reserves maintained 
by them in the previous quarter- to '25 per cent. Moreover \ lending 
rates in excess of the quota were made more progressive. The 
following schedule of rates; was laid; down^,  ^ \
(1); Borrowings up to the limit of the quota* At Bank rate.
(2) Borrowings in excess of the quota but At 1/2 per cent
limited to 100 per cent of the quota.— above Bci.nk Rate.
(3) Borrowings in excess of.the aggregate of At 1 per cent
(i) and (,2) but, limited to 150 per cent: above Bank Rate,
of . the quota, 0 n:; \
(4) Borrowings in excess of the aggregate of At 1 l/2 per cent
(.1) , (2) and (3) but limited to 100 per above Bank Rate,
cent of , the quota • ! . t , ' 1 ’ . : :
(5) Borrowings in excess of (1), (2) , (3) and At 2 per cent
i4) . ;V' V.v-Y i' it*. v-1-/ t-V: above Bank Rate.
- Moreover,- the quota'was extended to cover all borrowings 
of ^ the. soheduled. banks fromthe* State Bank whereas..formerly it 
applied only to borrowings against government securities. In addition 
to the tightening of the quota system, the; statutory reserve require­
ments for demand and time liabilities were raised from 5 to 7 l/2 
per cent. The increase was to be implemented in two instalments 
name.lv 1 .1/4 per cent on 1st April 1965 and the rest on 1st May 
1965, the Bank rate was;also further raised from 4 to 5 per cent , 
Despite these restrictions, the money supply increased by \ 
Rupees 682 million in 1964-65. The income velocity also increased 
from 5.20 tp"’5.29'in-this year and the price index as shown by the 
national income.deflator increased by 4 per cent. However, the tight
13. Gf.:Government of Pakistan, JEconomic Survey, 1965-66, Chapter 9.
14. Ibid, P. 125.
money policy of the State Bank was severely criticised by the 
public. Moreover, the. recessionary tendencies in Pakistanis ; 
economy in 1965-66, following the war with India, necessitated 
some relaxations in monetary/policy. The credit controls imposed 
in 1964— 65 wore, therefore, relaxed in 1965-66, On the other hand, 
the quota system was withdrawn with effect from 16th August,1965 "
and' different!ai'' rates of State Banks1 lendings were abolished. 
Moreover, the statutory reserve requirements of the scheduled 
banks were reduced from; 7 1/2 per cent to 6 l/4 per cent in August 
and to 5 per cent in September 1965, Lastly, the margin requirements 
for various types /of banks, advances were also substantially reduced 
Monetary expansion was the highest in this year, namely, Rupees 1221 
million due to heavy deficit financing but since income velocity 
declined significantly during the year, due to tightening/of controls 
the/ rise in prices was only 4.5; per cent , " ' ■ ' / " " r'/
. ■ In the following year, the G.N.P deflator showed a sharp
rise of 12 per cent due to:a rapid, increase in income yelocity, 
sighificarit monetary expansion ; and crop fai.lures. The State Bank . ;
then adopted a restrictive monetary policy. The margin requirements 
on certain types of bank credit lowered in September 1965 were again 
raised to their former level. The scheduled banks were: also; required 
not to extend credit facilities for financing hire purchase and 
instalment: credit operations:, except wilh respect to agricultural , 
and industrial machinery. In January/ 1967,, the statutory reserve 
requirement .for scheduled banks were raised, froin 5 per cent to 
6 1/4 per cent'16. In September 1967, the liquidity :rafiO/wia^ also, /./:/:
15. ..Ibid, P . 126. /
16. Cf. Government of Pakistan,. Economic Survey, 1967-68,
Chapter IV P. 61.
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for the first time, raised from 20 to 25 per cent. In January 
1968, how ver, the\ reserve requirements for demand and time 
liabilities were lowered back to 5 per cent. No other credit 
measures were taken in 1967-68.
A review of the monetary measures taken by the State Bank 
of Pakistan during the period under’study indicates that although 
the Bank has tried to regulate the money supply in the interest of 
price s t a b i l i t y i t  has not acquired much control over it partly 
due to the Government's deficit financing operations, arid partly 
to the fact that it has not used the instruments of monetary policy 
efficiently. The Bank must have exercised more rigorous monetary 
control in those years when income velocity was rising so as to avoid 
undue pressure on prices. The years 1956-57, 1959-60 and 1966-67 
are * espec,ial.ly uioteworthy :i n/1 his/ context. The income ;velo,city^ ^^  
increased sharply in these years but monetary expansion also turned 
but to be; fairly high':•particularly, in the private sector* The Bank 
relied most of the time only on selective credit control measures 
and rarely used other instruments of monetary control. There was 
considerable pressure/on prices in the First Plan period but the 
Bank concentrated mainly on the regulation of bank advances to 
importers by fixing the margin requirements. In January 1959, however 
for the first time, the Bank rate was raised from 3 to 4 per cent.
On two m o r e  occasions, the Bank rate-was used as an instrument of 
monetary policy, namely In 1963 when progressive rates were , 
introduced under the quota system and in 1965 when the Bank rate was 
further raised to 5 per cent. But with.a high demand for credit in 
the economy, these changes were not successful in curtailing the 
scheduled banks1 borrowings from the State Bank which, in spite of
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increased bank rate continued to rise sharply during the period 
under study. In order to be effective, very high marginal rates A 
were required but these were undesirable for the reason that a 
change in bank rate is a barometer of general business conditions 
and any drastic rise in it would have severely hampered the private 
sector activities to the detflffinient of general economic development,
? .Changes in reserve requirements also failed to,achieve 
their objective because the scheduled banks were always able to 
supplement their reserves by borrowing from the State Bank. A more 
effective way of regulating the. scheduled banks* liquidity and 
thereby credit would have been to make necessary changes in their 
over-all liquidity1 ratio. The scheduled banks in Pakistan are ;; 
required by, law to maintain a minimum liquidity ratio of about 20 to 
25 per cent of/ theirt flme and - demand deposits. Liquidi ty is defined 
to include gold and cash in tills, balances with the State Bank of 
Pakistan and unencumbered approved securities. Approved securities 
are those which the State Bank is willing to accept as collateral 
for its advances. The/liquidity ratio Was/. used as an instrument of 
monetary: control only once in September 1967 when the required ratio 
was raised from 20 , to 25 per cent.V By regulsiting the. scheduled banks1 
liquMity ratio, the Bank could simultaneously manipulate their 
holdings of cash, reserves, Government securities and advances more 
effectively, Thus what the changes in Bank rate and reserve require­
ments could notASchieye individually can be more/effectively 
achieved by one single operation, //A i a '
./ The changes in liquidity; ratio should be combined with 
openemarket operations. Open-market operations have been rarely , 
used by the Bank for the reason, that the market for government
securities is currently v e r y  narrow. Of the total central and 
provincial Government debt in Pakistan, over 90 per cent is held 
by the banking system. The yields on Government securities are 
rather low and have not increased much over the/period under study. 
Considering the pace of inflation, the real: rate of interest on 
Government securities is too unattractive for the general public/ 
and potential buyers. However, the commercial banks purchase these 
securities in order to maintain: the required liquidity ratio. If 
a rise in the liquidity ratio is combined with the open-market sale 
of Government securities, it can prove to be more effective in 
checking the flow of bank credit to the private sector. On the 
contrary, a lowering of liquidity ratio together with the open-market 
purchase of government securities by the State Bank can substantially 
increase the commercial banks* resources for advancing credit to 
the private sector and making investment in private securities• : .:
Moreover, in order to make; the Government securities more attractive 
to the buying public, yields ond/hem; should be increased. An; 
effective way to broaden the securities market would be to set prices 
on them at which the Bank would buy and sell unlimited amounts of 
Government securities. The State Bank can then raise or lower the 
buying and selling prices in a Ytf;ay to encourage purchases or sales 
by the public. If yields become more attractive, the commercial 
banks may also choose to hold Government securities in quantities 
greater than needed to fulfil their liquidity requirements in order 
to earn the high yields. Strong control over the quantity of credit 
and money would then be available to the State Bank through changing
security;prices in addition to other tools of monetary control
■ - v~ ’* 17
especially changes in the liquidity ratio •
17. Cf. R.C.Porter, ’’Narrow Securities Markets and Monetary Policy: 
Lessons from Pakistan” , Economic Development and Cultural Change, 
October, 1965,
By using the instruments of monetary control more 
: effectively, and taking appropriate action when necessary, the 
State Bank can acquire greater control over the price situation*
If the fiscal control of the economy is also made more effective, 
smooth economic development would be possible. In the following 
chapters we shall consider some more, policy variables -influencing . 
the price situation in Pakistan and these include the agricultural 
and commercial policies. The following chapter is devoted to an 
examination of the agricultural policy in Pakistan and its implica 
tions for the price situation* • -
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 ^ chapter vi ' : V; V
AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND FOOD DEFICITS : \  ^ L
1. AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT AND POLICY:  ^ V  ^t
J The developing countries often lay too much emphasis on : ^
industrialization and in their, attempt to indust ri|lize rap i dly tend 
to forget their real resource, potentials. Agricultural development 
is often given secondary,place in economic development programmes 
and rapid development of other sectors at the expense of agriculture 
creates serious imbalances in the economy. In the face of rising 
money incomes and the emerging industrial sector, severe pressure 
is exerted on the agricultural sector for food and raw material 
supplies.. Due to the lagging agricultural sector, supplies of agri­
cultural products become inadequate and their prices rise at a fast 
rate causing, general inflationary pressures in the economy. Since " i t 
industrial development programmes occupy a presti g e ous jios.ition, 
justice cannot be done to the agricultrual sector. The neglect of  ^ -
agricultural sector in Pakistan has given rise to serious food 
shortages which have been the principal source of inflationary : -
pressures in the economy. Food being an important wage-good, its 
shortage also has had serious welfare implications. . ..
; ' The areas comprising Pakistan and more particularly West
Pakistan were considered to be the granary of undivided India. Thus, 
Pakistan.inheritedia&primar^ economy with only 10 per
cent of the aggregate manufacturing capacity of undivided India.
Little manufacturing capacity.cdupled with fairly, large supplies of 
domestic raw materials:and a wide market for consumption goods provided 
considerable private incentive for industrial development. Guided by the 
import substitution motive, the Government provided great concessions
to those who took initiative in setting up the industrial capacity*
O n ,the one hand, heavy protection was provided to domestic industry 
through high protective tariffs. On the other, liberal ‘tax con­
cessions in the form of tax holidays and: depreciation allowances 
were allowed to the emerging industries. Moreover, the foreign 
exchange earned by the agricultural sector through the export of 
primary products was liberally allocated to industries -for the 
import of capital goods and raw materials. The seriously over-­
valued exchange rate, following Pakistan1s decision not to devalue 
her currency in.September 1949, meant a great subsidy to industry 
and a net transfer of resources from the agricultural to the industrial 
sector took place, Consequently, profit margins and re-investment rates 
remained high in the„industrial sector and this sector maintained an 
average annual compound rate of growth of about 24 per cent during : 
the period 1950-55, though from a very low base. An important feature 
of industrial development was the establishment of cotton textile
-•  ^ i ' ■ t
industry which in 1954 accounted.for nearly 45 per cent of the value 
added in large-scale manufacturing and some varieties of textiles 
also began to be exported.
In sharp contrast to the rapidly expanding industrial 
production, the agricultural output tended to stagnate in this 
period while the output of food crops: actually declined as there 
was some shift towards the production of cash crops. The stagnation 
of agricultural sector was the outcome of Government*s development 
policy and deliberate turning of the terms of trade against agri­
culture and in favour of industry. From 1953 onwards, a policy of food 
control and rationing was being pursued in Pakistan under which the 
surplus areas.in major foodgrains were required to sel|, all their
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surplus products only to the Government at fixed prices which were 
much lower than what they could fetch in the open market. In 
addition, heavy export duties existed on jute, cotton and tea which 
yiefded nearly 10 to 15 per cent of all Government revenues. These 
tended to lower the rupee price of commercial crops to the farmers. 
Both .these, factors tended to depress farm incentives with respect 
to food as well as non-food crops.
It was a part of the Government1s saving strategy in the 
1950* is- to deliberately turn the terms of trade against agriculture . 
and i favour of industry for the purpose of transferring income to 
the.high-saving manufacturing sector. Moreover, import controls 
imposed in 1952 restricted the import of manufactured1 goods and raised 
their prices. The import controls together with food rationing and 
price control have been? instrumental in effecting a transfer of income 
from the agricultural to the. industrial sector. On the one hand, the 
over-valued currency, export duties on agricultural products and 
subsidization of food prices in the urban areas through imports and 
compulsory procurement from the agricultural sector kept down the prie 
received by the farmers below world prices. On the other hand, the 
prices that the agricultural sector had to pay for its imports from 
the. non-agricultural sector were much higher than the world prices 
due to restricted imports and high-cost of domestic industries. An 
estimate of this resource transfer made by K.B. Griffin puts it as
■ ■ i
high as 15 per cent of the agricultural income in 1964-65 • But 
Griffin has only measured the difference between the current price 
exports from the agricultural sector and current price imports made
1. Cf. K.B.Griffin, "Financing Development Plans in Pakistan", 
Pakistan Development Reveiw, Winter, 1965
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by this sector at domestic; prices. This does not reflect the terms 
of trade loss, which has been measured by Stephen R. Lewis'2. The :
terms, of trade indices computed by him for the two sectors of the 
economy ittlch represent the net barter terms of trade for each 
sector, that is the wholesale prices of goods that the sector sells
relative to the wholesale prices of the goods that it buys. These
are given in Table 52. The indices indicate that the net barter terms 
of trade of the manufacturing sector improved and those of the agri- /
cultural sector deteriorated from 1951-52 to about the middle of v
1960’s. The movements in East Pakistan Were much sharper than the 
movements in West Pakistan but in both cases, the movements are quite . 
distinct. : ; - V--' ' V' ; ' : ‘ \
Lewis has also computed the implicit exchange rates for 
agriculture and industry^. An implicit exchange rate is the ratio 
between the domestic wholesale price in rupees and the international 
( c.i.f or f.p.b ) price of the same item in dollars. Table 53 gives 
the implicit exchange rates for the two sectors. The averages 
represent the domestic values of $ 1.00 worth of the commodity or 
bundle of commodities sold and purchased by these sectors. This table 
points out the difference between the terms of trade that agriculture 
and manufacturing maintained domestically and the terms of trade that 
they could maintain if they had traded in international markets without 
the distortions iiitroduced by the restrictive trade policies. It is 
evident from this table that even in the mid-1960’s, the agricultural 
Sector received about Rupees 5.00 for agricultural goods worth $ 1.00 
but it. paid over Rupees 8.00 for manufactured goods worth $  1.00. Thus
2. Cf. Stephen R.Lewis, Economic Policy and Industrial GrOwth in Pakistan, 
(London, 1969), Table 12, P. 60.
3. Gf. Stephen R. Lewis and S.M.Hussain, Relative Price Changes and 
Industrialization in Pakistan, 1951-64 (P.I.D.E Monograph, Karachi, 
1967) and also Stephen R.Lewis, "Effects of Trade Policy on Domestic 
Relative Prices: Pakistan 1951-64" The American Economic. Review
.■(March 1968).' V - ' ■/' '.
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the restrictive trade policies led;to a serious distortion in the 
allocation of resources between the two main sectors of the economy.
The unfavourable terms of trade between the two sectors hindered the 
commercialization of agriculture and retarded investment in agri­
cultural improvements. It tended to reduce the agricultural incomes 
and thereby savings in the agricultural sector.
It is often thought that the farmers in under-developed 
countries are not very responsive to price changes but this was not 
true of Pakistani farmers in the 1950’s who reacted sharply to the 
lack of price incentives and did not exert themselves fully to expand 
their output. The area under principal agricultural crops which had 
substantially increased up to 1953-54 showed little increase since 
then.. In a country where yields per acre are low and can be increased 
only in' the long-run, the increase in acreage is an important way- of/ / ■ 
expanding the agricultural output but this could not be done due to 
inadequate incentives. Empirical studies about farmer response to 
price changes in Pakistan have revealed a fairly high price-elasticity 
of supply. W.P.Falcon has, computed the price-elasticity of acreage for
cotton in Vest Pakistan to be 0.4 which equals that found for the
4- • - ’ .
United States . In an earlier study of undivided Punjab region, Raj
Krishna also found high elasticities of 0,6 and 0.7 for rice and cotton
respectively and 0,2 to 0.4 for other crops except wheat and bajra for
; ■ / ' . V' : / . 5 - ; ' ' ■ '■
which the elasticities were only 0.1 •
; Out’put in the agricultural sector continued to remain
depressing in the: First Plan period partly due to unfavourable weather
4. Gf. W.P,Falcon, "Farmer Response to.Price in a Subsistence Economy: 
The Case of West Pakistan", American Economic Review, Papers and 
Proceedings, May 1964, PP. 580-591.
5. Cf. R. Krishna, "Farm Supply Response in India-Pakistan: Case Study 
of the Punjab Region"., Economic Journal; September 1965 PP. 477-487.
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TABLE 52
Domestic Inter-Sectoral Terms of Trade for East and West Pakistan
( 3 Year Moving Averages, 1951-52 to 1963-64 ).
Pakistan
Agricultural
Sector
Year
West Pakistan
Manufacturing Agricultural 
Sector Sector
East
Manufacturing
Sector
1951—54 108.62 97.39 126.86 77.09
1952-55 112.22 91.14 138.55 65.32
1953-56 116.42 87.36 144.81 62.83
1954-57 112.00 91.41 128.54 78.34
1955-58 107.77 96.03 108.67 90.11
1956-59 104.52 98.76 1.97.28 97.19
1957-60 102.60 99.43 399.65 94.93
1958-61 98.05 103.13 101.67 100.65
1959-62 95.32 106.39 105.53. 102.14
1960-63 94.75 108.28 106.21 103.01
1961-64 96.06 107i84 104.36 100.46
Notes: For the manufacturing sector1s terms of trade: The 
weights for manufacturing prices are the values added in each 
industry in 1959/60 and the weights for agricultural prices 
are estimated purchases of agricultural goods by the non- 
agricultural sector in 1959/60.
For the Agricultural sector1s terms of trade: The weights for 
agriculture prices are the gross output of each commodity in 
1959/60, and the weights for manufactured goods are estimated 
purchases of manufactures by the agricultural sector in 1959/60,
Source, Stephen R. Lewis, Economic Policy and Industrial Growth 
in Pakistan, Table 12. p. 60.
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. :, TABLE 55
Implicit Exchange Rates for Agricultural and Manufactured 
Goods, Bast and West Pakistan (three-year averages)
EAST PAKISTAN
Manufactured Goods Agricultural Goods
Gross Purchased; Marketings Purchased by
Output by Manufacturing
■ Agriculture
1951-54 6.15 : 9.07 2.87 • 3.32
1952-55 6.62 9.74 2.73 3.01
1953-56 6.88 10.17 2.86 • 2.97
1954-57 7.00 9.81, 3.70 3.77
1955-58, 7.20 9.83 4.46 : 4.57
1956-59 ; 7.14 9.46 4.85 5.01
1957-60 7.20 . 9.07 4.65 4.95
1958-61 . 7.2-1 8.56 . 4.75 5.10
1959-62 7.13 ; . 8.42 - 4.83 5.17
1960-63 6.85 , 8.29 . 4 . 8 7 5.09
1961-64 6.63 8.15 . • . 4.77 4.93
WEST PAKISTAN . > ’ v sy: ,
Manufactured Goods Agricultural Goods Official
. V ■ Exchange
* SL "fc ©  " -Gross Purchased by Market"- Purchased 
Output Agriculture ings by Manu­
facturing
1951-54 7.07 8.39 .3.81 4.13 3.31
1952-55 7.63 , '8.94 3 .si ,s ; 4.15 3.31
1953-56 7.84 9.00 • 3.76 4.06 3.78
1954-57 7.66 8*51 3.94 4.19 4.27.
1955-58 7.90 8.56 4.33 ' 4.57 4.75
1956-59 7,96 : 8.57 4.73 5.06 4.75
1957-60 7.95 8.68 4.85 5.30 4.75
1958-61 7.73 8.59 5.06 5.60 4.75
1959-62 7 .68 8.61 . 5.19 5.70 4,75
1960-63 7.53 8.41 5.40 5.79 4.75
1961-64 7.39 8.33 ; ' 5.35 5.69 4.75
Source: Stephen R. Lewis, Economic Policy and Industrial Growth
in Pakistan , Table:19, p. 91.
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conditions and partly to inadequate implementation of development 
programmes in this: sector, GoVerhmenttiS’ policy towards agriculture 
remained as it was in the pre-Pian period,namely food control and . 
high export taxes on agricultural products continued. The sectoral ; 
distribution of development expenditures ih the Plan also reflected 
Serious neglect of agricultural development. Although the Plan 
claimed to have given top priority to the development of agriculture, 
only 23 per cent of aggregate Plan outlays were assigned to irrigation 
and agricu1tune taken together while;industry and mining claimed 28 per 
cent. How this disparity between the Plan objectives and sectoral 
allocation of development funds can be reconciled remains unex- :
plained. For a country where agriculture contributes about half of 
the national income, these allocations were very disappointing. What 
is m o r e t h e r e  were^significant shortfalls; ;in actual programmes in the 
agricultural sector and only 17 per cent of the actual development .
outlays of the Plan went into agriculture: while industry and mining 
received 31;per Cenh, ConSeq;uently.r i^e growth rates in industry and 
agriculture continued to be strikingly unbalanced. Although industrial: 
development also suffered a lot in this period on account of foreign 
exchange difficulties and consequently shortage of capital goods and 
raw materials and considerable idle capacity was reported in this 
sector, industry-continued to remain by far the leading sector in the 
country. While agriculture maintained a poor rate of growth of 1.4 
per cent per annum on an average, industry maintained a Compound rate 
of g;rowth of about. 10 per cent per annum.
In the Second Plan period, however, performance of the 
agricultural sector was much .better. The average rate of growth 
maintained by this sector and shared almost equally by both parts of 
the country was about 3,5 per cent per annum as against 1.4 per cent
’ 7'7 777^7:77ff:/ 182 -."V- ■ ' . ''777V"7- ':7 7 7 7 ;'7; 7 ;777
in the previous Plan. Inspite of heavy damage caused by floods and 
; . cyelohesf in" Easi- Pakistan/and drought in West Pakistan;in some years'
of the Plan, crop production maintained an upward trend. The output g 
,f of foodgrains increased by 3*6-.million’ tons as against the Plan
: target; of 2*7 million tons . I n  the case of cash crops, however, signi­
ficant shortfalls were reported especially in case of jute, tea and
■ 77:v:kXi^777■ ' ■:-'7-7." '•-7 . 7 - ; ‘ 7 77 fcyy ' 77:7 ■;.7 \
tobacco. An oyer-all high rate of growth maintained^ the agricultural 
sector fin this Plan can! be explained in terms of such changes as 
greater use of modern inputs and expansion in water supply especially 
j through privaietube-welis.,On the basis of a quantitative analysis, 
it has been reported that private tube-wellS accounted for.about 
9 per cent of the increase in irrigation water supplies in West 
Pakistan in the Second Plan period and that almost one-fourth of the 
I fotai 27 per cent: increase' in the value of crop output in this period 
can be attributed to the increase in private tuberwells^. Government1s 
. policy towards agriculture had, by this time} taken! a more favourable 
turn* The food control and rationing/had been abolished in 1960 and 
support prices for major foodgrains were introduced instead, with a 
view to protecting the farm incentives. The Plan allocations to 
agriculture were also made more, favourable as compared with the 
previous Plan. For the first time, the share of agriculture and 
irrigation in the aggregate Plan outlays was kept close to industry 
and mining namely !24 and 26 per cent respectively. Although the public 
sector development programmes in agriculture met with significant 
shortfalls, they were more than made up by the: excess of private 
. investment over the Plan allocations.
6, Cf. W.P. Falcon and C.H.Gotsch, "Lessons in Agricultural. Development- 
Pakistan" in G.F.Papanek (Ed.), Development Policy, Theory and V; f 
Practice, (Harvard University Press, 1968), P.278.
183
However, acute sectoral imbalance continued in this 
Plan as well. With a relative improvement in the foreign exchange 
position, investment and growth in the industrial sector once again 
accelerated. Private investment in the industrial sector more than 
doubled in this period and the average annual compound rate of growth 
increased to 15 per cent. Most of the complex industries like engi­
neering and chemicals grew more rapidly in this period.
One of the important targets of the Third Plan was to 
achieve food self-sufficiency by 1970. In view of this objective, a 
target of 5 per cent annual growth rate was fixed for the agricultural 
sector. In the public sector allocations, for the first time, equal 
importance was given to agriculture and industry. In the private sector 
however, Plan allocations to agriculture were almost half of industry. 
In practice, the performance of the agricultural sector in the first 
two years of the Plan was deplorable due to unfavourable weather 
conditions both in East and West Pakistan. The output of foodgrains 
declined by about 7.6 per cent in these years from its 1964-65 level 
and the average rate of growth in the agricultural sector was only
1,4 per cent. This gave rise to a serious food shortage in the country 
which,was aggravated by reduced availabilities under the P.L. 480 
programme. The revised version of the Third Plan gave top priority 
to those programmes which had a direct bearing on food output. Never­
theless, the food shortage continued until 1967-68 in which year the 
crops were exceptionally good and the output of major foodgrains went 
up by 22 per cent. As a result of good crops in this year, the average 
rate of growth in the agricultural sector turned out to be 3 per cent 
per annum in the first three years of the Plan.
Growth in the industrial sec or also suffered seriously 
in this period due to foreign exchange' difficulties and cut-back 
in foreign aid, The Elah had laid considerable emphasis on the 
development of industrial sector and more particularly on the estab­
lishment of a heavy.'industrial complex. About 13 per cent of the. 
public sector and 42 per cent of private sector development outlays 
were assigned to this sector. But in the first two years of the Plan 
only 20.5 per cent of the proposed public sector investment and 28.2 
per cent of private sector investment could be realized. In the 
third year of the Plan, however, industrial investment recovered 
substantially and the average annual coinpund rate of growth;maintained , 
by the industrial sector in these three years turned out to be 9 per 
cent, that is three times that of agriculture.
2, The Demand for Food and Food Deficits; ; :
We have seen the progress of agriculture in Pakistan and 
the importance given to it in the process of economic development,
The'slow rate of grbwth in the agricultural sector, together with a 
high rate Cf population growth and rising per capita incomes, were 
bound to create serious food deficits and excess demand conditions in 
the market for agricultural products, studies undertaken by the F.A.O 
testify that the per capita consumption of staple grains and root 
crops tends to rise, rapidly in a developing economy , Unless the. 
agricultural sector is able to meet the rising demand for food, 
excess demand for food is most likely to appear in the process of 
economic development. Agriculture*s role of providing more food and 
raw materials to thenon-agricultural sectors can be fulfilled only 
if this sector has enough supplies of capita,! and modern inputs arid
7. Cf. United; Nations, F.A.O, The State Of Food And Agriculture, 
. 1965 p. 7i. : : "
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if adequate attempts are made to transform the production techniques
not
so as to raise yields per acre. This has/been satisfactorily done in 
Pakistan where industrialization has demanded greater attention and 
a larger portion of development resources. Consequently, the 
development process has been characterized by serious food shortages 
which have not been fully overcome even by imports so that considerable 
pressure has been exerted on food prices which has contributed to the 
general inflationary pressures in the economy.
Until about 1950, Pakistan had a comfortable food supply.
In normal years, the country had enough major foodgrains for domestic 
consumption together with a small exportable surplus of about three to 
five hundred thousand tons. In the 1950’s, however, the food output 
maintained an average rate of growth of only 1 per cent per annum 
whereas the rate of population growth was over 2 per cent per annum 
and there was some increase in per capita incomes as well. The domestic 
output, therefore fell significantly short of demand and food imports 
began to feature prominently in total imports. During 1950-55 about 
1.6 million tons of foodgrains were imported into Pakistan and as the 
P.L. 480 food imports began only from 1954, most of these imports had 
to be financed from the country’s own meagre foreign exchange resources. 
Nevertheless, the food prices maintained an upward trend indicating an 
excess demand for food in the economy. The nutritional standards also 
deteriorated in the absence of adequate food supplies. In view of the 
deteriorating food position in the country and to subsidize the cost of 
living of urban industrial workers, price and distribution controls 
on major foodgrains were imposed in 1953.
The food position worsened in the First Plan period as the 
demand for food continued to rise with an annual population growth rate 
of about 1,8 per cent and some increase in per capita income while the
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rate of growth in the agricultural sector was deplorably low.
Food imports aggregated 5 million tons in the Plan period 
(including those under the P.L. 480 programme) and these consti­
tuted about 8 per cent of; the domestic production of foodgrains.
Yet, both’the controlled and free market prices of rice in East 
Pakistan and of wheat in West Pakistan continued to rise throughout 
the Plan period•
In the Second Plan period, however, the output of foodgrains 
increased on an average by about 4 per cent per annum. But with a 
population.growth rate of 2.6 per cent per annum and a rise in per 
capita real income of about 3.5 per cent per annum, the food deficit 
continued. The; food imports aggregated' ,8; million tons; in this .period 
and only with heavy food imports it was possible to stabilize the 
prices of major foodgrains to a considerable extent and also to lift 
the price and distribution controls on foodgrains in 1960.
In the Third Plan again the country faced a serious food 
shortage both on account of poor crops and reduced availabilities 
under the. P.L. 480 programme. The output of major foodgrains declined 
significantly in the first two years of the Plan though in the third 
year, there was a substantial increase. However, with a population 
growth rate of 2.7 per cent per annum and a rise in the per capita
real income of about the same magnitude, the demand for food
increased at a fast rate. The food imports aggregated 6:million tons 
in the first three years of the Plan and a major portion of them had ' 
to be financed from the country’s own foreign exchange resources.
Still the food prices rose at a significantly fast rate indicating 
an excess demand for food in the economy.
In order to see to what extent, the per capita foodgrain
consumption in Pakistan has been influenced by the rising per capita
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real income, the income-elasticity of foodgrain consumption was 
computed and was found to be 0,59. The computations were based on 
the data given in Tables 54 and 55 and the computed result is as 
follows: * ;
Log C = - 0.33755 +0.58874 Log Y 
P P
; (0.20704)
R = 0.651 R2 = 0.424
where,
=  the per capita consumption of foodgrains in real terms.
Y = the per capita real income.
P
It must, however, be mentioned that the actual consumption 
of foodgrains ih Pakistan during the period under study does not fully
represent the demand because it was.restricted by availabilities. The
fact that food prices moved up significantly throughout the period 
under study indicates that there has been an excess demand for food in 
the economy. Nevertheless, in the absence of any other possible measure, 
the elasticity computed above can be taken as an approximation of the 
income-elasticity of the demand for foodgrains in Pakistan. By using 
the rate of population growth and the income-elasticity computed above, 
an estimate can also be made of the warranted increase in the output of 
foodgrains. Table 56 gives this estimate. Column 2 of the table shows 
the warranted growth of foo.dgrain output which equals:
= P Ttp '
where G^ is the warranted increase in food output in per cent,
P the population growth rate, t\ the income-elasticity of the demand 
for food and Y^ the rate of growth in per capita real income. The 
population elasticity of the demand for food was thus assumed to be 
unity and the income-elasticity 0.6. Table 56 indicates that in most
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of the years under study, the rise in domestic output of foodgrains ' 
was much less than warranted in view of the rising; populrifion; and 
per capita real incomes in the economy, thus creating excess demand 
conditions in the market for foodgrains. Although a large part of 
this excess demand was.met from imports (including those under the V 
P ; L . 480 programme) and releases from government foodgrain stocksf ; 
the food prices maintained a constant upward trend during the period 
under study reflecting an unsatiated demand for food in the economy#
The pressure on food prices was a major factor determining the cost ;
of living in the country and was greatly responsible for the infla- 
tionary pressures experienced in the course of economic development.
Lot us now examine the food position in both wings of : j
the country in more detail. i ; I
3. The Food Position in East. Paklstn:
T" In East Pakistan, agriculture is the major source of
income, wage goods, export earnings and industrial raw material but / 
the agricultural sector, which dominates the East Pakistan economy is 
unduly. dependent on weather conditions and co-6p;eration of nature. ,
Production of major crops in that part is very greatly determined by 
weather, conditions and there are 10 to 15 per cent variations in it 
according to whether or not the weather is favourable. The food :i;
position in East Pakistan is largely determined by the changes in crop 
. cpnriitipris^;: ’.V.; '' ." v  ■' ■ . >.-•■ >.
 ^ J In 1955-56, there was a serious shortage of rice in East
Pakistan due to unfavourable weather conditions arid poor crops. The 
net availability of rice declined from 7.6 million tpris in 1954-55 to 
6.5 million tons in 1955-56 and the average price per inaund increased :
sharply from Rupees 13 .25 to Rupees 20.94. Substantial foreign exchange^
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which was needed for financing the development imports had to be 
diverted.to p a y  for foodgrain imports. West Pakistan also became 
a food deficit area in the 1950’s and foreign exchange expenditure 
on foodgrains became the single most important drain on Pakistan1s 
balance of payments after 1956, The value of foodgrains imports in 
the three years 1956 to 1958 exceeded the value of total capital goods 
imports into the country. The availability of rice in East Pakistan 
increased significantly after 1955-56 and remained fairly large over 
the rest of the First Plan period but thejaverage price of rice per 
maund ruled over Rupees 30 and remained more or less unchanged in the 
following four years of the Plan. This is because with a rise in 
population, the demand for foodgrains in that wing increased at a 
faster rate than either local production or imports. Pressure on food 
prices was, therefore, inevitable. Table 57 gives the net availability 
of wheat and rice in East Pakistan and their prices during the First 
Plan period.
The food position in East Pakistan remained comfortable 
in 1960-61 despite food decontrol and the provincial Government 
maintained large stocks of foodgrains to meet emergencies. Total 
production of rice during 1960-61 amounted to 10.5 million tons of 
which East Pakistan produced 9.5 million tons. Import of rice during 
the calender year 1960 also aggregated over three hundred thousand 
tons valued at Rupees 275 million. Consequently despite decontrol, 
the rice prices in East Pakistan during the year 1960-61 remained 
below the level of the preceding year. This was due to better supply 
position following two successive bumper crops. The record 1959-60 
rice crop of 9.5 million tons was surpassed in 1960-61 by 11.3 per 
cent and created a new record of 10.5 million tons. The rise in rice
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production was due to favourable weather conditions, coupled withy 
use of better seed and,fertilizers. The yearly average retail price 
of coarse rice dropped to Rupees 24.5 per maund in 1960-61 compared
to Rupees 26*6 in the: previous year.
The acreage tinder rice declined in 1961-62 due to 
increased acreage under ;jute which competes for land with rice crop 
yet there was another record crop of 10.6 million tons and rice prices 
remained stable. The following year, area under rice crop.increased , 
blit production could not keep pace with the rise in acreage because :
of severe floods and attack of pests and crop diseases in East■Pakistan.
The production of rice, therefore, declined to 9.9 million tons. Import
of foodgrains into the province, however, reached a record level of
1.4 million tons and the per capita availability of food-grains reached 
a high level of 352 lbs: during the year. The'average retail price of
coarse rice ruled around Rupees 27 per maund.
The production of rice which suffered a §et-back in
1962-63 set an all time record in 1963-64 when it increased to 11.6
million tons. The new production level exceeded the Second Plan target 
of 10*2 million tons by 14,5 per cent.1 Rice pricesy therefore, ruled 
lower in East Pakistan during 1964. The provincial average prices of 
coarse varieties of rice remained within the range of Rupees 21 to 
Rupees 25 per maund during 1964 compared to the range of Rupees 22 to 
30 per maund in 1963, Imports of foodgrains into the province were also
at a high level in this year and the per capita availability of foodgrains 
including rice arid wheat reached an all time record of 374 lbs during
1963-64. , . y /  -
y y In 1964-65, the acreage of rice in East
Pakistan increased by 1.9 per cent over the previous year but 
production showed a decline of 0.9 per cent. The:decline
in productionywas due to damages caused to crops by floods and 
low yields in some districts. Imports of rice during 1964-65 were 
also substantially lower than in the previous year. Rice prices, 
therefore, moved up further in this year. The average retail price 
of coarse;rice in the province was around Rupees 25,10 per maund.
Imports of rice during 1964-65 were 0.58 lakh tons against 1,43 
lakh tons in 1963-64 and,2.36 lakh tons in 1962-63. The entire 
quantity was supplied to East Pakistan. While rice prices declined 
in 1964, in the first three months of 1965, the prices showed an 
upward trend and the provincial average rose from Rupees 22 at the 
beginning of January 1965 to Rupees 25 at the end of March 1965,
Two successive bad harvests in both wings of the country
due to climatic factors, put a serious strain on food supplies,in
the country in 1965-66 and 1966-67. The situation was aggravated by a 
decline in imports from the United States under the P.L, 480 programme. 
Import of food-grains from Pakistan1s own resources had to be increased 
and imports into East Pakistan were also raised blit due to irregular 
and slow supply of foodgrains;■in the province,, the provincial Government 
had to restrict the issue.of wheat and rice,from its stocks in order 
to maintain adequate resources for any future emergency. As a result, 
the per capita availability of foodgrains in the province declined
sharply and the average retail prices of all varijties of rice shot
up during the years 1965—66 and 1966—67. The retail price of coarse 
rice increased sharply from Rupees 25.1 per maund in 1964-65 to 
Rupees 29.1 per maund in 1965-66 and to Rupees 38.7 in 1966-67.
The food situation, which was difficult in ,1966-67 showed 
a marked improvement in 1967-68. Domestic production of foodgrains in 
both East and West Pakistan show§3 considerable increases. The
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TABLE 56 ■ ’ V
Warranted and Actual Growth of Foodgrain output
Year Warranted Growth of Actual Growth
Foodgrain Output of Foodgrain
• ■ v  Per cent Output Percent
1955-56 ; 0,8 - 7.9 8.7
1956-57 4.5 18.5 -14.0
1957-58 1.5 1 ' - 6.2 7.7
1958-59 1.7 - 2.2 3.9
1959-60 ; 3.4 - ' 13.6 -10.2
1960-61 4.2 : 7.0 - 2.8
1961-62 4.6 1.9 2.7
1962-63 2.1 - 3.7 5.8
1963-64 ' 6.0 . 12.4 ; . . ^ 6.4
1964-65 3.6 , ; 2.5 1.1
1965-66 . 3.8 'v ■ - 3.3 _ 7.1
1966-67 4.1 ; - 4.3. . / 8.4
1967-68 5.2 ./ y 22,3 -17.1
Excess of 1 over 
2 in per cent of 
Foodgrain Output
Source: Computed from Table 1 and 3.
TABLE 57
NET AVAILABILITY AND PRICE OF WHEAT AND RICE IN EAST PAKISTAN
Year Wheat, Net Price Rice, Net Price R s . Per
Availability Rs. Per Maund Availability Maund 
( OOO Tons ) .( 000 Tons )
1954-55 38 12.56 7591 13.25
1955-56 47 19.19 6465 20.94
1956-57 90 19.31 ' 8720 30.83
1957-S> 108 19.38 8188 28.58
1958-59 88- 16.38 7209 30.50
1959-60 200 17.56. 8913 32.02
Source: P.I.D.E, A Measure of Inflation in Pakistan, Tables 1 and 2, 
Appendix B.
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production of rice was almost 15 per cent higher than in 1966-67. 
Import of foodgrains into the province including wheat supplies 
under the P.L* ,480 programme increased sharply. Per capita 
availability of total foodgrains, therefore, increased to 548 lbs 
during the year as compared with 337 in the previous year. The 
average retail prices of rice which had increased sharply in the , 
previous year also came down to more normal levels.
The rise in retail prices of rice in East Pakistan over 
the period under study can be explained in terms of the per 'capita, 
availability and deteriorating food situation in the province or in 
terms of rising money supply. Studies indicate that the former has 
dominated as a factor influecning the price of rice. On the basis of 
linear regression analysis, covering the data for the period 1959-60 
to 1967-68 and taking the average retail price of coarse rice in 
rupees per maund as a dependent function of annual per capita avail­
ability of total foodgrains and estimated provincial money supply, 
Rabbani and Repetto have found that the annual retail price of coarse 
rice is related more to annual per1 capita availability rather than to 
to money supply. The estimate suggests that a reduction of one, pound 
per capita per year in total foodgrains availability would push up 
that year’s average retail price of.coarse rice by 0.23 rupee per 
maund. On the other hand, a reduction of the money supply by one 
crore rupees would restrain retail prices during the associated fiscal 
year by less than 0.06 rupee per maund• Ninety-three per cent of the 
variance in retail rice price can be explained in terms of the two
\ . O ^
independent variables .Table 58 presents the data used in this study.
8. Cf. A.K.M.G. Rabbani and R.C.Repettbfc, ’’Foodgrains Availability, , 
Money Supply and the Price Level in East Pakistan” , Pakistan 
Development Reveiw, Summer, 1968.
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TABLE 58
FOODGRAINS AVAILABILITY, MONEY SUPPLY AND/PRICE LEVEL 
-■-•"IN; -EAST-PAKISTAN
Year Average Retail 
Coarse.Rice Price 
(Rs, Per Maund)
Availability per Estimated Year
Capita (lbs per End Money Supply
head per year) (Rs. Crore)
1959-60
1960-61
1961-62
1962-63
1963-64
1964-65
1965-66
1966-67
1967-68
26.6
24.5
25.4
27.1 
23.8
25.1
29.1 
38.7 
36.0
338
367 
360 
352, 
374
368 
365 
337 
348
143 
149 
184 - 
195 
235 
260 
289 > 
311 
306
Source: A.KiM.G.Rabbani and R.C.Repetto, ’’Foodgrains Avaidlability, 
Money Supply and the Price Level in East Pakistan” , Pakistan 
Development Rev»*tw, 1968, Table 1. •
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4+ The Food Situation in West Pakistan: : ■
West Pakistan, which from times immemorial has been an 
important foodgrain producing area in India, also became a food 
deficit area in the 1950*s. There was a marked increase in the 
consumption of wheat and rice in West Pakiistan between 1955, and 
1959 while the consumption and production of coarser foodgrains 
remained almost unchanged. Taking all foodgrains together consumption 
in West Pakistan was 20 to 25 per cent higher in 1959 than in 1955 
and. was far in excess of either population increase or rise in per 
capita income. As the consumption of foodgrains exceeded domestic 
production, in the province, net imports of wheat increased subs­
tantially. The Government needed large quantities of foodgrains 
especially wheat for controlled distribution in urban areas. The 
distribution of wheat through Government depots which was managed 
through compulsory procurement, plus imports and releases from stocks 
averaged over one million tons annually during the period 1957-60 as 
against 0.7 million tons annually in the preceding three years. The 
year 1955^56, was a year of poor crops both in East and West Pakistan 
and net availability of wheat and rice in West Pakistan was considerably 
reduced and their prices started rising significantly since then. Even 
the controlled prices of wheat and rice in the province had to be 
raised due to general food shortage since 1955-56. While the food 
requirements of the province continued to rise with population growth, 
urbanization and industrial development, production failed to keep 
pace with the rising demand for foodgrains. Moreover, foodgrain 
procurement did not rise in proportion to the rise in production 
despite the fact that procurement prices were raised by the Government.
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The total quantity of wheat procured during 1957-59 was only • - 
3 per, cent higher than in 1954-56 while production over the 
period increased by 10 per cent. This indicates that either con- 
sumption of foodgrains in the rural areas was. rising so that 
marketable surpluses did not increase in proportion to the rise 
in production or that free market prices of foodgrains were 
lucrative enough to divert part of the marketable surpluses to that 
direction despite compulsory procurement scheme of the Government* 
Probably both these trends were true for the First Plan period When 
there was a general food shortage in the country. Although the net 
availability of wheat inWost Pakistan continued to rise after
1955-56, wheat prices ruled high due to rapidly rising demand for 
food in the province. Table 59 shows the net availability of wheat 
and rice in West Pakistan7and their prices in the First Plan period.
The over-all food position remained satisfactory during ,
1960-61. The yield from wheat crop harvested in April/May 1960 
amounted to 3.88 million tons of which West Pakistan produced 3.85 
million tons. This indicates a small rise over the previous year* The 
price of wheat, however, went up during the year as a consequence of 
decontrol. Import of large quantities of wheat continued under the 
aid programme as well as under direct purchase arrangements. In
1961-62, the area under Wheat crop increased by 2.2 per cent and. 
production also increased by 4.1 per cent to 3.94 million tons. Conse­
quently , the price of wheat, ruling between Rupees 14,50 and Rupees
17 per maund in February 1962 dropped in June and ranged between 
Rupees 11,50 and Rupees 14 per maund. In 1962-63 again there was a 
good crop but import requirements increased because of Government 
policy of building up stocks and to make up the food shortage in East 
Pakistan where the rice crop had a set back. The Government purchased
. 200 ‘ . .
% ^ TABLE 59 ■
NET AVAILABILITY AND PRICE OF WHEAT AND RICE IN WEST PAKISTAN 1954-60
Price Rs. Rice, Net Price Rs. per
Per Maund Availability Maund
( 000 Tons )
1954-55 3587 8.94 746 18.25
1955-56 3163 10.88 695 . . 18.94
1956-57 3806 14.50 , 828 23.88
1957-58 4194 13.06 736 28.50
1958-59 4107 14.75 770 26.25
1959-00 5629 13.25 816 31.91
Source:. P.I.D.E, A Measure of Inflation in Pakistan, Appendix A , 
Table 1 and 2.
Year Wheat, Net
Availability 
( 000 Tons )
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large quantities of wheat from different markets and therefore the 
price of wheat went up by March 1963 and ranged between Rupees and
l6 .50 per maund. The area under wheat was estimated at .12.5 million 
acres and showed a slight decrease of 0.7 per cent as compared with 
last year. The decrease in acreage was due to unfavourable weather con­
ditions and production;also correspondingly registered a decline of
0.7 per cent. The price of.wheat in different centres of West Pakistan 
showed’a rising trend during greater; part of 1964. The quotations of 
average quality: wheat were Rupees 1.50 to Rupees 2 per maund higher 
as compared with 1963.
The acreage under wheat crop increased by 1.9 per cent in 
1964-65 due to sufficient rains and adequate supply of canal water.
High price of wheat during the preceding year also contributed towards 
increased acreage* The production of wheat was estimated at 4.4 million 
tons compared to 4,1 million tons in 1963-64 and this exceeded the 
Second Plan target of 4.3 million tons. Imports of wheat during 1964-65 
(up to the end of March 1965) were 1.26 million tons against 1.51 
million tons in 1963—64 and 1.61 million tons in 1962-63. Out of the 
total imported quantity of wheat, 0.1 million tons were supplied to 
East Pakistan and 1.16 million tons to West Pakistan. In 1965-66, 
there was a marked fall in the production of wheat in West Pakistan 
resulting from unfavourable weather conditions. The wheat crop in this 
year iflas only 3.9 million tons compared to 4.4 million tons in 1964-65. 
However, the supply position of wheat remained easy as a result of 
adequate imports from abroad and liberal releases from government 
stocks. Harvests in 1966-67 were again very bad and two successive 
bad harvests created a serious food gap. This necessitated heavy 
imports of. foodgrains in 1966-67 estimated at 1.5 million tons. A 
large part of these had to be financed from the country*s own foreign
exchange resources as the P.L. 480 food imports were drastically cut. 
The shortfall in wheat production and slow arrivals of wheat imports 
created scarcity- conditiohS; wrfh ;a steep rise in prices. The price- of 
wheat during July-December 1966 ranged between Rupees 14.50 to 
Rupees 34 per maund against Rupees 12 to Rupees 19.50 per maund during 
the corresponding period of the previous year. However, with some 
rains in February and March and arrivals of more imported wheat, the 
prices began to decline. In April 1967, the prices of wheat in West ' 
Pakistan ranged between Rupees 20 and Rupees 30 per maund and the 
declining trend continued with the coming of new wheat crop in the 
markets. In the following year, the food position showed a marked 
improvement. The production of wheat was about 25 per cent higher in 7 
this year and arrivals of imports.were also fairly satisfactory. V
In-creased supply in the market lowered the prices of almost all :V 
foodstuffs. However, the total foodgrains deficit in the country for f 
1967-68 was estimated at 2.4 millicjn tons which. included 0.35 million 
tons for reserves in West Pakistan and about 0.3 million for reserves 
in East Pakistan. I:-;;.: - : ^ 1 - •
J5* East-West Food Position: A Comparison:
On the whole, West Pakistan has had better food supplies than
East Pakistan and the prices of staple foodgrains ruled, much higher in
the, East than in the West. A.C.S.O survey of household income and
expenditure in Pakistan indicates that; the per capita consumption of
all food items except rice' and, fish is higher in West Pakistan than in
the East . It is obvious that consumption is determined mainly by
availabilities. Table 60 shows the monthly per c a p i t a  consumption of
major food items in East and West Pakistan and the ratio of West to
East, The lower.consumption of m o s t  food items: in East Pakistan is
9. See C.S.O, Report on the Quarterly Survey of Current Economic 
Conditions in Pakistan, Household Income and Expenditure^
July 1963-June 1964, (Karachi, 1967).
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TABLE 60 ' -'V-,.. . -
MONTHLY PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION OF MAJOR FOOD ITEMS IN 
EAST AND WEST PAKISTAN. AND THEIR RATIO .
(Based on Consumer Survey, 19.63-64). ■
Food Items East Pakistan : West Pakistan West/East
( Seers )* ( Seers )*
Rice and Wheat 14.79 , 15.07 1.02
Rice 13.85 1.40 0.10 :
Wheat 0.94 13.67 14.54
Pulses : 0.42 0,75 1.78
Potato . ■ 0.22 0.40 ; 1,82
Sugar 0.29 1.09 3.76
.-Meat ; ? S  0.30 ;  ^ 0.48 1.60
Fish 1.01 - : 0.06 0.06
Milk. . ; V  0.96 . 3.90 4.06
Fats and Oil 0.21 0.49 ; 2.33
,*■ One Seer is equal to 2.057 pounds•
Source,: M.I .Khan, ’’Aggregative Analysis of Food Consumption in 
Pakistan", Pakistan Development Review, Winter, 1969.
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partly due to lower per capita incomes in that part as compared 
with West Pakistan and partly to lower per capita availability of 
all these, items. Due to much lower availabilities and higher, demand^ 
the prices of most food items including staple foodgrains have ruled 
higher in East Pakistan than in the West. While the average price of rice 
in East Pakistan has most of the time ruled around Rupees 30 per maund, 
the price o f Lwheat in West Pakistan has rarely exceeded Rupees 20 per 
maund. The fact that East Pakistan has experienced: more inflationary 
pressures than West Pakistan during mpst of the period under study 
can be largely explained by the high and rapidly rising prices 6f food 
items. A large population with a higher rate Of population growth 
coupled with limited food supplies and other essential commodities and 
significant transport difficulties was bound to experience more . . .
inflationary pressures than the other wing which;has a smaller popu­
lation and is relatively well off in real terms. Transport bottlenecks 
have especially come in the; way of adequate supplies of foodgrains 
in East Pakistan.. Government’s attempts; to meet food shortages in the 
Eastern wing especially in the:case of floods and other calamities have 
been greatly foiled due to inadequate transport facilities and diffi*-* 
culties in mobilizing the food resources.
CHAPTER VII
' ■'■■ COMMERCIAL POLICY AND INFLATION
. Inanunder-developed country, with limited productive 
capacity and real resources, an important way of supplementing 
the domestic supplies and of holding the price level within 
reasonable limits is to maintain a high level of imports and to 
increase the import .capacity of the economy. This may Be possible 
both by increasing the export earnings of the country and also by 
acquiring greater external resources. In. Pakistan, attempts have 
been made in the past to increase the inflow: of external resources 
and quite successfully too. But the commercial policy especially 
the exchange rate'policy pursued in the course of economi c deve- ' ■ 
lopment has not fully, served the purpose of maximizing the. export 
earnings and thereby increasing the import capacity of the country.
;On the contrary, it has tended to severely restrict import supplies 
in-a-ruthless bid at import substitution and has substantially 
raised the prices of imported commodities in domestic markets• It 
has also given rise, to inefficient and high-cost productive units 
and mal-allocation of resources in the economy. On the whole, the 
commercial policy has not only failed to improve the balance of 
payments position of the country tut has also contributed to infla­
tion. These issues are.discussed at some.length in the present chapter 
1. The Exchange Rate And Import Policies:
Pakistan1s'exchange rate■pblicy has from the very beginning ■ 
been closely linked up,with the policy of industrijlization and import 
substitution. At the time of partition, Pakistan had very little
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manufacturing capacity.The existence,of a fairly wide market and 
the availability of raw materials for consumption goods.industries 
created, an environment for industrialization. The Government was 
also keen on import substitution measures and diversification of 
a predominantly agricultural economy. The first ’Statement of 
Industrial Policy1 was announced by the Government in 1948 which 
exphasized the need for industrialization with a view to utilize 
the domestic raw materials and labour supplies. Priority was given 
to consumer goods industry for which raw materials were locally 
available and a relatively simple technology was needed. The protec­
tion given to domestic industry in under-developed countries usually 
consists of: (l) an over-valued exchange rate that keeps the prices
of imported investment goods relatively low and encourages investment 
particularly in the'’'capital-intensive industrial sector, :The over- > 
valued exchange rate is also maintained on the assumption-that the 
foreign demand for the country^ exports (which comprise mainly of 
primary products) is inelastic, (2) the over-valued,exchange rate is 
combined with a direct import control system and protective tariffs. 
Sometimes, a multiple exchange rate system is also adopted to sub­
sidize exports and .to maintain a discriminating rate for imports.
In Pakistan, all the above measures have been adopted to encourage 
industrialization and import substitution.
The first decision with respect to the exchange rate policy 
and to the incentives given to domestic industry came in September 
1949 when Pakistan decided not to devalue her rupee while Britain and 
India did. It was expected that the non-devaluation decision would have 
a favourable impact on the internal price level and that the lower 
import costs ( in terms of domestic currency ) of machinery and other
capital goods would provide a stimulus to the country’s industrial 
growth. Some improvement in the- terms of trade through.switching 
.off purchases from hard to soft currency areas was also expected•
The non-devaluation decision of Pakistan meant that while; its.par 
value remained unchanged viz-a-viz the U.S. dollar, the rupee 
appreciated in terms of the pound sterling. A major threat to the ",
viability of Pakistan1s new. exchange rate arose .from India’s refusal 
to recognize it. The trade deadlock-with India resulted in a serious 
dislpcatibn: of Pakistanis trading activity,and the,challenge was met 
by an attempt to diversify the country’s exports and imports. Later, 
the onset of the Korean boom made Paklntanrs task much easier. By :
, t February 1951J India also recognized the par value of Pakistan’s ^
rupee; and trade between the two countries revived to some extent. Due 
‘V, to the massive foreign exchange earnings during the Korean boom, the
country; entered a riewphase of import liberalization. During the period 
from mid 1950 to rate 1952, imports were very freely available Under 
the Open General License System. Difficulties, however, arose when ■
the commodity boom began to taper off in early 1952* Consequently, 
import 'controls were-introduced in August 1952 which remained the 
sole basis of licensing decisions up to 1959 when the export bonus 
scheme was introduced* ' ; r
The recession in; internatiohal commodity prices continued 
unabated and by 1955-54 Pakistan’s export earnings had fallen to 
Rupees 13,970 million (as against the.1950-51 level of Rupees ;
24,339 million). Meanwhile, reserves had slumped to Rupees 6305 
million in June 1954. It was becoming clear that Pakistan would have 
to revise its thinking on the exchange rate issue in order to ;
strengthen its balance of payments position. The-following year,
1954-55, witnessed a nominal surplus of Rupees 9.9 million in the
balance of payments but this was achieved at the. expense of a 
severe restriction of imports and the consequent slowing down in 
the tempo of development. Under the pressure of circumstances, the 
decision to devalue was announced on August 1, 1955. This measure 
restored the value of; Pakistan rupee viz-a-viz pound sterling and 
the Indian rupee to the ratio prevailing before September 1949 and 
scaled down the par value with the U.S. dollar. The devaluation 
decision was backed up by the argument that significant structural 
changes had taken place in the economy. While domestic industrial 
capacity had expanded significantly and reduced the country’s 
dependence on foreign consumer goods, there was pressing need to 
push iup exports both of raw materials and manufactured articles. The 
balance of payments consideration less vital in 1949, had become - 
paramount in. 1955. _ ' V • .
The exchange rate adjustment proved.successful and there was 
a current account surplus of Rupees 361.8 million in the balance of 
payments during- 1955-56. But the beneficial effects of devaluation 
proved to be short-lived due to the operation of two major factors. 
The emergence in early 1956 of an acute food shortage in both wings 
of the country necessitated heavy food imports during 1956-57 and
1957-58. Secondly, the deficit financing operations of the Government 
and the consequent monetary imbjlance within the country had serious 
repercussions on the balance of payments. The accentuation of domesti 
inflationary, pressures reflected in the continuous decline in foreign 
exchange reserves. These reserves had been almost halved from Rupees 
1394.6 million in June ,1956 to Rupees 715.1 million in October 1958. 
Another devaluation was in view but the newly established military 
Government was advised by some foreign experts to introduce a system
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of multiple exchange rates instead of .an open devaluation. Conse­
quently the expopti bonus schemevasvdntroduced in' Janu 1959 which 
was meant to subsidize the non-traditional exports and to allow 
imports of spec 1f1ed commodities at discriminating rates. Under this; 
scheme, exporters of permissible items are allowed to retain certain 
specified portions (ranging from 20 to 40 per cent) of their foreign 
exchange earnings which can then be either sold in the open market or 
used for the import of specified items. The eligible list of bonus 
i mp or ts orig in a11y c o mp r i s e d 219■items but was greatly expanded in the 
vcourseof time,Generally, items either of aii inessential nature or 
for which adequate production capacity is available in the country 
have been transferred "from import li^censing (where exchange is ; 
provided by the State Bank of Pakistan) to the bonus import list. For 
the latter, importers must earn bonus'vouchers or purchase them in the 
market. These vouchers are freely traded in an organised market and 
generally earn a premium ranging between 150 to 200 per cent. The r  ^
scheme was a sort of a concealed and partial devaluation which applied 
to specified commodities. Nevertheless, the scheme marked the beginning 
of an era of import liberalization for the first time since the intro­
duction of import controls .in 1952* y ' , v
Alongside the export bonus scheme, a system of automatic 
licensing was also introduced. Under this system, for a list of 
commodities laid down in the import policy, category holders could get 
automatic licenses as soon, as they had utilized their previous license.
In 1961, the Open General License was once again introduced to faci- .
litate the entry of new importers. The goods and monetary limits for 
this; license wifcre fixed: for each half-yearly, shipping period. Gradually 
an increasing number of items were placed on the Open General License
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but over 90 per cent of commercial licensing was done within the 
category eystem, In 1964, a free list was also introduced which 
is widely considered to be the most important element of import 
liberalization * A major part of free list imports were financed by 
foreign aid but the country also had to commit its own foreign 
exchange earnings to finance a part of these imports. In 1965, 
liberalization of imports was partly reversed by a tightening of 
import controls in view of the foreign exchange difficulties caused 
by the cut-back in foreign aid after the Indo-Pakistan war. The 
Open General License went into abeyance and the free list was drasti­
cally reduced. In this period, the bonus voucher system was more ;
extensively used for the import of raw materials. After the revival 
of foreign aid, suspended in the period following the hostilities, 
the foreign exchange position improved again and the, introduction of 
a cash-cum-bonus list in 1967 marked a return to the liberalization 
movement, Under this arrangement importers of specified items can 
obtain import licenses entitling them to foreign exchange at the 
official rate, provided their applications are accompanied by bonus 
vouchers of the value of 50 per cent of their exchange requirements.
A system of export performance licensing also applies to spine 145 
commodities including gje particular:jute manufactures. Under this 
scheme import licenses over and above the entitlement under normal 
licensing are issued at rates 2 1/2 to 30 per cent of the f.o.b value 
of exports. Import liberalization in the I9601 s was made possible 
by the expanded foreign aid programme which made the foreign exchange 
position relatively; .comfortable and allowed a net increase in the
1. Cf. P.S. Thomas, "Import Licensing and Import Liberalization in 
Pakistan” , P ak1stan Development Rev few, Vinter, 1966.
>« /' " ■ './V: 2 1 ^ i -  ;W:--t ■ / :. ' n ’;o:: ,■-
number of licenses issued by the Government to importers. Economic 
development . in this decade was greatly assisted by liberalized 
: imports* /^/v-^/y V - ; / : V •
r Although Pakistan rupee was devalued in August 1955, in the
fape of rising demand for: foreign exchange in the process of economic 
development and the failure of exports to rise correspondingly 
causing balance of payments difficulties and depletion of foreign 
y exchange reserves, the rupee always:remained seriously over-valued*
Some studies have been made to.approximate the extent of over­
valuation of Pakistan currency at the official exchange rate. In the 
absence of quantitative controls on imports, prices of imports and 
import competing goods would have been set by the c.i.f prices of 
imports,■ plus tariffs and other indirect taxes, plus a normal trade : . 
mark-up for the commodity concerned. Difference between this price and : 
t the actual domestic; market, price may be atiribrited to the excess 
-demand for. imports, M.L.Pal:has made comparisons of such prices 
in Pakistan in two studies covering the period c.3.ose to the end of 
trie Second Plan^;. For the first survey in Karachi in 1964, unweighted 
average percentage mark-up for the commodities surveyed was around 
60 per;cent while for the second survey in Chittagong and Karachi .
6 months later and with slightly different sample of goods, the 
average mark-up was between 40 and 45. per cent• Broadly speaking the ‘ 
domestic value of imports in Pakistan in the mid 1960’s exceeded their 
full duty paid value at the official exchange :rate by approximately;
50 per cent whereas, the normal trade mark-up is reported by Pal, on 
;the basis of trade inquiries, to :be about 12 per Cent. The^excess
2* Cf. M.L.Pai, "The Determinants of the Domestic Prices of Imports”
Pakistan Development .Review, Winter 1964 arid "Domestic Prices of 
. Imports^: in Pakistan: Extensiori of Empirical Findings”, Pakistan/: 
Development Review, Winter 1965* / :
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mark-up is an iridication of the.implicit shadow price of foreign 
exchange for imports. //I' ’■/>/,.
Using the Pal data, Aminul Islam has also estimated the 
extent of over-valuation of Pakistan1s currency at the official ; i 
exchange rate in a different way^. The magnitude of the exfess of 
demand price over supply price of foreign exchange as a percentage 
of the latter Las been;defined as the rate of over—valuation of the 
domestic currency at the official;rate of exchange. The domestic 
market price of imports; minus the normal trading profit per /unit of 
imports minus‘ the -cost of distribution per unit of imports is defined 
as the scarcity price of a unit of foreign exchange. The excess of 
scarcity price of a unit of foreign exchange over the official rate 
of exchange as a percentage to the later is the degree ;of over- ^
Valuation of . currency. The c & f value of a unit' of imports is assumed 
to be equal to the official price of a unit of foreign exchange. Normal 
trading profit has been assumed to be 20 per cent of the c & f value 
and the cost of distribution to be 10 per cent of the c & f price. On 
the tasis of these computations , the over-valuation of domestic - . ,
currency is reported by Islam to be 92 per cent in the period June- 
August 1964. This includes the import taxes paid by the importers and 
thus the basis of estimation is; .differerit from the; ena adopted^ by Palf 
This is an;estimate of the ever-vaiuation of currency in comparison 
with the price of foreign exchange required to clear; the market for 
imports in the absence of fiscal or administrative controls.
The over-va1uation of domestic .currency has been sustained 
through a system of import controls, protective tariffs and multiple
3. Cf. A.X.Aminul islam, "An Estimation of the Extent of Over-valuation 
of the.-Domestic-'Currency- in Pakistan at the Official Rate of Exchange 
1948-49 - 1964-65” , Pakistan Development Review, Spring 1970.
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exchange rates discrimiriating against imports. In addition to the 
quantitative import controls explained earlier, the overvaluation 
of rupee has also been sustained through regulatory and protective 
tariffs. An elaborate cascaded tariff structure has been evolved to 
encourage import substitution and to restrict imports. Imports of 
consumer goods;and cbnsiimer durables have been most strongly discri­
minated against with tariffs exceeding 100 per cent. Domestic produc­
tion of these goods has been greatly encouraged. Lower rates of duty 
apply to intermediate goods and the lowest to capital goods. With 
the liberalization of imports in 1959, greater importance was given 
to regulatory tariffs and their rates increased very sharply thereafter 
All tariff rates increased after 1959-60 but the rates on consumer 
goods rose much more than those ;on semi-manufactures while those on 
unprocessed raw materials “rose least; of;>all. Between 1959 and 1963 
import duties had risen by about one-third with increases ranging from 
11 per cent on certain processed raw materials to 115 per cent on 
semi-luxury consumer goods. In July 1964, a regulatory duty ranging 
from 5 to 20 per cent ad valorem was imposed on free-list imports. In 
January 1965, duties on capital machinery imports were raised in West 
Pakistan from 12,5 per cent to 25 per cent ad valorem and from 7.5 
per cent to: 20 per cent in East Pakistan. In November 1965, after 
the war with India, import duties and sales tax were raised by a 
defence surcharge of 25 per cent. By 1966, the import taxes were almost 
75 per cent higher than in 1959, Table 61 gives the average rate of 
duty on imported goods by type of commodities.
2. Impact of Trade Policies on Prices and Balance of Payments:
The trade restricting policies pursued by the Government 
of Pakistan such as import controls, protective tariffs and discri­
minating exchange rates for.exports and imports in the form; of export
''' 214 i j ; / ' V / t . - ‘' V v . . ; -■ .'-7"V -
bonus scheme have tended to restrict availabilities in the economy 1 '
and there— by to contribute directly to inflation. Whenever imports 
were liberally available, prices remained stable and the country 
was able to maintain high rates Of economic growth. The main 
reason for the.marked success of Pakistan1^ Second Plan.both with, 
respect to rates of growth and price stability has been a more ; i ;
liberal supply of imports made possible by the expanded foreign 
economic aid programmes and import liberalization efforts. On the 
contrary, the principal reason for low rates of growth and higher 
rate of inflation in the hirst and Third Plan periods has been the / 
restricted supply of imports and inadequate foreign exchange reserves«.
In fact, attempts to develop an economy without adequate supplies of 
foreign exchange are bound to be frustrated. What is more, adequate <
attempts have, hot beeh made in Pakistan to increase the country1 s , / "
; ; export earnings or to adjust the exchange fate in. a manner to create 
equilibrium in tlie foreign exchange market to the extent this was 
possible^ As we shall see below, the export bonus scheme has suffered 
from some serious defects and has not adequqtely fulfilled its purpose 
of accelerating exports, • v--v''' ‘v -'
An important objective of import controls and tariffs in * J 
Pakistan has, been to give protection to domestic industry and thereby 1 
to encourage import substitution. But the import restricting policies 
have given rise to inefficient, and high-cost:industrial units which 
have tended to raise the, domestic prices of import substitutes to a. ;
considerable extent. A temporary protection ;dnd artificial support ;-■*
may be justified to an infant industry, for some time but, with the 
lapse of time, industries should bejlable to operate without artificial . 
support. What has actually happened in Pakistan is that industries
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have become more rather than less dependent on protection and 
subsidies; Protective tariffs and export subsidies have resulted 
in a mushroom growth of industry comprising of inefficient arid 
high-cost industrial units. As we shall see, the combined effect 
of economic policies^ has been to make the establishment; of r 
inessential .import^substitutirig industries more' prof it able; than, 
export-oriented; industries. The inessential growth of industries© 
has created idle capacity which has been on the increase as their 
import requirements have increased at a faster rate than the 
country*s capacity to import; At the same time, thejestablishmerit 
of a large number of inessential consumer goods industries have 
been instrumental in liberalizing consumption and discouraging 
savings. This in turn has stood in the way of export expansion and 
strained the balance of payments position of the country,
■ An important feature of Pakistan’s exchange rate policy
is the export bonus, scheme which is in effect a multiple exchange 
rate systems providing different rates of exchange to exports apd 
imports. The scheme was meant to accelerate the country*s exports . 
by subsidizing ^ the export industries. But in practice, it has "proved 
to be more import-substitutive than "export-orienting and hns resiiited 
ip a serious mal-allocation of resources in the economy. On the whole 
it has done more harm than good to the country in the course of time. 
It has in the process led to mal-allocation of resources, under­
utilization of capacity and wasteful; use of the country*S foreign 
exchange resources. Some of the demerits of this scheme are; discussed
below. - "‘"'V'-1'i ■ •' •’>>; V - . 1 . ■
: , On the one hand, this scheme has raised the p.rice of
foreign exchange to exporters of non-traditional products but has 
not given any incentive, to traditional agricultural products
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except rice. While the scheme has tended to increase non-traditional 
exports by manipulating the implicit exchange rate for them, it has 
depressed the exports of traditional agricultural products like 
raw jute and raw cotton. In some statistical studies, the price 
elasticity of demand for Pakistan’s major agricultural exports has 
been found to be significant and high due partly to the introduction 
of synthetic substitutes and the elasticity of export supply is also 
in most cases significant and greater than unity Thus the export 
bonus scheme as currently operated has not given the same advantage 
^ P a k i s t a n ’s total exports,as an outright devaluation would have 
done.
The bonus system has also distorted the pattern of resource 
use towards a less efficient allocation and has deprived the country 
of potential foreign exchange earnings. In a study, Ghulam Mohammad 
has shown:that the; introduction of the bonus scheme for rice led to 
a shift in the relative acreage from cotton to rice even though 
foreign exchange earnings per acre of land are higher for cotton 
than for rice . In another article, Richard Mallon considered the 
relative advantage of exporting raw cotton and raw jute as compared 
with their manufactures and concluded that foreign exchange earnings 
are higher when the former are exported but that the pattern of 
exports has been biased in favour of cotton and jute textiles since 
the exports of these commodities were subject to a bonus whereas the 
export of raw cotton and raw jute received no bonus and in addition
■ ‘v' v /'■g ’ - '■ ' ■ ■ , ,
have been subject to an export tax • Lesser foreign exchange earnings
A %  Cf . Nurul Islam, ;hExp6rt 'Ihbeni.fyes And Responsiveness Of Exports 
In Pakistan: A Quantitative Analysis” , Discussion, Paper No:58, 
(Economic Growth Centre, Yale UniversityTT October, 1968*
, 5. Cf. Ghulam Mohammad, "Some Physical Arid Economic Determinants of 
Cotton Production in West Pakistan” , Pakistan Development Review, 
Winter 1963 . ;
6. Cf. Richard Mallon, "Export Policy in Pakistan", Pakistan Develop­
ment Review, Spring, 1966, ; /
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as compared with devaluation imply a lesser supply of imports in 
the economy and higher prices of import substitutes. This has had 
a direct bearing on the general price level in the economy.. ;
Moreover, the export bonus scheme has tended to encourage 
inelficienV industrial units that are absolutely incapable of; 
competing internationally. Under the scheme,> the;,exporiers receive 
a higher domestic price than the official'exchange rate for their 
earnings of foreign exchange which is; the export subsidy. The export 
subsidy equals the.rate of bonus allowed to the industry multiplied 
by the rate of bonus voucher premium. For example if the rate of
bonus is 30 per cent prrO,30 and the rate of bonus voucher premium
. V ; per>eeiit' or;f>7p "- r=. ■' ; ./’■ • r - ’ f
is 170/ the export subsidy would be 51 per; cent of the total foreign
exchange earnings of the industry concerned. The rate of bonus
;allowed to an industry is higher, the lesser is its competitiveness 
in the international market. If the exporter /cuts his .export price 
by the aMount: of;;bbnus;and i f  the foreign demand for his exports is 
elastic, he can export more and earn more foreign exchange. The
implicit rate of subsidy provided by the scheme in relation to value
added diverges widely even at the same nominal rate of bonus ent it l a ­
ment and this rate is higher the more; inefficient is an industry. Thus 
the scheme has tended to encourage the growth of a large number of 
inefficient and high-cost industrial units in the country in the 
course of time. -v" \ . y ^  : ’
; What is more important from our point of view is the fact
that the scheme, as administered in the course of time, has provided
an allocative bias in favour of import substitution by raising the 
prices of imports more than would;-li.aye.;li)een'';,t-he case in the event 
of devaluation and relatively freer imports and has thus provided
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heavy- protection to import substitutive industries.This has in turn 
contributed to th< rise in general price level as the domestic 
infant industries always have a hi.gh er cost of production than the 
established international industries in the same line. The.system of j : 
exchange control and import licensing tend to favour import substi­
tution by, restricting imports and raising the prices of import 
substitutes in -the /domest'ib-c’market' thereby increasing the; marginal ’ 
profitability of new investment in import substitution industries as 
opposed to investment in export industries. The export bonus scheme 
was intended to encourage investment in export industries by giving 
an export subsidy which is determined by the rate of oonus and the 
level of bonus voucher premium. The scheme was also expected to 
;reduce the protection’provided by the exchange control and import 
licensing systems by allowing larger imports than was possible in . 
the absence of this scheme. But in fact the scheme as operated in 
Pakistan has implied net-subsidy for -the import-competing industries 
and has thus encouraged import substitution. This is further exgtplained 
below. ■ ; ,;-\V y ,v..V
.. ■ ■ The export subsidy can be regulated either by changing the i 
.rate of bonus' br byf allowingvthe level of premium to change or both.
While the rate of bonus is directly f ixed by the Government, the .... '
level of premium is determined by the forces determining the import t 
and export trade. Now, the rate of bonus has not changed much since / ; 
1959 except in 1967 when these rates were substantially raised by .
the. Government. On the other hand,; the bonus list, was greatly 
expanded in the course of time so that the demand for bonus vouchers 
increased at a fast rate than their supply and the average rate of , 
premium continued to rise from 121 per cent in 1961 to,170, in 1967•
While a rise in the bonus rate tends to encourage export expansion 
relatively, a rise in the level of premium emphasizes import 
substitution by raising the prices of imports under the scheme. The 
implicit tariff protection provided by the scheme can be expressed 
in the following way:
" . l+v ■■  ^ ' . ' > ... -
■J V l+bv * ’ ' ’ v ■ ■' ■ - .V'’
where,- ....................... ; . • .■7'-;,; :: •
t - the implicit tariff protection,
v =? the rate of premium on bonus vouchers and
b .= the rate of bonus. . . . ■ , ;
The implicit protection: provided by -this scheme increased 
from 0.77 in 1961 to 0,88 in 1966 and declined again to 0,83 in 
1967 due to a rise in the bonus rate^. Thus the scheme so far operated 
has raised the prices of bonus imports and import, substitutes .substan­
tially and has encouraged import substitution more than export promo­
tion. Like import controls, it has encouraged investment in import 
substitution industries more than in export industries.
The export bonus scheme has also encouraged monetary indis­
cipline. The dangers of excessive monetary creation have been concealed 
by this scheme as the impact has continuously been cushioned by the 
deteriorating effective exchange rates. In the case of a fixed exchange 
rate, careful consideration is given to all the pros and cons before 
a decision is made to move from one rate to another. But in the case 
of this scheme, theeffective exchange rates have been allowed to 
deteriorate without the gravity of the action being fully realized..
7. Cf. S.N.H Naqyi, jbOn Optimizing'f Gains "f,from Pakistan1 s Export.:
Bonus Scheme**, Journal of Political Economy, January/February,,
1971. ■v  .; ■ ' • . 1 ■' .- '. ' - ' . . ’
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The scheme is in fact a de facto devaluation with respect to certain 
Commodities without the advantages of a total devaluation. . : ;
Finally, the export bonus scheme has led to great uncer­
tainty in business and investment decisions, with sharply fluctuating 
prices of bonus vouchers and frequent shifts of imports from one >
category to another;as also adjustments in bonus rates; In' such a , 
situation, industries importing capital^ equipment, raw materials and :
spare .parts are faced with difficulties in formulating stable produc­
tion plans and pursuing.a rational cost policy, y
In view of. the defects of the export bonus scheme which is 
in effect a concealed and partial devaluation and dhe to the serious 
over-valuation of rupee, there IS a consensus among economists in ; :
Pakistan that the rupee should be devalued at least by 50 per cent ,
arid this may be coupled with some relaxation iii import controls. This y 
would assist in raising the level of-both exports and imports and : 
thereby help raise the over-all growth in the economy. But the Govern­
ment; view on this point is that, the advantages of an over-valued currency 
accrue in the form of lower import bill for development imports and y
lesser burden of external debt repayment. That is why the devaluation 
proposals have always been resisted by the authorities in Pakistan.
The main argument against a total devaluation of currency is that it V :
would cause a cost inflation through increased impoit prices and 
development costs. But the point is whether devaluation causes any 
more cost inflation than any other method of improving the balance 
of payments 1ike disguised devaluation in the form of tariff increases 
and export subsidies. Devaluation is no more inflationary than other -
measures and in fact it is less because other measures lead to a less y
efficient use of resources and hence less output. Devaluation cannot
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be regarded as the cause of inflation; it is most frequently a
reaction to inflation. For countries which have experienced only
low rates of inflation, there is plenty of evidence that devaluation
8is not quickly wiped out in the form of higher prices . Although the 
real effect of devaluation and unified exchange rate would take long 
time to develop but in the long-run it would be useful to have a 
unified and realistic exchange rate aS compared with an over-valued 
and artifically maintained exchange rate. Under conditions of inflation 
particularly, the multiple exchange rate system creates additional 
difficulties. These include discouragement of basic exports through 
maintenance of penalty export rates at over-valued exchange rate, 
distortions in domestic production and investment arising from 
multiple import and export rates and local currency losses. An 
important advantage of exchange rate adjustment, that is often over­
looked, is that it would increase the inflow of foreign investments 
into the country and would thus greatly relieve the foreign exchange 
crises and set-backs to economic development experienced in the past.
8. Cf. I.M.D. Little, Tibor Scitovsky and M. Scott, Industry And 
.Trade in Some Developing Countries: A Comparative Study, 
(Oxford- University Press, London, 1970). "
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CHAPTER VI11 ^  ';'y
THE STABILIZING RQ]^: QFyFOREIGN.;AID; ; : y : V yy;>
Foreign economic aid is an important source of real 
resources for under-developed countries undergoing development.
It tends to promote savings investment and economic growth in 
them and relieves the pressure on prices and balance of;payments 
that would otherwise be felt in the course of economic development.
In theypresent chapter we discuss the impact of foreign economic ; 
aid oil Pakistan*s development with special reference to its effect 
on the price situation. For our purposes we define foreign aid to 
include grants-in-aid and loans received from foreign governments, 
loans from international financial institutionsthe U.S;./P.L. 480 
imports generating counterpart, funds and technical assistance ; 
programmes. Foreign private investment is thus excluded because 
economic aid is only that part of capital inf lows which normal; 
market invenfives do not provide and which can be acquired only 
through institutional channels including the governments of friendly 
countries. "■-/< . ' V ■.:v \-y . ;■ *: : yy y y .7-7 y .. C-'.,yb-y.,,' S-y^ yy .
1 It is now cbmmonly accepted that, foreign economic aid can
accelerate the development of an unde r-developed country by providing 
y it additional imports and by raising the level of investment in it.
y If a country tries to develop without external assistance, It willAy
have to provide adequate capital equipment and technical skill from 
its own resources and export earnings. Self-sustained economic
: development would thus require substantial increase in skills,
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domestic savings and export earnings which would be difficult for 
a newly developing country to achieve on its own. Foreign economic 
aid is supposed to relax some of the bottlenecks created in the 
process of economic development su.fch as shortage of skill and ^
technical know-how, domestic savings and foreign exchange^.The
main function of foreign economic aid is to increase the rate of 
domestic capital formation in the recipient country to a level 
where self-sustained economic growth may be possible. Economic aid ! 
is supposed to raise the absorptive capacity of the country, that 
. is its capacity to mobilize additional savings and investment^,
1. Aid And Pakistan1s Economic Development;
Starting with; a very low inflow of foreign: aid in 1955,
; : Pakistanis economic development has been increasingly financed by
V '  foreign aid of different kinds so much so that now foreign aid has v 
become.an essential input in Pakistan1s productive activities. The 
level of economic activities in Pakistan in a given year is to a ’
great extent determined by the availability of foreign aid. In early 
years, greater part of foreign aid consisted of grant assistance from 
>v'f\r.iendly • countries,-: Thelpr.p^ortxon. of grants, however , declined over 
the years and now Only technical assistance and P.L. 480 commodities 
are provided on a grant basis. Economic aid so far received by 
Pakistan from various sources can be classified into four broad 
categories: • " Cy:\ r , " -  “
(l) Project a id in th e form of goods and machinery for purposes of '
i f a .specific developmehi prejeet,:^^ ; v-  ^ :
1, Cf. H.B Chenery and A.M^ Stroiit, ’’Foreign Assistance and Economic ; 
Development", American Economic Review, September 1966 and also A.O. 
Hirschmdn,tThe^ Strategy Aof Economic: Development, (Yale University 
Press, 1958), PP. 205-207. . • ' ;'/.’V- "-'A-/';;.
:2v Cf J P;N. Rosentein-Rodan, "International Aid For Under-developed 
Countries1’ Review of Economics and Statistics, May 1961, P. 107.
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(2) Non-project aid consisting, of raw materials, fertilizers and
other equipment for existing industt'fes•. ’ ’ , •
. (3) Technical'assistance in: the form of technicians, training
facilities, equipment for training etc. and v  ;
(4) P.L. 480 imports consisting of the United States’ surplus
agricultural commodities that are sold in Pakistan and converted 
into counterpart funds. These are utilized to meet the rupee cost 
of agreed development projects,
Most of Pakistan's foreign aid has, in recent years, been 
channelled through'the Pakistari Aid Consortium organised in 1960 by 
the World Bank in collaboration withtthe leading:aid-giving countries 
of the world. The Consortium met for the first time in Washington m  
October 1960 to consider the aid requirements of Pakistan1s Second 
Plan. The f oreign exchange cost \of .revised Plan was set at $  1774 
million, in addition, the -Planning Commission foresaw an additional 
foreign exchange expenditure of $ 525 million outside the framework 
; of the Plan. Thus the total amount of aid requested was $ 2174
million of which 34 per cent was required in the form of non-project , 
v v aid. Of the requested sum, $  1819 million were pledged by the Consor­
tium countries and more than $ 1300 million were actually disbursed 
in the Plan period. Pakistanis Second Plan had several features ,
; ,, which gained the. approval of Western aid-givers, for example, the
encouragement given to private enterprise in the Plan which was 
supposed to provide about 40 per cent, of total investment expenditures 
r ofHthe Plan, the Plarifslemphasis on f M u c i n g  the disparity between 
the eastern and the western wings of the country and the impoitance 
given to agricultural^ idevelopmentin the Plan^* ‘ ,
3; C f . John White, Pledged;to Development,(Overseas Development 
Institute, London, 1967) PP• 63-65.
The size of. the: Third Plan Was much larger than that of the 
Second Plan namely; Rupees 52,000 million and the estimated volume of 
foreign aid and foreign private investment required to finance it 
stood at $ 3260 million. However, in view of the large size of the 
Plan, external resources were to constitute 32 per cent of total 
expenditure in the Plan period compared with 38 per cent in the Second 
Plan. For the first year of the Plan, Pakistan requested pledges from 
the Consortium amounting to $ 500 million. When the Consortium met in 
July 1965 to consider the Plan, it approved its strategy but due to the 
changed attitude of the UlS:.A towards Pakistan, the pledging session 
of the Consortium was indefinitely postponed. In 1966, however, the 
U.S.A decided to resume aid to Pakistan. Still the total availability 
and utilization of external assistance in the first three years of 
thC Planhad beeii cohsiderabiy lower than the Plan expectations.
The pledges made by the Consortium and non-Consortium countries 
totalled $  1474 million or about 9 per cent less than the Plan 
estimate of $ 1650; million for the three years and actual disbursements 
were even loss, namely $ 1348, million. Table 62 shows the inflow of 
foreign aid to Pakistan during the period under study and.its ratio 
to G.N.P.
On the whole, the role of foreign economic assistance in 
Pakistanis economic development has Considerably increased over the 
period under study. The share of .foreign aid in the financing of 
aggregate investment increased from. 14.9 per cent in 1954-55 to 44.1 
per cent in 1959-60. In the Second Plan period, however, due to a high 
rate of economic growth and rapid increase in domestic savings, this 
proportion declined to about 38 per cent but in absolute terms, the 
flow of foreign aid to Pakistan, was much larger during the Second 
Plan than ever before. In the Third Plan period also the foreign aid
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receipts remained high in absolute terms but their proportion in 
aggregate investment further declined to about 32 per cent because 
of larger mobilization of domestic resources through increased tax 
efforts and greater reliance on deficit financing necessitated by- 
cutbacks in foreign aid. Whereas in 1955-56, foreign aid comprised 
only 2.7 per cent of the G.N.P, its ratio to G.N.P increased to 5.9 
in 1964-65 but declined again to about 5 per cent in the Third Plan 
because of reduced supplies. In 1967, official aid disbursements 
provided about 30 per cent of the aggregate imports in Pakistan,
Owing to its own limited foreign exchange, earnings and large 
development programmes, Pakistan has heavily depended on foreign 
economic assistance from advanced industrial countries. Foreign aid 
has been playing and will continue to play a significant role in the 
economic development of the country. It has helped in building up 
economic infra-structure such as power plants, transport and commu­
nication facilities, vital industries etc and has also provided 
large quantities of foodgrains, industrial raw materials, machinery 
and spare parts. The main contribution of foreign economic aid to 
Pakistan*s development lies in the following: (a) it has tended to 
raise the level of capital formation and of domestic savings in the 
country and (b) it has provided the country with development and 
non-development imports that could not be purchased out of the 
country’s own meagre foreign exchange earnings.
The rate of capital formation in Pakistan has greatly 
depended upon the availability of foreign aid. Development pro­
grammes in industry, transport and other fields gained momentum 
whenever foreign aid was available in required quqntities. On the 
other hand considerable idle capacity was reported in the industrial 
sector whenever due to reduced foreign aid, raw materials and spare
Total Foreign Aid Received By Pakistan, 1955-68
Year ■. Value Received Percentage
: y r (Million Rupees) to G.N.P*
1955-56 610 ' }; m ‘ • y ... 2.7
1956-57 : 864 . -y 3.2
1957-58 v: ' . 854 3.0 , .yy
1958-59 / 922 : . 3.3
1959-60 1395 4.4
1960-61 -yj 1433 4.1 .
1961-62 1407 3.8
1962-63 ;:yV;.. :.y,: 2081 ‘V’ y 3 . 3 ' v-'
; 1963-64 ' 2333
1964-65 2688 ; ' ' -v:-, y5V9 ,vv -"
1965-66:’ ^\;vv;:U y y ‘-V.’y..;yy2311. V  ; . 4.6 y;
1966-67 ■/ ' 2851; 1 4.9 •
1967-68 \ y y - \  3456 \V; y’ 3.6 yy.
Source: Government of Pakistan, Planning Commission, The Second
Five Year PlanV Table , 5, pV86. Final Evaluation of Second 
Rian, S:tat-’fist’Tca-1*-;Appen<Ji Table 4.1 and Mid-Plan Review 
■ ~oF~Third Plan, Statistical Appendix, Table 5.1. ; • y
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parts were not easily available and fresh undertakings and projects 
were worst affected. Changes in foreign aid inflows have also 
affected the real national income and the ner capita income through 
changes in capital formation. Since domestic savings are dependent 
uiion the level of income, the aid inflows have influenced the level 
and the rate of domestic savings. One of the criteria for granting 
economic aid to under-developed countries by the aid-giving coun­
tries is the absorptive capacity of the recipient country, that is, 
its capacity to raise the level of domestic savings and capital 
formation corresponding to aid inflows as a step towards self- 
sustained economic growth. The aid-receiving country has to mobilize 
enough domestic resources to combine with external resources so as 
to use;the foreign aid effectively. The rates of domestic savings 
and capital formation in Pakistan have corresponded well with the 
level of aid inflows. These rates were low in the First Plan period 
when aid inflows were at a low level. Considerable idle capacity was 
also reported in that period in the existing industries as there was 
an acute shortage of foreign exchange in the country. The pressure on 
prices in this period was aggravated by inadequate imports under 
excess demand conditions. The aid inflows were greatly expanded in 
the Second Plan period and these helped in raising the rates of 
capital formation, economic growth and domestic savings. With improved 
foreign exchange position it was also possible to liberalize imports. 
Due to high rates of growth in the economy together with liberalized 
imports, the price situation improved considerably in this period.
In the Third Plan period again serious foreign exchange difficulties 
were experienced due to cut-backs in foreign aid. Both capital 
formation and domestic savings were therefore adversely affected in 
this period. Imports had to be restricted and pressure on prices
iriSjreased further.
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In the First and Second Plan periods, foreign aid financed 
nearly 36 per cent of the country*s total imports and in the Third 
Plan about 32 per cent. These included both development and non- 
development imports including food imports. Most of these imports 
would not have been available without foreign aid inflows. The 
country experienced serious food shortages in the course of economic 
development and these deficits would have been much more pronounced 
if foodgrain imports had to be financed exclusively from the country’s 
own foreign exchange earnings. In the absence of resources provided 
by foreign aid and the P.L. 480 programme, the country would have 
faced more' serious inflationary pressures than it actually did and 
development programmes would have had to be curtailed.
As far as the price situation is concerned, the contribu­
tion of foreign aid is three-fold. Firstly, by providing necessary 
inputs, raw materials and capital goods, foreign aid accelerated 
economic growth and thus increased the domestic supplies of goods 
and services at a faster rate than would otherwise.have been, 
possible. Next, it directly supplemented the domestic output with / 
different kinds of imports including those required for consumption 
purposes and thus ..helped in holding down ..the price Ixiyel level.
Foreign aid has financed almost One-third and in some good years 
even more of the country1s total imports. If these imports had not 
been available, the^pressure on prices would have been much more 
than actually experienced. Lastly, the P.L. 480 programme has been 
of special significance in supplementing the country's food supplies 
which have had a- great bearing on the price situation. From the 
point of view of price situation therefore the effect of the U.S.
P.L. 480 programme need to be studied in detail.
2, The Effect of P.L. 480 Programme,:
The U.S. P.L. 480 programme has occupied a major place in 
the economic aic] programmes in recent history. This programme cover's 
imports of; surplus U.S. agricultural- commodities provided by of 
through the U.S• Department of Agriculture under the Public Law 480 
of 1954. These shipments;are arranged under three Titles. Title 1 of 
the;Law.provides commodities for commercial sale against payment in 
rupees f rom which counterpart . funds are generated .’ Title II provides 
surplus Commodities for emergency relief in the: case of cropifailures 
or other calamities. The. sale proceeds of ,these comiriodities go i nto
a separate fund held by the Government of Pakistan. In addition,
surplus cpmmodi11e s ;are alsoppovided under Title III of the programme 
which are distributed among the needy free of charge through voluntary 
charitable ofgamzatiohs. The, ocean freight is paid by the recipient 
country in the base of Title I and by the Ail.D in other cases.
.’Locai' CUrrency or counterpart funds are generated from the 
sale;of commodities provided under various programmes. There are two 
types of local currencies genevated by the U.S. commodity aid, 
hainelyr ''y\
(1) Government of U.S. Funds and,
(2) Government of Pakistan Funds. .
Government o r U.S. Funds arise out of (a) the rupee 
equivalent of the dollar payments made in the U.S.A by the U.S 
Department of Agriculture for supplies.of surplus agricultural 
commodities under P.L, 480 Title I and (b) repayment of loans received 
from the DLF or those from counterparts. A special deposit a c c o u n t  
called the Deposit Account of the U.'S.A Commodity Aid under P.L. 480 
Title I is opened in the State Bank Of Pakistan receiying these
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credits. These, funds are spent to meet the requirements of both 
the U.S. representatives in Pakistan and the Government of Pakistan#
On the other hand, the Government of Pakistan funds are of 
two kinds: (a).counterpart funds made up of the rupee equivalents of 
dollar disbursements made for imports under, P.L. 665/138 ( Defence 
Support Programme.) together with customs duty, if any. These are 
deposited in a special account opened in the State Bank of Pakistan 
for this purpose and termed as Deposit Account of the U.S.A. Commodity . 
Aid. under P.L. 665/138. Except to the.extent of 5% of the accumulation 
in this account which are transferred to the U.S representative in 
Pakistan for their expenses in local currency, the entire, money, is 
expendable by the Government of Pakistan with the prior approval of 
the A.I.D for the economic development of Pakistan, (b) Funds 
comprising the sale proceeds of commodities received, as; a relief 
measure under P.L. 480 Title II. These funds also go into a separate 
account opened with the State Bank of Pakistan under the name of 
Deposit Account of the U.S.A Commodity Aid under P.L. 480 Title II.
Five per cent of the total accruals are placed at the disposal of ; 
the U.S. representatives in Pakistan for their local expenses. The; 
balance is utilized in consultation with A.I.D for direct relief or 
relief works, in areas hit by natural calamity like cyclones, floods > 
•etc. • ‘
The counterpart releases play an important role in the 
implementation of the country's development programmes. In 1960-61, 
for example rupee releases accounted for 36.2 per cent of the entire 
capital resources of the Government. Until 1966-67, all the sale ■ 
proceeds of P.L. 480 shipments accrued in local currencies. From the 
year 1967-68, however, a portion has to be repaid in dollars spread 
over a period of 40 years, the first instalment being due 10 years
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after the date of the last delivery of commodities in each calendar 
"year.The outstanding amount carries interest at 2 per cent during 
the first ten years and 2.5 per cent during the next thirty years. 
Under the changed terms of the P.L. 480 programme, Pakistan will 
have to acquire necessary foreign exchange to repay a part of the 
sale proceeds whenever they are due for repayment. Nevertheless, 
the programme is still an impprtant source of revenue for the 
Government . Pakistan has been the second largest recipient of the 
U.S surplus agricu 1tura! exports next to Yugoslavia and by the V  
middle of 1967 had received commodities worth about $ 1100 million. 
It is, therefore, important to investigate the effects of this 
programme on the monetary and price situation especially because 
its effects have been greatly'debated in some recipient countries.
The P.L. 480 programme influences the price level in two 
ways. Firstly, it supplements the supply o f ;consumption goods and 
raw:materials especially foodgrainsr and thus brings about a stab- 
lizing effect on the price level. In the absence of this programmej 
the pressure on prices especially food prices would have been much 
more than actually experienced. In the case of crop failures 
particularly^ the P.L. 480 supplies enlarge and thus;help the 
authorities in holding down the price level. However, the aggregate 
effect of the programme on the price level will be a combination of 
three effects namely (a) the real effect of the P.L. 480 imports 
on availabilitiesj (b) the monetary effects of the sale of P.L. 480 
commodities and the consequent^ withdrawal of purchasing power from 
the public coupled; with the effect: of counterpart spending arid 
(c) the effect of P.L. 480 imports; -onlocal agriculturalproduction. 
These are now discussed further. :  ^ ; \
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The food position in Pakistan hegan to deteriorate in the 
,1950's so that the country became a net importer of foodgrains and 
a large part of these came under the P.L. 480 programme. There was 
food control and rationing in the country and both wheat and rice 
were being distributed at controlled and subsidized prices. In face 
o f  the general food shortage in the country and the overfall 
inflationary situation, the P.L. 480 programme was a great boon as 
it provided food and other materials to the country. It tended to 
avert what could have been a very serious inflationary situation. 
Especially in the First Plan period, the programme helped a lot in 
checking a seriously inflationary trend in food prices which could 
have had undesirable effects on the general development of the 
country. Christopher Beringer points out that in the First Plan 
period, the effect and probably the aim of this programme was 
diversionary, that.is saving of the country's foreign exchange on 
the food front. The average annual imports of P.L. 480 commodities 
under Title I in this period were about Rupees 230 million. It can 
be safely assumed that in the absence of P.L. 480 programme the 
quantity of food imports on hard currency account would have been 
smaller in spite of the severe food shortage in the country. If at 
least half of this amount would have had to be spent in any case,
the foreign exchange saved through the P.L. 480 imports was about
' ■ ' 4
7 per cent of Pakistan’s average annual export earnings •
In the Second Plan period, however, the P.L. 480 imports 
increased substantially and the expanded P.L, 480 programme went
4. Cf. Christopher Beringer and Irshad Ahmad, The Use of Agricultural 
Surplus Commodities for Economic Development in Pakistan,(Pakistan 
Institute of Development Economics Monograph No: 12, Karachi,1964) 
PP. 19-20.
235
beyond the limited objective of providing diversionary resources and 
substantial additional funds were made available through it for 
enlarging the size of development Plans, The best example of this is 
provided bv the fact that nearly 50 per cent of the accruing local 
currency m  the Second Plan period was spent on the Rural Works 
Programme, especially in East Pakistan, which was not originally 
provided iii the Plan. Under this programme, the surplus rural 
population is-employed m  projects like the construction of rural 
roads, schools, medical dispensaries, canals etc. The programme is V 
spec.if 1 cal ly labour~intens.iv e and is designed to provj^e employment , 
to the seasonally unemployed or under~empIoyed rural population.
The Rural Works Programme, by impiicatioh, required greater food 
supplies in the rural areas in order, to support the increased Consum- 
. ption of the newly employed rural.population detached from the farm ^
and engaged in the village uplift projects. If food supplies had not 
been heavily supplemented by P.L. 480 imports, the rise in food 
v prices especially in rural areas and also in the rest of the economy,
would have been great. The surplus food programme has permitted a 
large increase m  employment",5 wages and /spending especially in the^ 
rural areas of East Pakistan without an undue pressure on food prices. 
The programme however need to be so managed as to protect farm : ^
incentives. The farmer needs both fair and remunerative prices as 
well as the infra-structure which the‘Rural Works Programme makes '
• ■ _ possible^, • ' '--"/v ";• ' •' •' ' ‘ , -
In the first two years of the Third Plan, the P.L. 480 
imports to Pakistan declined Substantially due to the changed , 
attitude of the United States Government on aid to Pakistan. In these
5. Cf. R.V. Gi&bert, "The Works Programme in East Pakistan” , ..
international Labour Review.(Geheya, March 1964).
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twoybarsy, the food prices increasedvsignificantly i3oth/because of 
crop failures and ieduced availabilities under the P.L, 480 
p r o g r a m m e I n  the third year of the Plan, however, normal supplies 
were resumed and this, together with good crops, brought down the 
food prices, ^  - V b ■ - -
The value of P.L. 4 8 0 -imports/to Pakistan: and;their ratio 
to the gross national product, are shown in Table 63. Chart VII shows 
the ratios of total foreign aid and P.L. 480 imports to the G.N.P. 
graphically. . :
:, In addition to the effect of the P.L. 480 programme on v I / 
availabilities. Let us also examine its monetary, effects which arise 
when the commodities received under the programme are sold and pur­
chasing power is withdrawn from the public and counterpart funds 
: are generated;.x Laferv the ^ counterpart/spending/ transfers back a part
or whole of the purchasing power withdrawn from the public. The impli­
cations of these transactions can be discussed further. Initially, 
the P.L. 480 imports mean a transfer of foodgrains and some raw-•' 
materials from the donor country to,Pakistan. When these commodities ^ !
are sold in Pakistan, purchasing power is withdrawn.from individuals :
and businesses to the credit of the Governments of United States and
Pakistan. Money supply available to the rest of the economy is, 
therefore, reduced vrhereas cash balances held by the State Bank of ;
Pakistan on behalf of the Governments concerned increase by the amount 
of these sales. To this extent, the P.L. 480 programme has deflationary 
effects in so far as the supply of consumption goods in the economy 
rises while an equivalent amount of/ currency has been withdrawn from 
circulation. But at the same time, the counterpart funds generated
from the sale of commodities also give claim to the Governments :
concerned Over the Country1s real reasources. If the counterpart funds
accumulated through the sale of commodities in Pakistan, are kept idle, 
the deflationary effect of public* s reduced cash holdings would 
continue. But if these funds are spent partly or wholly as they will.; 
be j then the net monetary effect will depend upon the manner and 
timing of spending and the propensities to consume and save of the 
recipients of countCrpart spending. The ultimate effects of counter­
part .spending/ w i 11 also /depend upon the propensity to invest and 
import of the economy. '■ -V/-\;/V t l ;
; Let us ’first- assume- that counterpart funds are spent promptly 
and by their full amounts Experience, has shown that this is hardly 
likely to be the case . Nevertheless y if this haxDpens and. if the , v 
recipients of government counterpart spending belong to the same Class 
and have more or less the same propensities to consume and save as 
the purchasers of P,L. 480 commodities, then no net inflationary, 
effects would be created. This is because^ a; prompt and full spending 
of counterpart funds would simply replace the money supply withdrawn ; 
from the public. The sale of surplus commodities in Pakistan tends to 
withdraw the money supply mainly from;the poorer sections of the * 
community who spenA a larger propprtioji of their income on food con­
sumption. The recipients of counterpart spendi ng would also be mostly 
the poorer-and newly employed people who will have more or less the 
same propensity to consume and save as those from whom the money 
supply had;been withdrawn. Thus the redistribution of money supply 
will not affect aggregate spending to any significant degree and on 
this assumption, the money supply circulating roundthe domestic 
production as:well as the propensity to consume of the community will 
remain more or less the same; Thus no|| net inflationary effect would 
be created. On the other hand, the country will have an increased
Year ,
1955-56
1956-57
1957-58
1958-59
1959-60
1960-61
1961-62
1962-63
1963-64
1964-65
1965-66
1966-67
1967-68
Source:
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TABLE 63
Aggregate P.L. 480 Imports 1955-68(Million Rupees)
Value Received Percentage to G.N.P
145 0.6
. 430 " 1.6
. ' ." 358/ ' 1.2
315 1.1 :
” 370 " ■* 1 .1
490 1.4
320 0.9
V :  ■■■ - 6 9 0 ' ' -  " 1 . 8
; ' V  - 634 ' ;; ' ' 1.5 .
; . 752  ^ V' 1.6 - - •
420 ; 0.8
437 0.7
836 1.3
Government of Pakistan. Planning Commission Second Five 
Year Plan, Chapter 4, Table 5, Final Evaluation of Second 
Plan, Statistical Appenptx Table 4.4 and Mid-Plan Review of 
Third Plan, Statistical Appendix, Table 5.4
RAT 10
to tn
tn
O')
tn
i
tn
co
tna?i
tnto
01
ai0)
0)
NJI
cn
to
CT>
COIo>
LtP
O
01
IO)
tn
O)
tni<y>01
cr>
01i01
ro
0)
i0)00
240
supply of food and raw materials and the demand for these commodities 
would be satiated vtfithout aVrise in tlieir prices. Thus the community 
as a whole should be better off without any pressure on prices. In fact 
the inilow of basic commodities into the economy would have an over- .. 
all stabilizing effect* ' \
The other possibility is that the counterpart funds are spent 
with some delay and at a time when the P.L. 480 aid goods have been 
consumed. In this case, the counterpart spending would have net 
inflationary effects unless, by the time, the countefpart spending 
takes place, availabilities, including, domestic output and imports 
increase to match the spending. Unless this happens, the counterpart 
spending would ^xert pressure on prices as it would give rise to 
claims against newgoods in the economy. Here again it is assumed that 
counterpartspending does not change the propensity to consume of ;
the community'toiany significant extent* t ^  ^ *
; So far it has been assumed that the counterpart spending 
is by the full amount of accumulations in a given year.But; this may 
not be so. If in a given year, the counterpart spending exceeds 
accumulations in that year, this will have as much inflationary 
implications as deficit financing because in this case the money 
supply injected into the economy as a result of counterpart spending 
would exceed withdrawals.from the public; in the year concerned. Even 
on the assumption of an unchanged propensity1 to consume and prompt 
spending, this will have net,inflationary effects. If counterpart 
spending is delayed and is in excess of accumulations in a given 
year, the inflationary effects will be further aggravated. On the 
contrary, if counterpart accumulations exceed spending, it tends to 
cushion the inflationary effects of Government borrowings and cash 
balance utilization for financing.development projects. More generally
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it may be said that in a seriously inflationary situation, counterpart 
spending would add to inflationary pressures but in most cases a 
selective counterpart spending would only help in breaking through 
the supply bottlenecks and in damping the general inflationary 
pressures in the economy especially on the food front^.
On the whole, the P.L. 480 imports into Pakistan and counter­
part spending have tended to.cushion the inflationary effects of 
Government’s deficit financing operations. In an already inflationary 
situation and in view of the large quqntum of deficit financing 
especially: in the Second and Third Plan periods, the large quantities 
of foodgrains made available under the surplus commodities programmes 
have obviously brought a stabilizing effect on the food sector of 
the economy. As mentioned earlier, the domestic agricultural sector 
in Pakistan failed; to meet the growing demand for food in the economy.
In a situation of rising money incomes and expanding money supply, 
serious food scarcity could prove to be highly explosive. But as the 
P.L..480 .food imports greatly supplemented the domestic food supplies, 
the rise in food prices was much less* than it would have been in 
the absence of this programme. On the other hand, in most years under 
study, accumulations in counterpart funds exceeded spending, thus 
withdrawing, larger money supply than injected into the economy and 
thereby providing a cushion to Government1 s deficit financing operations 
This is evident from Tables 29, 30 and 31 in Chapter IV. Thus, taken 
as a whole, the operation of counterpart funds and the availability 
of P.L. 480 supplies tended to dampen the otherwise inflationary 
situation in Pakistan. In the absence of this programme, the infla- . 
tionary impact of, development programmes would have been much more 
serious .than actually experienced, ^ /
Cf. A,E.Lachman, The Local Currency Proceeds of Foreign Aid,
(Development Centro of O.E.C.D, Paris, 1968)j~P,691 ~
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By stabilizing the price of an importantvwage-good, the 
P fL. 480 programme enabled the poorer sections of the community to 
raise their consumption of food thereby increasing their productive 
efficiency• It might also have helped,'them in increasing their 
savings by /.supplementing' their real income. But the point.is whether 
or not the P.L, 480 imports depressed: the production incentives in 
the agricultural sector by holding down food prices. If it did, then 
the beneficial effects of the:programme would have been partly 
washed off by the loss of domestic agricultural output. There is a 
commOn. allegation against the P.L. 480: programme that .it tends to 
depress the incentives for agricultural development in the recipient 
countries. This is on the Supposition that the P.L. 480 imports turn 
the relative prices against the cultivators and thus the incentive 
to maintain or expand agricultural production is adversely affected. 
Some authorities including the staff members of the F ,A.O apprehend 
that if P.L. 480 bxports from the United States continue and are 
expanded:, desirable and necessary agricultural development would not 
be possible in the receiving countries^. Edward Mason also writes 
about Pakistan: >
’’The availability of surplus agricultural Commodities from 
the United States has certainly not been, in Pakistan and a number 
of other less developed countries, an unmixed blessing. During the 
19,50fs, as we have seen, the terms of trade moved sharply against 
agriculture, and partly for this reason, the output of foodgrains 
increased less -rapidly than the growth of population. P.L. 480 
shipments had something to do with reducing farm incentives and, to
7. Cf. T.W. Schultz, ’'Value of U.S .Farm Surpluses to Underdeveloped 
Countries” , Journal of Farm Economics, Vol. 42, i960; Reprinted 
in J . Bhagwati and R*S> Eckaus, Foreign Aid, Penguin Books, 1970.
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some unquantiftable degree, must share the blame for the relative 
stagnation of agricultural output. On the other hand, if no c 
; surpluses had been-available, the result would probably have been, 
in the Pakistan of the 1950's, a chaotic food price situation in 
which attempts at rigid controls would,have been accompanied by 
black mark price fluctuations and great price differentials ;
between markets" V  -' ‘ " ' v 7 '=.7' •'
The depressing effect of the P.L, 480 orogramme on local 7
incentives for agricultural development is also reported by another 
v .writer: ,7-j . 7'.". ■' ' ' ;7 7-...y;' 7;v-7 \7‘
"During the First Plan period in Pakistah (1955-60) it ’wass- 
1 : argued, both inside and outside the Planning Commission, that ?
considering the availability of P.L. 480, it would be a waste of 
scarce material and human resources to give a higher priority to 7" 7' 
agriculture’.’—* ; ' ';--7-7 - ■ '7"'" -7:.\-. '.77 ’.."■= 7 . • i-
' Now it is obvious that the P.L, 480 food imports tended
to lower the foodgrain:prices than utfiat they would haye be.en in the 
absence of this programme. It has also been mentioned earlier in 
this study that the price elasticity of agricultural products in ; 7;
ji; Pakistan is greater than zero. Thus private incentives to agricultural 7 
development might have been adversely affected• It may also be that 
the Government of Pakistah relied too much on availabilities under ;
this programme for supplementing domestic output and, therefore, ; 
concentrated more on industrial development than on agricultural :
development. But two things are worth noting in this context. First, 
the ./depressing effect on domestifcv agriculture and reduced agricultural
> 8. Edward S . Mason, Economic Development in India and Pakistan, 7; : 7
7: ; (Harvard University Centre for International Afftirs, 1966) P. 52.
; 7 7 : 9. Hal Mcttriek, Food Aid and Britain, (Overseas Development :
Institute, London, 1939) P. 70. 7 r
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output would have partly neutralized the effect of P.L. 480 
programme on the food prices. Moreover, in view of the infla­
tionary effects of deficit financing and development programmes, 
there was a pressing need for a countervailirig^fdree of additional 
imported supplies to keep the foodgrain prices at a reasonable level. 
The main contribution of imported surpluses is the provision of 
foodgrains at reasonable prices in the face of an otherwise highly 
inflationary situation. During the Second Plan period, approximately 
15 per cent of Vest Pakistan wheat was supplied under P.L. 480 
Title I. These imports permitted a stabilization of wheat prices in 
the Rupee 14 to 18 per maund range. Thus the industrial workers in 
urban areas were provided with a key wage-good at reasonable and 
stable prices. Price stability along with import liberalization were 
two important factors in permitting West Pakistan industry to grow 
at about 15 per cent per annum in the Second Plan period. On the 
other hand, in East Pakistan, the P.L, 480 commodities were used 
primarily in support of the Rural Works Programme which was designed
to reduce the severe seasonal unemployment and underemployment in
10the rural areas of East Pakistan.
By stabilizing the foodgrain prices, the P.L. 480 programme 
also enabled the Pakistani farmers to pay more attention to the 
production of cash crops. As the P.L. 480 imports introduced an 
element of stability,in the foodgrain market of Pakistan, the farmers 
found an impetus to move into the production of higher valued cash 
crops by which they could hope to increase their incomes.
Moreover, by supplementing other types of aid to Pakistan, 
the P.L. 480 programme provided additional funds for purposes of
10. Cf. W.P Falcon and Carl II. Gotsch, "Lessons iniAgricultural 
Development — Pakistan" in G.F. Papanek (Ed.), Development 
Policy Theory and Practice, Op. Cit. PP. 3 0 5 - 3 0 7 ,
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economic development. It also relieved the critical foreign 
exchange bottlenecks and gave support to the country^s balance ; 
of payments position by providing foodgrains and other goods like 
oilseeds, dried milk and eggs, raw cotton etc. which in the absence 
of this programme would have had to be imported from the country* s 
own foreign exchange resources* The diversion of scarce foreign 
exchange resources to the import of these goods would have reduced 
the import of capital goods arid would have hampered real economic 
growth in the country. If these imports were not available, deficit 
financing and development programmes would have been much more 
inflationary than they actually proved to be, ,
CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSION AMD POLICY IMPLICATIONS
1• Summary of Findings:
This study indicates that Pakistan has experienced fairly 
significant inflationary pressures in the course of her economic 
development,; Although the official price and cost of living indices 
are gross underestimates, studies made by the Pakistan Institute 
of Development Economics and general observation of facts indicate 
that inflationary .pressures have been fairly strong. East Pakistan 
has particularly experienced more inflati onary pressures; than West 
Pakistan because Of inadequate supplies of food and frequent natural 
•:caiamit'i'esV,}.Ofrten, the paceyof inflation has beenrepressed by direct 
economic Coritrcls\including food control and rationing and import:: 
controls. If inflation had not been officially repressed and income 
velocity had been allowed a free play, price increases would have 
been much more pronounced than actually recorded by most official 
indices* Moreover, internal inflationary pressures were greatly 
diverted towards the balance of payments pressure and depletion of 
foreign exchange reserves despite the fact that^current,account : 
deficits were greatly relieved by heavy capital inflows. Internal 
inflationary pressures were thus greatly cushioned by the external 
sector. When pressure on balance of payments and foreign exchange ;
reserves is also taken into account, the over-all inflationary 
pressures in Pakistan become quite significant*
• A large part: of: inflationary pressures have also been i - 
absorbed by relative :'wagb; Vi*igi'flitlpjs • expected.. in a labour surplus
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economy with relatively less/organised labour-, money wages in 
Pakistan increased to some extent in the process, of inflation and 
: economic development but most of the time, they lagged behind the 
rising cost of living so that real wages were adversely affected.; : 
The real wages in East Pakistan were almost 25- per cent less than 
those in We^t Pakistah becauseV of the jiig;her rate of inflation, 
more unemployment and less organised labour in that part of the 
country. Due to this wage^lag in both parts of the country, sinfla­
ti onary pressures could not fully spread themselves and labour had 
to bear the brunt of inflation. In most modern economies, wages 
either serve as the initiator of inflationary pressures or at least 
play an. active role in their transmission. This is true not only 
of devcloped countries but also of. the Latin American countries 
where industrialization has gone far ahead of the less developed 
1 countries of Asia, In Pakistany/onrthcbbntpary^.wagem have tended 
to absorb a part of the inflationary pressures created in the 
process of economic development. On the other hand, high rates of 
profits in the industrial sector, especially in the early years of 
industrialization wheri competition was 1ess, distorted the distri­
bution of income in the urban industrial sector. There is a growing 
discontent:in the country about increasing concentration of income 
and wealth and economic power in the hands of a re1atively few. 
Urban income differentials are so wide that in Karachi top 5 per 
cent have incomes 27 times higher than the bottom 5 per cent. There 
!'‘'lias’;yadso:?been;;Subs,tantia-l': red istributi on of income ..f rom the rural 
:to the urban sector as incomes in the agricultural sector have been 
greatly depressed by deliberate turning of the terms of trade in 
favour of industry and against agriculture through the development'
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policy. Domestic resources have been mobilized in Pakistan by 
restraining the growth of living standards of the poorest members : 
of the society namely the rural masses. • yo
Inflation in Pakist.an/, howeVer, not given much support to
economic growth. The available evidence suggests that profits in
Pakistaii; have not so much been determined? by the rising prices as ; ;
by the degree of competition. High rates of profit have often been 
associated with low rates of inflation and vice v c r s h  Similarly 
savings and investment havebeen largely determined by the availability , 
of imports of capital goods and raw materials rather than by the 
rising prices. When'adequate investment opportunities were not avail­
able , savings tended to be diverted towards redundant consumption 
, or,hoardings.;' t;;- y ‘ !ry;c ££.- • - ~;-£ . " '
£y^. Monetary expansion was quite significant in Pakistan most y ; 
;of the time under study. Government’s deficit financing operations 
and the rising demaiid for bank credit in the private; sector were 
the main factors responsible for it. Iiiternal credit expansion was, I 
however, greatly cushioned by the external sector which recorded 
significant defircitsf^in;.most, years under"; study. On. the absorption 
side, the demand for money in Pakistan has been mainly of a transac- 
tions and precautionary nature and has thus been a stable function 
;'vyy y. of the level of real income. But the marginal changes in money-
income r at i o can be explained in terms of the following factors: y :y y' 
(a) whenever direct economic controls including import restrictions 
were relaxed, spending opportunities increased and income velocity y„ 
rose leading to a decline in the money-incbme ratio. Relaxations 
in import controls however increased the supplies of imports and 
 ^ supplemented domestic output. A part of the inflationary implications
of a rise; in income velocity were thus absorbed by the rise in 
import supplies. Opposite happened when economic controls were 
tightened, (b) the money-income ratio has declined sharply after 
every pealt and income velocity then rose significantly. This is 
because, the public in Pakistan seem to have adjusted their real 
cash balances to the desired 'level with5 some£lag possibly of a 
year. Whenever monetary expansion was high and money balances 
accumulated with the public in excess of what they wished to hold, 
these were spent rapidly in the following year, thus resulting in 
a sharp rise in income velocity, (c) income velocity increased when 
crops were bad because the urban consumers ttied to maintain their 
food consumption by increasing their expenditure on food while the 
rural producers ‘maintained' their consumption by reducing marketable 
surpluses* ’£';£/y-‘_- ”■ - ■' -1 £■;: ■
The fiscal and monetary; man/tgeiftent in Pakistan suffers from 
serious deficiencies arid needs considerable improvements. The tax. 
receipts in Pakistan have increased at a fairly fast rate since 
the Second Plan period when attempts were made to mobilize larger 
domestic resources for financing economic development through the 
public sector and the income-elasticity of tax revenues has well 
exceeded unity, nevertheless tax potentialities in certain directions 
have hot been fully tapped* In order to reduce the reliance on deficit 
financing, tax potentialities must be fully utilized and some sugges­
tions have been made by us in this connection. On the other hand, 
non-development expenditures must be reduced as far as possible* 
However, since in a country like Pakistan, taxation cannot; be pushed 
very far without a serious loss of private incentives, deficit 
financing is likely to continue as a source of public sector financing 
but attempts must be.made to curtail it as far as possible.
v v/' -Vt . .-’V''.
As far as monetary management is concerned, the State Bank 
,vf ; of Pakistan has failed to acquire efficient control over monetary 
expansion partly1 because it lias largely been determined by the 
Government's deficit- financing operations over which; the Bank did 
not have much control and partly because it has not made full use 
of all the instruments of monetary controlavailable to it. Inade­
quate monetary control was partly due to the fact that the Bank 
mostly relied qn selective credit control measureis. Of the other 
instruments used by it, changes in Bank rate and Reserve require­
ments proved to be very ineffective. Scheduled;"banks1 borrowings 
from the State Bank continued to rise in spite of a rise in Bank 
rate on three occasions as they were not high enough to control '
borrowings in the face of rapidly rising demand for credit in the
v ecqnomytThe Bank could prqbabf yycpjytrtrl '/monetary- expansion; more 
successfully if it had used the overfall liquidity ratio of scheduled
banks together with open-market operations as the principal instru­
ments of monetary control. By regulating the scheduled banks' 
liquidity ration, the State Bank could simultaneously manipulate 
their reserves and holdings of Goyernment securities and thus 
monetary control would have been easier. It was also the responsi­
bility of the Bank to develop the market for Government securities 
so as to make open-market operations more effective. By setting 
prices on Government securities and regulating their yields, the ;
Bank could make open-market operations more effective.
However, it appears that factors like food shortages and 
foreign exchange difficulties, have been more important;sources of 
inflationaryVpresssures;than any thing e l s e .  T h e  agricultural sector 
, in Pakistan has maintained a very low rate of growth while noh«
. .agricultural sectors have grown at a fast rate. Considerable pressure
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: was therefore exerted on food, prices in .the course of economic 
development and this appears to be the principal source of 
inflationary pressures in the economy. The lagging agricultural 
output was to a large extent the outcome of Government's agricul-* 
tural policy ^ather thah o f ; any inhep.ent Inelasticities exhibited 
by this sector. Throughout the 1950’s., agricultural prices were 
greatly depreissed by the Government’s food control policy and; 
compulsory procurement of foodgrains at controlled prices together 
with high taxes on agricultural exports. Farm incentives were, 
therefore, greatly depressed and the price-elasticity of crop acreage 
being substantially higher than zero, this tended to depress agri­
cultural output. On the other hand, industrial development was 
encouraged through liberal tax concessions and generous allocation 
to industry of scarce foreign exchange earned by- agriculture* Import 
controls, high tariffs and Government’s agricultural policy all 
resulted in adverse terms of trade for agriculture viz-a-viz industry. 
The outcome was a^ l stagnant agriculture and a rapidly expanding 
industrial sector. The agricultural policy was somewhat •.modif 1 ed in 
the 10()0! s ; food control and rationing were abolished and export ; 
taxes on agricultural products were greatly reduced or abolished.
These steps tended to encourage farm incentives and the agricultural 
sector then maintax ned a rate of growth almost double that of the : 
1950! s. Nevertheless, in the face of rising per capita real incomes 
and a high rate of population growth, the excess demand for food 
continued in spite of heavy food imports both under the P .1.. 480 
programme and from the country1s own foreign exchange resources.
Fbod,prices, therefore, increased significantly, contributing to 
the general inflationary pressures in the economy.
In addition to food shortages, chronic foreign exchange 
difficulties have also been greatly responsible for generating 
inflationary pressures in Pakistan*s economy. In an under-developed 
economy, imports arc an important source of supplementing the 
domestic output. These are needed both for development and non- 
deve 1 opinent purposes. Foreign exchange- shortages’ conipel. these 
"countries to use import controls of various kinds. Instead of 
hitting at the basic problem of foreign exchange shortage and of 
using the appropriate exchange rate and commercial policies, so as 
to increase the foreign exchange supplies to the maximum, trade 
restricting policies and exchange rate manipulations have been used 
as a device of meeting the si'tuat ion. The exchange rate and trade 
policies used in Pakistan have done more harm tlian good to.the 
foreign exchange position and import supplies. A highly over-valued 
official exchange rate with import licensing and multipie exchange 
rate systems have not only restricted imports and raised their 
prices but have also limited the possibilities of earning more 
foreign exchange. Official exchange rate has been adjusted only once 
in the history of Pakistan despife inflation and balance of payments 
difficulties, with the consequence that the exchange rate has always 
remained seriously over-valued. This has necessitated strict import 
controls and protective tariffs. Import restrictions and tariff 
protection raised the prices of imports and import substitutes by 
encouraging inefficient and high-cost i nd us t r i a1 units in the 
country. In order to accelerate exports and to liberalize imports 
to some extent, a multiple exchange rate system was introduced in 
195?? which gave an export subsidy to certain categories of exporters 
and provided foreign exchange to specified categories of importers 
at discriminating rates. The scheme tended to discriminate against
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Pakistan1::sr'1b;rhdit'ipnal exports but; bn; the whole- it failed to 
increase total foreign exchange earnings substantially* On the 
other hand, it raised the prices of imports allowed under: the 
scheme enormously. In its net effects the scheme has proved to be : 
more import: substitutive than export accelerating. In her long-run 
interests, Pakistan must adopt a unified and realistic exchange 
; rate but in fact an open devaluation has always been resisted for ■; ,
political reasons* '’V v -  . \
: ; An important conclusionofour study Is^  ^vthat economic 'V..v
development efforts in an under-developed, country without a sound 
agricultural base and adequate foreign exchange supplies are bound 
to lead to pressure on prices and balance of payments. Sound agri­
culturaldevelopment^Halid . adequate provision of f oreign exchange 
are essential pre-requisites of stable economic development. Foreign 
capital infloWs and commodity aid have, however,savecl Pakistan from 
what could be considered a potentially serious i nf 1 a t, i o n a r y situ at i on. 
On the one hand, foreign economic aid has provided the country with 
necessary imports^required for. developmetnt w^ hicli would otherwise have 
not been available and thus it greatly reduced the potential pressure 
on prices and balance of payments. Moreover, the P.L. 480 food imports 
have specifically provided a cushion for the inflationary implications 
of economic development.programmes on food prices. The programme has 
provided the country an important wage-rgodd as well as additional 
funds for development in thejfoim of counterpart funds. The economic! 
aid programmos have, on the whole, been greatly beneficial to stable 
ecOnomic growth in/the Country. . :
2. The Policy Implications: "Ti•:
- I / This study suggests that economic development in an under­
developed country like Pakistan must be backed by sound economic
H>''' ' v -V ■' :H ■ v;Hr v  , 254 v : - ■ . ; : :??v : ' • ■
policies directed to ensure stable and efficient economic growth.
These include adequate agricultural development alongside industrial 
development, attempts to acquirevadequate foreign;exchange resources 
both by pursuing rational exchange rate and trade policies and by 
seeking to acquire larger foreign capital inflows* lesser reliance 
on inflationary methods of financing the public sector development 
programmes, increased tax efforts and improvements in the tax . 
structure and lastly more efficient monetary control by the monetary 
authorities. These issues are elaborated further below.
There hasvbeehsso; much emphasis on industrialization in 
Pakistan that the resource potentials of the country have been 
grossly neglected. Agriculture which can provide substantial market­
able surpluses to feed the non-agricultural population together with 
necessary raw materials for the growing industry and also some 
exportable surpluses has been unduly neglected. Government’s agri­
cultural policy including food control and high export taxes in the 
19501s as also the sectoral allocation of development funds in 
different Plans have grossly discriminated against agriculture. Food 
shortages which are not so much due to inherent rigidities in the H 
agricultural sector as to lack of proper incentives and investment 
in agricultural sector have Caused serious pressue on prices.
Food shortages have persisted despite heavy imports both under 
the P.L. 480 programme as well as on the country’s own account.
A trend rate of growth of about 3 per cent per. annum in the agricultural 
sector since the Second Plan period is not enough for a country where 
population is increasing at an average rate of ,/'£y#7 per cent per annum 
and money incomes are also rising. Food being an important wage-good:
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Especially deserves greater attention in the development programmes 
of the country., This can be done both by increasing public sector - 
investment in the agricultural sector in future Plans and also 
by providing adequdte incentives for private; investment in agri­
culture in the form of effective land reforms, price stabilization 
measures etc• The food supplies in East Pakistan particularly need 
to be improved as this is a densely popuLated area with limited food 
resources, frequent natural ca1ami t i es and transport bottlenecks.
The fact that adequate foreign exchange resources are 
extremely important for stable and rapid economic development in an 
under-developed country cannot be over-emphasized. This is because, 
in most of these countries, the domestic output needs to be supple­
mented by substantiaL imports. In thV absence of these imports not 
only production would be adversely affected but also consumption 
would have to be further lowered. Foreign exchange supplies can be 
increased both by accelerating export s' and a1so by seeking to iherease 
foreign capital inflows. As far as the country’s own foreign-exchange 
earnings are concerned, among other things, the exchange rate policy 
has a lot to do with it. The Pakistan rupee has;always remained / 
seriously over-valued and this must have depressed the country’s 
exports. Some recent studies on the price-elasticity of Pakistan’s 
Exports/indicate rfchat the elasticity; demand for major agricultural 
exports is high and statistically significantEandfhe elasticity 
of export supply is also m  most cases significant .and greater than 
unity. ;A realistic exchange i ate would presumably have increased 
the country’s export earnings by pushing up both traditional and 
non-traditional exports. The multiple exchange rate system, in the 
form of export bonus Scheme has done more harm than good to the 
country by discriminating against traditional exports and by raising
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the prices of imports, thus creating an over-all import substitutive 
effect rather than an export accelerating effect. In our view, a 
unified and realistic exchange rate with some relaxation in import 
controls would more effectively serve the purpose of maintaining 
price stability and of improving the balance of payments position.
The country’s own foreign exchange earnings may be supplemented by 
foreign capital inflows as in the past and the P.L. 480 food 
imports may continue to supplement domestic agricultural output in 
order to meet the foodrequirements /Df-f developing economy.
On the other hand,/the existing reliance on deficit financing 
in the Government sector should be reduced as far as possible by 
cutting down non-development expenditure and also by raising additional 
tax revenues by.re-orienting the. tax structure. This is because deficit 
financing has played a significant role in generating the inflationary 
pressures next to food deficits. It is often suggested by economists 
that safe limits of deficit financing should be determined in the 
interest of price stability. However, in our view safe limits of 
deficit financing do not mean much in the context of Pakistan condi­
tions because the size of deficit financing has been determined by 
political.circumstances and foreign capital inflows. Nevertheless 
attempts can be made to manipulate its size by regulaating the. 
factors responsible for it as far as.possible.
The responsibility of the State Bank of Pakistan in regulating 
monetary expansion is also considerably enhanced in view of the 
deficit financing operations of the Government and their impact on 
money supply. The Bank will have to demonstrate greater efficiency 
in monetary management particularly in those years when the Government 
is compelled to take resort to heavy deficit financing. Monetary
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/expansion on private.account should;be more effectively controlled 
in these years by using the instruments of monetary policy more 
efficiently. : H: : ; / '■'■■H- . ’ : -V . i-. •' •
may be hoped that policy measures of the kind suggested 
abbve would ensure:more stable and efficient economic development 
in Pakistan in the future.
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TABLE S .A«1.
•H .
Public Sector Developraent Outlays In First Plan 
(1955-56 Prices, Million Rupees)•
Sector Plan Allocations Actual Expenditure
Agriculture 1505 570
Water and Power 2697 1350
Industry, Fuels and Minerals 1622 780
Transport and Communications 1666 1170
Housing and Settlement 861 640
Education.and Training 580 440
Health . 288 160
Social Welfare and Manpower 133 30
Total 9352 5120
Expected Shortfall 1852 —
Net 7500
Source: Government of Pakistan, Planning Commission, The First Five 
Year Plan, 1955-60. (December 1957 p.15 Table l) and M. Haq, 
Strategy of Economic Planning, (Table 0-1 Appendix C.)
260
TABLE S.A.2
P r iva t e\S e.c t o r 0 U11 ays in the: First PI an 
(1955-56 Prices, Million Rupees);
Sector Plan Estimates -Actual Expenditure
Industry tand Mining - 1750
Transport and Communications 450
Housing and Settlement 800
Miscellaneous .300
Total 3300
1650
170
890
2710
Source: M . Haqy Ibidt, (Table 31, Chapter 5), and 
(Table.C^2.Appendix C.)
TABLE S.A. 5
Second Plan Development Expenditures in Government Financed Sector
(Current Prices, Million Rupees)
Sector Plan Allocation Actual Expenditure
Agriculture 2515
Manufacturing and Mining 1910 
Water and Power 4140
Transport and
Communications 2725
Physical Planning
and Housing 1885
Education and
Training : ' ■ 955
Health 370
Social Welfare and
Manpower 120
Total 14620
1856 
1627 
; 4341
3072
1666
. 913 
400
, 75. 
13950
Source: Government of Pakistan, Planning Commission, 
Final Evaluation of Second Five Year Plan, 
(Chapter 3 Table IV).
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TABLE S»A. 4 v
Private Sector Development Expenditure in Second Plan 
(Current Prices, Million Rupees)
Sector Plan Estimates Actual Expenditure
Agriculture r 1155
Industries and Commerce 3660
Fuels arid Minerals: 550
Transport and Communications 1325 
Housing 1525
Education 100
Health and Social Welfare 65
Total V s. 8380
Source: Government of Pakistan, Planning Commission Final Evaluation 
of Second Plan (Chapter 5 Table 1•)
3400
5300
550
1600
2510
150
80
13590
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TABLE S. A. 5 . / ■'
Public Sector Development; Expenditure in Third Plan
; (Current Prices, Million Rupees) t
Sector Plan Allocations Actual Expenditure
t 1965-70 7  ^ 1965-68
/ (Revised) :7..v>; :v ■
Agriculture: 4115 ' : 1341
Water and Power .8047 3808
Industry, Fuels and 
Minerals v 4105 1423
Transport and 
Communications t 6711 . /..■■■; ■ V'' : 2894
Physical Planning 
and Housing . . 2477 t■ 1049
Education and ‘!: 
Training i 2374 ■CV.-' ~ 682
Health '■ 1175 ' V V  /' ' 486
Social Welfare ' 90 : ■ : . S' - 29
Manpower 86, ; ■■■;:; '• ■.• '-'SS 21
Rural Works 
Programme 1820 t Y  530
Total 31000 12263
Expected; Shortfall 1000
Net. Estimate . 30000 . — M
Source: Government of Pakistan,; Planning Commission Third Five Year 
Plan (Revised, Marach 1.967) , and Mid-plan Review of Third 
Plan, (Chapter 3 Table 11) •
TABLE S.A. 6
Third Plan Development Expenditure in Private Sector 
(Current Prices, Million Rupees)• :
Sector Plan Estimates Actual Expenditure
\ " 1965-70 1965-68
Agriculture 4370 1297.
Industry and Mining 9330 6795
Transport and ;
Communications 3900 916
Housing , .4000 2329
Miscellaneous 400 913
To tal: ';'.vY Yt 'Y..\ --'V: ’22000 " S “-'-Y Y ’■ -12250 ; I ,■ Y
Source: Government of Pakistan, Planning Commission, Third Five
Year Plan, (Chapter VII), and Mid-Plan Review (Chapter 4, 
Table 11.) Y
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TABLE S.A, 7 A*
Balance of Payments, 1956-57 to 1965-64 (Million Rupees)
Item 1956-57 1957-58 1958-59 1959-60
A, Goods and : 
aS e rv ices
B. Transfer . 
Payments
Current 
■A, Account 
f  . ; (Af B) : A
C •Private; 
Capital 
Movements
D. Official 
Grants and 
Loans
E. Short-term
’ Liabilities
- 962.1
-  13*0
- 975.1
35.9
729.7
0,5
Fi Reserve/Monetary
Movements 228.8
G. Suspense
Accounts — 18,8
Capital Account + 975.1
-1517.2
- 12.9
*1530.1
22.5
1224,2
3.8
289.3
•62:1,5 -806.4
:-.t 0.2 - 6.0
-621.7 -812.4
1.4
765.0
2.5
7.2
969.6
1.7
-118.0 -204.5
2.0 - 30.2 - 39.6
+15 30.1 +. 621. 7 +812.4
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TABLE S .A. 7 (Continued)
I tern 1969-61 1961-62 1962-63 1963-64
A . Goods and 
Services 1354.1 -933.4 1586,1 1872.0
B, Transfer 
Payments 5.4 1.6 4.0 80.6
Currents
Account t ...
(A+B) -1359.5 -931.8 -1582.1 -1791.4
C. Private 'v ■' \ ■
Capital
Movements 18.8 1.8 - 3.1 . - 16.0
D . Of ficial v ■ ' ' t ' : Y t  ’ <, ■ ..
Grants and ■'’■■■■■ ; Y ;-W. ...tY' Y -Y-Y\.:: \Y .
Loans ’ / 1363.9 922.2 : 1904.9 ^ 1855.0
^Short-teim Y Y Y Y Y t Y  Y Y - v  YY-. Y .' Y ; :';YY; YY
Liabilities Y;YY' : t4 i0; YYY.Y' 6.4 < j.; 9* 9 5’*O'
F. Reserve/
Monetary Y  ’■ - Y r-
Movements 16*3 102.7 — 314.0 121.2
G.. Suspense . Y - . . f  ' ■ t  ■'
. Accounts ' 5 6 . 5  - 91.4 — 15.5 - 173.7
Capital Account Y +1359.5 +931.8 , +1582.1 +1791.4
Source: State Bank of Pakistan•
TABLE S.A. 8
Balance of Payments 1964-65 to 1967-68 (Million Rupees)
item;; ;/ , t : -1/Yl964-65 / 1965-66 1966-67 1967-68
.‘A;-- Goods and ; .• Z/Y Y y  Y  , , /'/Y •; ; ■ " ■ Y ‘ \ ■ “*■ /,Y. ’■
Services —3012•1 —2305•2 , —3049*4 . ;i -3010•3
B. Transf er -lY- Y Y.V*‘ .. Y,Y ■ ' Y  : ; Y 1- Y‘Y-':
Payments 1429*5 1058.1 1006.1 1400.6
Current -1582^6 ’ -1247.1 -2043.3 -1609.7
Account Y; --Y.;:'Y.\v-Y ,\v'-
(A+B) ; - v,:. Y  ■'
C .  CApital Y  Y ;  Y Y :  Y / . v ' ^  '• Y Y -  Y Y V Y Y ' Y  ; / V  • Y Y ' " " '
Transactions 1519.0 v . 1319.5 1670.4
I);. Monetary ‘ ; YY; Y-Y Y .  '
. Moveihents I YY'Y.” 288.3 - 87.9 -425.7
Y /- (a) Gold,Dollar > YYr'-Y'Y: ; YYY/""' - . Y' .Yp-YY.Y- 
’’ Y 'YZ:' and/Sterling/ ;; ; ;  YYY Y / Y ‘Y- Y Y / Y  Y Y
Reserves 283.6 - 311.6 " 470.1
(b) Others 0.05 223*7 44.4
E. Balancing v Y - ; 1 Y  /•.Y Y Y Y / Y Y Y t Z Y " : Y / Y  Y-';-r \
Items - 224,7 15.5 - 52.8 - 88.4
Capital Account +1582.6 . , +1247.1 +2043/YY Y  + ^ ^ * ^
1576.8
121.3
-Y;Y1.1Y
192.4
Source: State Bank of Pakistan.
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